ON PHILOSOPHY IN S. A. ARTSYBYSHEV’S TEXTBOOK

The review by N. T. Fedorov and A. A. Kvasov sets out important, though by no means exhaustive, critical remarks on the philosophical content of S. A. Artsybyshev’s textbook Physics.

The following lines are intended to point out the inaccuracy, carelessness, and sometimes lack of thought in a number of formulations in the “Introduction” and in certain other passages of the textbook, and to help the author free himself from them.

The author repeatedly discusses the question of the definition of matter; in doing so, he twice (see p. 5, and also p. 228) quotes from V. I. Lenin’s book Materialism and Empirio-Criticism: “Matter is that which, acting upon our sense organs, produces sensation; matter is objective reality given to us in sensation”*). In his commentaries the author impoverishes Lenin’s definition of matter. In fact, in giving the definition of matter, V. I. Lenin emphasizes that outside us there exists an external, objective source of our sensations, an objective reality corresponding to our sensations. He writes this even before giving the definition cited above**). V. I. Lenin develops the same thought in other places as well, where he touches upon the question of defining matter.

S. A. Artsybyshev’s comments on the above Leninist definition of matter are clearly unsatisfactory. He does not emphasize V. I. Lenin’s main idea indicated above, but writes: “By matter we call everything that can be perceived by our senses directly or with the aid of special instruments” (p. 5). That is all. In the commentary on the same quotation from V. I. Lenin, on p. 228, the author writes: “The electron, whatever instruments we may observe it with, acts upon our sense organs, and therefore it is material...” In both commentaries, as we see, the central thought of V. I. Lenin has disappeared: that matter is the objective source of our sensations, objective reality corresponding to our sensations, that, while being reflected in our sensations, it exists independently of them. What is expressed in S. A. Artsybyshev’s commentaries (“by matter we call everything that can be perceived by our senses”) is close in meaning to Mill’s definition of matter (“matter is the permanent possibility of sensations”), with which P. Yushkevich agreed (see on this point: V. I. Lenin, Works, vol. 14, p. 132).

One must think that such commentaries are the result simply of a carelessness of thought, of a negligent attitude toward important formulations of questions of principle; one wants to think so, for the author has two other places (pp. 178 and 241) in which the concept of matter is interpreted correctly. But carelessness in interpreting the most important philosophical definitions must not be allowed, especially in textbooks, for the harm from it is enormous.

*) V. I. Lenin, Works, vol. 14, p. 133.
**) It should be noted that in this case V. I. Lenin only refers to a definition, as to one given earlier (see Works, vol. 14, p. 117), and therefore breaks off the thought with the words “etc.” Behind these “etc.” in V. I. Lenin an important thought is implied. In the preceding definition of matter that Lenin has in mind, this thought is expressed as follows: “...which [objective reality. — S. S.] is given to man in his sensations, which is copied, photographed, reflected by our sensations, while existing independently of them” (italics mine. — S. S.). For some reason the author has thrown out from the quotation Lenin’s indication of the breaking off of the thought (“etc.”).

The definition of matter in S. A. Artsybushev’s textbook was unfortunate in still another respect: he connects materiality with a definite physical property—mass. Thus, on p. 241 he writes: “The electromagnetic field possesses mass, really exists, and therefore is material...” True, in this phrase it is also said that the field “really exists” (the correct thing to say would be: exists objectively), but the fact of possessing mass is brought to the fore; in any case, for Artsybushev this is a necessary mark of materiality.

There is no need to say that neither V. I. Lenin nor any of the founders of dialectical materialism ever connected materiality with the presence of mass. Quite the contrary: V. I. Lenin emphasized the independence of the definition of matter from the presence of mass (Works, vol. 14, p. 247). True, in physics we do not know forms of matter that would not have mass, but this can in no way serve as grounds for revising the extremely broad definition of matter given by Marxist philosophy.

Is the linking of materiality with the presence of mass not an accidental slip? No, it is not. From another place in the textbook we learn that, alongside the philosophical definition of matter, there also exists “the physical definition of matter,” which for the author plays a role no less than the aforementioned philosophical definition of matter. Let us read this passage: “Fields have a real, objective existence outside our consciousness; consequently, from the standpoint of dialectical materialism they must have a material nature. (Here we see that the author is capable of expressing correct thoughts about the definition of matter; only the word ‘must’ weakens the assertion; one ought simply to say: consequently, fields are material. S. S.) Is there not here a contradiction with the physical definition of matter, according to which all matter must possess mass? Of course, there is no contradiction. The point is that every energy corresponds to a definite mass” (p. 178. Italics mine. S. S.). This is followed by a reference to Einstein, who, according to Artsybushev, established the relation \(E = mc^2\).

