THE PROBLEM OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENDS AND MEANS AND ITS WORLDVIEW SIGNIFICANCE

V. I. BAKSHTANOVSKY, V. N. SAGATOVSKY

A clear awareness of the goals of society and of the goals of an individual’s life serves as the core of a worldview. Knowledge and erudition in themselves, not bound together by definite attitudes, not subordinated to a goal, are still only raw material for a worldview. But in order for goals to be transformed into adequate actions, goal-congruent means are needed.

The problem of the relationship between ends and means has always been relevant in ethics, in ideological struggle, and in practical activity. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote that one of the most difficult questions that confronted him in his youth was the question of the relationship in which ends and means stand to one another: whether there exists an inseparable connection between them, and whether the use of improper means leads to the distortion or even the destruction of the intended end¹.

In our literature there have been no special works devoted to this topic, but in recent years a certain amount of attention has been given to it in monographic studies on ethics².

For a correct solution of the problem of the relationship between ends and means in ethics, there are good prerequisites in the contemporary understanding of purposiveness as a universal category. In contemporary science, above all thanks to the development of cybernetics, there has taken shape such an understanding of objective purposiveness, which has nothing in common with teleology. The end as a category characterizing only the conscious activity of man appears, under this approach, as a specific case and the highest form of a certain universal property of reality (compare the relation of consciousness to informational reflection). Let us first consider the relationship between ends and means at the level of the universal, and then interpret the results obtained in relation to ethics.

In the broadest sense, by an end one may understand that state toward which the leading tendency of development of a given system is objectively directed. Those actions that bring the system closer to the end are, in relation to that end, means. Let us emphasize that to speak of means without reference to a definite end is meaningless. Hegel already noted that “the means is that which represents nothing in itself, exists only for the sake of another and in this other

has its own determinateness and its own value”³). Actions that contribute to the attainment of a goal will be expedient. Thus, in relation to their goal, means are by definition expedient, but they may prove inexpedient in relation to another goal, i.e., not be means with respect to it. The main difficulty, as will be shown further, consists in being able to determine the means corresponding to a goal.

In living nature, expediency has a clearly expressed informational character⁴). According to contemporary conceptions, any reflex activity includes an acceptor of action—an apparatus that analyzes information coming from the effectors performing definite actions and that ensures control of these actions in accordance with the needs of the living system⁵). Here the goal appears no longer as the state itself toward which the system objectively strives, but as an anticipatory reflection⁶) of this future state, as an informational process directing the system toward this state. For example, in a dog whose feeding has repeatedly been combined with the lighting of a bulb, the latter expediently causes salivation.

In man, the goal for the first time acquires a conscious character. This means that a person can give himself and others an account, in the signs of the second signaling system, of what he is striving for, i.e., can externalize his goals, place them before his consciousness, and make them an object of awareness and analysis. The presence of consciousness makes free choice possible and permits us to speak of moral responsibility. Thereby the question of the relationship between goal and means is transferred into the sphere of ethics. Means will be expedient if they contribute to the attainment of the goal. Means will be morally expedient (or simply moral) if they contribute to the attainment of a good goal, of the good. In this sense one may say that a goal justifies the means corresponding to it.

But does a goal justify any means, even immoral ones? For this is precisely how the question has always been posed in ethics. From what has been set forth above it should be clear that such a formulation of the question is incorrect, metaphysical; it fails to take into account the requirements of the principle of the concreteness of truth. For a given goal there cannot be any means whatever. However, since the question has really been posed and continues to be posed, we shall have to examine and criticize those metaphysical answers that are given to a metaphysically posed question.

Three main answers may be distinguished: 1) the goal justifies any means (the Jesuits); 2) no goal justifies immoral means (most vividly expressed in the theory of nonresistance to evil by violence); 3) the goal sometimes justifies the means and sometimes does not (eclecticism).

Representatives of the first two points of view tear goal and means apart from one another, exaggerate the significance of one or the other, and pose the question in the form of a metaphysical alternative: which is more important—the goal or the means? “Since the goal is permissible, the means are also permissible”⁷), say the Jesuits. Here is an example of the opposite point of view: “It is wrong to think,” wrote R. Rolland, “that the goal justifies the means.

