ON SOME PRINCIPLES FOR DISTRIBUTING THE MATERIAL INCENTIVE FUND IN SECTORAL RESEARCH ORGANIZATIONS

V. G. ZAVYALOV

Among the broad range of problems on which the growth of the effectiveness of scientific labor depends, material incentives play an important role. Material incentives for the labor of workers employed in sectoral research organizations are intended to exert a significant influence on the pace of scientific and technical progress and on the more rapid introduction of the achievements of science into material production. However, the existing practice of material incentives in many respects does not meet the requirements placed upon it and needs improvement.

In the economic literature, the “Regulation on bonuses for the creation and introduction of new technology,” on the basis of which material incentives for the labor of workers of sectoral research organizations are built, has repeatedly been criticized. It has been pointed out that the chief shortcoming of this regulation is the use of different factors in the formation and distribution of the incentive fund. Thus, the amount of resources forming this fund depends on the size of the wage fund, while the specific sums of bonuses for employees are determined depending on the economic effectiveness of the newly created technology.

As a result, the actual volume of resources made available for bonuses, as a rule, does not coincide with the actual need for them in the scientific organization, which limits the stimulating role of bonus funds.

In this connection, it was proposed to abandon the wage fund as an indicator for forming the incentive fund and to use for this purpose only the economic effect obtained from newly created technology.

This point of view was confirmed in the resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR published on October 24, 1968.

The transition to economic effectiveness as the basis and source for forming the material incentive fund is undoubtedly correct, since an economic evaluation of the results of scientific labor is possible only through economic effect. The connection of material incentives with the results of the labor of scientific workers is necessary, since in their wages a direct dependence of results on labor expenditures is almost not traceable. The reasons that do not allow this dependence to be revealed are, first, the circumstance that the result includes the expenditures not only of living but also of materialized labor, which wages, naturally, take into account—

cannot be taken into account. Secondly, unlike other branches of social production, where living labor serves both as the basis and as the measure for receiving remuneration, in the sphere of science it performs only the first function. The creative nature of scientific labor itself makes it impossible to determine in advance, with the same degree of precision as is done in other branches of social production, the result and the expenditure of time required to obtain it. The absence of a social measure of labor in scientific activity compels society to regard the formal recognition of labor expenditures by scientists as a sufficient basis for issuing remuneration, and to fix their payment according to the formal attributes that serve as the basis of this recognition: level of education (qualification) and length of service in a research organization.

This feature, inherent in scientific labor, requires an organization of systems of material incentives that would reward scientists for the final results of their labor. The economic evaluation of final results in applied research inevitably takes the form of an economic effect. The product of scientists’ labor finds application directly in material production in the form of new machines, apparatuses, new technological processes, etc. Consequently, the efficiency of the labor of collectives of research organizations is manifested through material production. Material production makes it possible to find an indicator that, in generalized economic form, would reflect the concrete results of the work of research organizations. This indicator is the economic potential of research work. The sphere of science, owing to the uniqueness and unrepeatability of most scientific investigations, does not possess an indicator that would express the results of scientists’ work in a uniform and homogeneous way.

Economic potential is measured by the maximum economic effect that can be achieved on the basis of introducing this work into production during the calculation period, assuming the optimal scale of introduction. However, the entire economic effect cannot be regarded as the result of the labor of scientists. It includes the labor expenditures of various stages of scientific and technical progress: scientific research, design and engineering development, creation of a prototype, and industrial production. Therefore, when moving to economic efficiency as a source for forming incentive funds of research organizations, it is first of all necessary to establish that part of the effect which falls to the share of these organizations. The difficulty of this task consists in the fact that it is necessary not only to determine the expenditures at the stage of scientific research, but also to divide the total savings in such a way that a definite share of the economic effect would objectively correspond to these expenditures. The next step is the distribution of this share within an individual research organization. At present, most of them do not have independent bonus regulations adapted to the conditions of their own organization, and distribute incentive funds guided only by the instructions of the general standard regulation on incentives for the creation of new technology. Therefore, the distribution of bonuses within an organization is carried out either in proportion to the wage fund of the workers of an individual scientific subdivision, or depending on the size of its staff.

Such a practice cannot be deemed satisfactory. Obviously, it may be possible to find certain general principles that could be used as the basis for distributing the bonus fund initially among scientific subdivisions.

For that part of the bonus fund which is distributed in a centralized manner among research organizations, these principles are more or less clear. In order for employees to receive a bonus, the work they have performed must be recognized as new and important in scientific terms, included in the plan for new technology, and must bring a definite economic effect to society.

The need to observe the listed criteria as the basis for granting remuneration to employees is beyond doubt. However, even at this stage certain difficulties arise. Thus, when compiling a list of topics to be included in the plan for new technology, different units of a research organization arrive at different interpretations of the concept of new technology. What is considered new technology in a scientific department is not such in a special design bureau, while what the SDB has recognized as new technology is rejected at the plant manufacturing the prototype. If all these units are combined into a single technological chain headed by the research institute, then contradictions among them are inevitable. They are the result of the absence of a single concept of “new technology” recognized by all links in the research–production cycle. The many definitions of this concept found in the literature suffer from excessive abstraction or indicate such features of new technology as lend themselves to the broadest interpretation. Apparently there is a need to concretize these definitions by clarifying individual features contained in the concept of new technology. On the basis of such a definition, each scientific organization could develop criteria (taking into account the specifics of its activity) that would make it possible to determine the scientific value of topics and their national-economic significance and thereby serve as a basis for including them in the plan for new technology.