Thus, according to Artsybushev, the philosophical definition of matter proves insufficient; one must also see whether the assertion of the materiality of the field also contradicts the physical definition of matter! In other words, the definition of matter as objective reality is placed on the same level as the “physical definition of matter” (“according to which all matter must possess mass”). At the same time it follows from the text that the author regards the field primarily as energy. That is why he fears a contradiction with the philosophical definition of matter (energy is not matter!). He “rescues” the author’s position by referring to the relation \(E = mc^2\). If not for this relation (discovered by Einstein!), things would be bad: there would remain a contradiction between the philosophical definition of matter and the “physical definition of matter”!

All these absurdities result from the fact that, on this question, the author follows a fairly widespread opinion, according to which, alongside the philosophical concept of matter, there also exists a physical concept of matter, which physics develops and whose definition of matter must satisfy the philosophical concept as well. The incorrectness of this position was already subjected to criticism on the pages of Uspekhi fizicheskikh nauk, to which we shall refer.* Let us add

* S. G. Suvorov, “On the So-Called Physical Concept of Matter,” UFN, XLIV, 4, p. 485.

only that the given example very vividly illustrates the incorrectness of the criticized position.

In the review by N. T. Fedorov and A. A. Kvasov, the unsatisfactory character of the presentation of the subject of physics, begun in the textbook by S. A. Artsybyshev, as well as the unsatisfactory analysis of the connection between physics and philosophy, has already been noted. But not everything has been said there. S. A. Artsybyshev depicts the connection between physics and philosophy on two planes. The first plane is, so to speak, personified. “The connection of physics with philosophy can be traced, beginning with the ancient world, when the philosopher, as a rule, combined in his own person both ‘physics...’” (p. 5). In the same spirit the author writes about the “epoch of the Renaissance,” in which, although the separation between these sciences had begun, “nevertheless the connection between physics and philosophy was never broken. Many outstanding philosophers... were at the same time major mathematicians and physicists” (p. 6). It is clear that this plane of consideration of the question takes only its external side and does not reveal the true connection between physics and philosophy.

The second plane of consideration of the question is a reference to “examples of the struggle that arose in philosophy in connection with discoveries in physics. Such a struggle in philosophy is, naturally, present.” However, it is only a reflection of the true, deeper connection between philosophy and physics. This connection consists in the fact that every concrete science, taken as a whole, is nothing other than the practical application of a definite theory of knowledge of the material world. From this flow many profound consequences for the concrete sciences, in the present case for physics. In particular, it entails the necessity of critically examining the treatment of physical facts and theories, the construction of the physics course from the standpoint of the only scientific theory of knowledge—Marxist-Leninist.

In S. A. Artsybyshev’s textbook this question is not even posed. It should be welcomed that in many cases the author uses statements by the founders of Marxism on particular fundamental questions; as a rule, this is not found in other textbooks. But one must go further. One must develop and substantiate the ideas of the founders of Marxism by analyzing the subsequent development of physics and, at the very least, point out the tasks facing Soviet Marxist physicists in the field of the reconstruction of science.

We do not think that the task itself of reconstructing the course is within the power of a single teacher, however capable, and still less do we think that it should begin with a physics course for medical students, for whom physics is to a considerable extent an auxiliary subject. Here there is the danger that amateurish actions may lead to “breaking firewood,” which will only bring confusion into the minds of students. What is needed beforehand is the development of these questions in articles, monographs, and creative discussions. How complex this question is is shown by the results of the discussion held in 1951 in Leningrad at a meeting of physics teachers on the question of the Marxist-Leninist education of students in reading the course of general physics in higher educational institutions. But one thing is certain: since the textbook poses the problem of the connection between physics and philosophy (and this is good!), it is necessary to point to this task. Otherwise, the illumination of the very problem of the connection between physics and philosophy is impoverished.

It is necessary to show that materialist philosophy is connected with the concrete sciences, in particular with physics, in a two-sided manner. On the one hand, materialism, as F. Engels indicated, changes its form with every new discovery even in the field of natural science (including physics). And on the other hand, this connection is such that the philosophy of dialectical materialism is the guiding method for the development

of physics, an instrument of scientific research (A. Zhdanov). Of the first aspect of the connection (the significance of concrete science—physics—for the development of the form of materialism) S. A. Artsybushev does not even mention; and yet an analysis and substantiation of this aspect of the connection are absolutely necessary when discussing the question of the connection between physics and philosophy. Of the second aspect of this connection (dialectical materialism as an instrument of scientific research) something has been said, but on another plane, in another paragraph, which shows that the authors did not understand that this question is not some other question, but precisely the fundamental question of “the connection of physics with philosophy.” In this other paragraph it is said that “in studying physical phenomena we must be guided by the basic principles of the Marxist dialectical method” (p. 7). This, of course, is correct. But even here it is not shown why dialectical-materialist philosophy is capable of being an instrument of scientific research.

Thus, the entire problem of the connection between philosophy and physics is treated by the author superficially, although a special paragraph is devoted to it.