³) Hegel. Philosophy of Right. Works, vol. VII, p. 166.
⁴) We have no opportunity here to discuss the debatable question of whether information is a universal property of matter or occurs only in living nature and machines created by people, although we incline toward the first solution.
⁵) See: P. K. Anokhin. “Physiology and Cybernetics.” Voprosy filosofii, 1957, No. 4; idem, Preface to Koss’s book Cybernetics. Moscow, 1956.
⁶) See: P. K. Anokhin. “Anticipatory Reflection of Reality.” Voprosy filosofii, 1962, No. 7.
⁷) Quoted from: Yu. V. Samarin. The Jesuits. Moscow, 1868, p. 231.

For true progress the means is even more important than the end”³. In both cases it is forgotten that an end is achieved only by definite means, and that means are such only for a definite end. The Jesuits suppose that no means are capable of changing the end. The adherents of the theory of nonresistance to evil by violence, on the contrary, believe that means always remain unchanged—good or evil—and that an evil means in itself (violence) can allegedly never serve a good end.

Often both points of view are countered simply by citing facts that contradict them. It is not hard to show that if cruelty, treachery, lawlessness, etc., are used even from “good motives” (a person, let us say, sincerely believes that all this is the best means for combating the enemy), they nevertheless easily corrupt a person and alter the ends, even if these were pure at first. It is clear, for example, that the end of building communism on Earth as rapidly as possible does not justify such a means as the deliberate unleashing of a thermonuclear war in which imperialism would perish, and along with it half of humanity. Such a means would change the very end, for communism is built for people and is the embodiment of humanism. This is an inappropriate means. On the other hand, for example, violence or deception, when used as necessary means, may have absolutely no effect on the morality of the end. The expropriation of the expropriators, or a doctor’s concealing the truth from a gravely ill patient about his condition (under certain circumstances), are moral acts. Proceeding from such facts, an eclectic conclusion is sometimes drawn: in some cases the end justifies the means, and in others it does not. But this is no way out of the situation. Eclecticism leads to blind empiricism in simple cases and to subjective arbitrariness in complex ones. What is needed is an objective criterion of the correspondence between means and end.

This criterion, in our view, may be formulated as follows: an end justifies those means which are necessary and sufficient for attaining the given end, while at the same time do not change it for the worse and do not contradict higher ends.

The latter requirements need serious explanation. The point is that the invariability of an end attained with the help of one means or another often turns out to be an appearance. A simple example: a person has preserved his life at the price of betrayal. Life is the greatest value, and preserving it is a worthy end. But is the life of a traitor human life? Betrayal can preserve only the existence of a biological individual, but not the life of a social human being who enjoys the trust and respect of society. In relation to the latter end, the means has proved inappropriate, immoral. We struggle for longevity and for health, but these ends are not the highest for a person. In relation to other ends—social ends—they, in turn, function as means. Therefore means directed toward preserving life and health are moral only if they do not contradict the interests of society.

Failure to understand that ends constitute a definite hierarchy again leads to metaphysical conclusions. One cannot, for example, unconditionally agree with the following proposition: “Socialism cannot subordinate a person’s personal happiness to certain ‘higher ends,’ because the highest end of socialism is the personal happiness of the human being.” This proposition is true only in the case where personal inte-

resources and goals coincide with public ones. To proclaim as the goal of socialism the satisfaction of personal interests that are opposed to public ones would be simply senseless. If an immediate goal impedes the attainment of a higher goal, then it must be rejected as an inexpedient means. Otherwise we would arrive at E. Bernstein’s conclusion: “If he pursues only immediate goals, then it is a matter of quite secondary importance whether he sets himself a definite ultimate goal.”⁹

However, the higher “ultimate” goal is not an absolute crown in the system of goals, as in teleology. The “hierarchy” of goals is rather a cyclical system, in which the main goal performs the role of a regulating principle and at the same time serves as a means for fulfilling subordinate goals. The latter can be achieved in all their fullness only if the higher goal has already been achieved and can act as a means. Thus, if the core of personal happiness for a person is a creative attitude toward life, then its attainment promotes the satisfaction of public interests, the building of a genuinely human society, which, in turn, ensures the triumph of precisely such an attitude toward life, when the personal and the public organically coincide. In Hegel’s words, the means, in order to be expedient, must be permeated by the nature of the goal; it must itself appear as its fulfillment and realization.¹⁰ But since every means is, in another respect, a goal, the entire system of means and goals must be bound together by the unity of the goal, which, as is known, was a fundamental trait of Marx’s character. Awareness of such a system of goals is a most important task in the elaboration of a scientific worldview, which, in particular, can serve as a key to solving various moral problems.