Bonuses from the centralized fund in the form in which they currently exist do not make it possible to increase the amount of the bonus if the work has been performed at the level of an invention or exceeds the level of the best world models. Therefore, it is advisable for the higher organization to allocate, for the rewarding of such works, part of the funds contributed by subordinate institutions in the form of additional one-time bonuses for qualitative indicators in completed developments.

The most important component of the bonus regulations of a research organization should be the principles for distributing bonuses among individual performers. The basis for determining the amount of remuneration for an individual employee may be the complexity of the work performed, the employee’s qualifications, and the degree of creative activity in carrying out the topic.

The complexity and special importance of the assignment being developed must inevitably be reflected in the size of the bonuses of scientific workers. The discrepancy that often exists between the constantly changing conditions under which work of various scientific and technical levels is performed and the unchanged salary rates of scientific employees hinders the growth of the efficiency of scientific labor. This discrepancy leads to the fact that employees receiving high salaries possess a privilege that may not correspond to their present achievements or to the work they perform.

It would be advisable to take into account the complexity of work according to the system proposed by the German economist T. Kuzicka¹. For this it is necessary

to divide the tasks being performed into several groups depending on their complexity. At first, three or more such groups may be established. The supervisor of the completed topic could quite easily determine to which category of complexity the work of a given research worker should be assigned. The amounts of remuneration to the employee should be established in accordance with the complexity group. For this purpose it is necessary to introduce a correction coefficient reflecting the degree of complexity at which the research worker worked. For example, work of average complexity corresponds to a coefficient value of 1.0, below average—0.5, and above average—1.5. The coefficient values may also be different. In this case the amount of remuneration of an individual research worker would depend on the total amount of the bonus established for the performance of the given topic, the number of those participating in its performance, and the degree of complexity of the work done by each individual employee.

The other part of the bonus fund that remains at the disposal of the institute should henceforth be distributed according to the results of fulfillment of the thematic plan. Otherwise, any material interest in carrying out topics not included in the new-technology plan disappears. Yet it is necessary to ensure such interest, since employees strive to participate primarily in the creation of new technology, because this is more interesting (here it is easier to ensure that the employee’s scientific interests coincide with the work being performed) and the receipt of a bonus is guaranteed. Under these conditions, the stimulation of state-budget and contract work from the so-called local fund (the funds remaining at the disposal of the institute) is the main form of material encouragement. Unfortunately, it is precisely in the distribution of this fund that the greatest confusion prevails.

The size of bonuses for scientific subdivisions is established either in proportion to the wage fund or on the basis of the number of their employees. When bonuses are distributed among performers, the aim is to ensure that all employees receive remuneration, which leads to a reduction in the amount of the bonus and to the loss of any material interest. There is practically no connection between the concrete results of a department’s work and that share in the bonus fund which is established for it. Bonuses for the performance of contract work are paid from the same funds that remain at the disposal of the institute, and only in certain cases from funds allocated for these purposes by the enterprise, with the permission of the higher organization.

It is necessary to link the distribution of funds for bonuses based on the results of fulfillment of the thematic plan, above all, with the concrete results of the work of scientific subdivisions. The economic form expressing the evaluation of these results is a certain effect obtained in the national economy from the application of one or another development. It should serve as the basis for establishing the amount of bonuses for scientific subdivisions. As a criterion, one could use the indicator proposed by M. Yudelevich²), which is the ratio of the planned economic efficiency of a development to the wage fund of the department. On the basis of this indicator, a scale of coefficients should be developed that determines the size of bonuses for individual scientific subdivisions (departments, laboratories, sectors). The further distribution of bonuses among individual performers should take into account their creative contribution to the work performed. Under conditions in which there are no precise measures of the quantity and quality of labor

²) Economics and Organization of Scientific-Research Work. L., 1966, p. 40.

for research workers, this contribution can be approximately determined by means of an expert assessment given by the head of the research topic. In the future, it will be necessary to develop objective indicators that measure the labor of a scientist.

It is advisable to separate bonuses for work financed from the state budget from bonuses for the fulfillment of economic contracts. To encourage the latter, institutes should be allowed to use part of the funds allocated to them by customer enterprises. The present procedure for paying remuneration for the fulfillment of economic contracts may be retained as an additional incentive for those cases in which work performed at the request of an enterprise has produced an exceptional economic effect.

The measures listed are, of course, not the only ones possible. Other ways of improving the system of material incentives for the labor of employees of sectoral research organizations are also possible. But the measures named establish a stronger link between remuneration in the form of bonuses and the results of the labor of research workers, and thereby contribute to increasing the effectiveness of this type of activity.

1. “Economic Accountability and Material Incentives (in Industry and Construction),” Moscow, 1967, p. 182. ↩