In the “Introduction” there are many erroneous, imprecise formulations. Let us note some of them by way of example.

The author writes: “All philosophical schools, whose number is very great, are divided into two groups—the materialist and the idealist” (p. 6). As is clear, the philosophy of dialectical materialism also falls into the number of one of the “schools” (into the “group” of materialist “schools”). Such a formulation is extremely careless; in its light the history of the struggle of the two philosophical camps (as F. Engels precisely characterized it) is blurred, and it gives no idea of the historical place of dialectical materialism in this struggle.

Of the moving contradictions S. A. Artsybushev writes that “they are antagonistic and are in a continuous struggle with one another” (p. 8). However, it is well known that not all contradictions are antagonistic.

Asserting that 70–80 years ago some physicists imagined the atom “in the form of an elastic ball, something like a billiard ball,” S. A. Artsybushev concludes: “Such a naive conception of the atom in many respects satisfied physicists; it allowed, for example, the creation of the kinetic theory of gases” (p. 10).

If one believes this assertion of the author, one may arrive either at the absurd conclusion that naive conceptions are the basis of progress, or at another no less absurd conclusion: that now, when physicists’ conceptions of the atom are no longer so “naive,” the kinetic theory of gases has lost its significance.

The author’s reasoning about law is quite unsatisfactory. He writes: “It must, however, be remembered that all measurements inevitably contain some errors, caused both by a certain imperfection of our senses and by the inaccuracy of instruments. Therefore laws established experimentally can in no way be accepted as absolutely exact” (p. 9). To go further is nowhere to go: the establishment of exact laws of nature proves impossible; this is prevented by the imperfection of our senses and the inaccuracy of instruments. Sensing the slippery nature of such an assertion, he makes the reservation in a footnote that “this circumstance by no means prevents a correct perception of the world around us, since all possible ‘deceptions’ of the senses are carefully studied and can be precisely taken into account.” But no reservations, even if there were another ten of them, can help the author, for he has yielded to agnosticism in the main point: whatever one may say, the exact meaning of what has been said is that although “this circumstance” does not prevent correct per-

...adequately reflecting the world around us, but the imperfection of our senses (and the inaccuracy of instruments) does not allow us to establish absolutely exact laws.

S. A. Artsybyshev does not understand that only an agnostic can speak of the imperfection of our senses in the gnoseological plane, for in fact all of man’s practical activity has shown that our senses give absolutely exact, indisputable knowledge of the laws of nature (see, for example, V. I. Lenin, Works, vol. 14, p. 98). Likewise the author does not understand that errors of measurement by no means prevent us from establishing absolutely exact laws of nature (and even from determining the magnitude of measurement errors), for although the establishment of a law is connected with measurement, it is still more than measurement: it is the establishment of the necessary connection of the various aspects of a phenomenon. And this connection can be established even in the presence of inevitable measurement errors. Foreign operationalist physicists speculate on “the inaccuracy of measurements.” The duty of Soviet scholars is to expose these anti-scientific speculations.

Following the quotation given above about the inexactness of knowing laws, S. A. Artsybyshev writes: “First of all they (laws. S. S.) require broad verification in practice, i.e. in application to various concrete questions both in the field of science and in technology. But even if such verification is passed successfully, one still cannot draw a conclusion about the universal applicability of the law. One can only assert that it is valid within those limits in which it has been verified” (p. 9).

If from the preceding text it followed that the question all along was whether we are able to reflect the regularity of nature exactly, then from this text one can conclude that the question is probably whether it is necessary to establish the limits within which a law is valid. This would be the correct way to pose the question. But then all the preceding arguments by S. A. Artsybyshev that we cannot establish exact laws of nature are irrelevant in this case. Here the author has in an annoying way confused two completely different problems. This is, first. And second, if we agree with S. A. Artsybyshev, then it turns out that the establishment of a law is some kind of infinite, bad process, for we can only assert that a law is valid only within those limits in which it has been verified. We, therefore, know the area of application of a law empirically and never know the very boundary beyond which the law is no longer valid. But if this is so, then it means that we do not know the law in its necessity, and consequently we do not know the law itself either.

Contradictory formulations are found in S. A. Artsybyshev on the question of assessing the validity of Newton’s laws, and on the relation between old and new physical theories.

One should welcome the attempt to give philosophical meaning to the questions of the development of physics, to show in a textbook its connection with questions of philosophy. However, this must be done more solidly, so as not to direct students’ thought in a false direction. The author must be conscious of the responsibility of such an attempt and take all measures to make it successful.

The publishing house, too, must not stand aside from this responsibility. It is not clear why Medgiz did not organize a proper review of the textbook before it appeared.

With this review we would like to draw the attention of the author and the publishing house to the need for a more careful formulation of the fundamental propositions of the textbook.

S. S.