Various errors in practical conduct are very often connected with a metaphysical tearing of goal and means out of a single system. In the Yugoslav film Murder in the Square, the protagonist, Dr. Bernardi, feels himself responsible for the lives of 300 hostages who have been taken for the murder he committed of a German general. He decides to present himself to the Germans, relying on their promise in that case to release the hostages. More precisely, he realizes that the fascists cannot be trusted, that they need him only as a subject from whom information about the partisans can be extracted. And yet the powerful moral feeling of anxiety for the fate of the hostages, in which he has become involved involuntarily, drives him to an obviously inexpedient act. He is guided by the feeling: “To sacrifice oneself for the salvation of many is good; if you have not done this, you will not forgive yourself for what has happened.” But in this situation this means would have yielded only a needless sacrifice. Therefore, this means is noble not in itself, but only in the majority of goal-situations (just as truthfulness is most often good and falsehood bad, but again not absolutely, not in general, but under definite conditions).

Dr. Bernardi runs to the German commandant, but on the way he is overtaken by a partisan’s bullet. Why? Obviously, so that under torture he would not betray his comrades.¹¹ But the partisan’s precaution, in our view, is immoral. The entire logic of the film shows that the doctor is a courageous—

⁹ E. Bernstein. Historical Materialism. Moscow, 1901, p. 329. For a detailed critique of such a view, see: G. V. Plekhanov. Critique of Our Critics. Selected Works, vol. 2, 1954.

¹⁰ See: G. V. Plekhanov. Works, vol. 15, 1926, p. 129.

¹¹ One may suppose that the partisan decided to spare him torture. But this is incorrect. During the time that the enemy, sorting out Bernardi’s confession, would have postponed the execution, various events might have occurred capable of changing the situation quite unexpectedly. The partisan had no right to assume such responsibility.

a confident person that he can be trusted, that he will not betray. A fighter who knows that he is not trusted to the end loses one of the sources of his strength. To refuse to trust a person “just in case” means to sin against one of the highest aims of our struggle—the struggle for a society in which people would feel themselves friends, comrades, brothers.

Thus, there are neither aims nor means that would be unconditionally good or bad in all respects and at all times. Yet within the framework of a concrete historical situation, a definite social aim appears as unconditional. For an animal, the unconditional aim is the preservation of life. For a human being, only a life worthy of a human being is unconditional. At the present time such a life is guaranteed only by the transition to communism and by the struggle for it. Therefore all other aims and means must be considered in the light of this fundamental principle.

The reproaches of our ideological opponents that communists allegedly adopt the Jesuit slogan “the end justifies the means” are the result of their metaphysical thinking. Thus, the Canadian philosopher G. B. Mayo, in the Encyclopedia of Morals, published in London in 1957, asserts that communists justify any success, by whatever means it may have been achieved. This accusation does not correspond to reality. Means capable of staining the purity of our aims, of altering these aims, are unacceptable to us. “Humanism as an aim determines the most humane character of the means of its achievement” (Marx). But communism is precisely completed humanism⁴.

1. See: J. Nehru, The Discovery of India. Moscow, 1955, p. 20. ↩

2. See: G. Bandzeladze, An Attempt at an Exposition of the System of Marxist Ethics. Tbilisi, 1963; Ya. A. Milner-Irinin, Ethics, or the Science of True Humanity. Moscow, 1962; F. A. Selivanov, Ethics. Tomsk, 1961; Yu. V. Sogomonov, Good and Evil. Moscow, 1965. ↩

3. R. Rolland, Works, vol. 13, p. 32. ↩

4. See: K. Marx and F. Engels, From Early Works. Moscow, 1956, p. 563. ↩