Principles of Planning Science in Light of the Economic Reform
Abstract Generated abstract
This article examines the planning of scientific research in the context of Soviet economic reform, emphasizing the distinctive features that separate science from industrial and agricultural planning. It argues that effective planning must integrate research with national economic needs, financing, material supply, forecasting, coordination, and implementation, while avoiding administrative overmanagement, subjectivism, and rigid calendar targets. The author supports stronger links among academic institutes, higher education, branch research, and production, but also insists that fundamental science requires flexibility, competition of ideas, and tolerance of risk, since important discoveries and even negative results cannot always be predicted or economically calculated in advance.
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Principles of Scientific Planning in the Light of Economic Reform
Yu. S. Nekhoroshev
Speaking of the possibility and necessity of planning science in a socialist society, one must not forget that it differs significantly from the planning of industry and agriculture. And this has not always been understood. The planning of science is the determination of the rates and paths of its development, the establishment of the size and structure of material expenditures, the clarification of the future benefit from investments in scientific research.
The practical implementation of planning scientific research is a difficult matter. The difficulties are caused by the very specificity of science, but not all areas of it are equally receptive to what is commonly called planning. For example, in the opinion of Academician B. Pontecorvo, in nuclear physics the most important discoveries, from both the cognitive and the practical points of view, cannot be planned. They have been and will be unexpected. The greatest theoretical discoveries and discoveries of industrial significance in the neutron and uranium fission process were not planned at all.^1
It is easy to trace the shortcomings that developed during the years of “free-rein” management of the development of science and technology. It is known that for a long time we had no practice of conducting scientific research—
^1 Bruno Pontecorvo. “On elementary particles, accelerators and skeptics.” Pravda, February 1, 1967.
under the principles of a unified state plan. Planning of science was carried out by numerous economic, financial, and planning bodies. Traditions unfavorable to the unification of economic conditions took shape.
But all this does not mean that we have accumulated no experience whatever in the planning of science and that everything must be begun anew, from scratch.
The world priority in organizing the accelerated and planned development of science belongs to our country. Immediately after the October Revolution, V. I. Lenin advanced the proposition that it was necessary to organize the interrelated development of industry and science under the conditions of the construction of socialism. On his instructions, in January 1918 negotiations began with the Academy of Sciences on cooperation with the Soviet government and on the performance by scientists of important state tasks. As a result, the Academy of Sciences began the research that was necessary for the national economy. In his famous “Sketch of a Plan of Scientific and Technical Work,” he proposed that the country’s scientists draw up, on a scientific basis, a plan for reorganizing the entire national economy. At the same time he gave a number of important recommendations on how best to draw up such a plan. This Lenin document played an outstanding role in affirming the unity of science and practice, without which the successful development of scientific creativity is impossible. Less than a year after the October Revolution, a special body was formed—the Scientific and Technical Department of the Supreme Council of the National Economy—intended to promote the development of science and technology in the country.
Vast experience in the planning of scientific-research work has been accumulated by the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, ministries, departments, scientific-research and design-engineering organizations, and higher educational institutions.
The planning of science, even at the level at which we still have it today, yields definite positive results: 1) a more or less clear concretization of the goals of research and the sequencing of their achievement has been attained; 2) a fuller idea has been obtained of what the country’s scientists are working on; 3) a satisfactory allocation of forces and a relatively rational distribution of material resources have been ensured; 4) it has been possible to eliminate, in many cases, obvious duplication in the work of large scientific collectives; 5) gaps in the choice of subject matter for scientific research have become more apparent.
All this ensures the fruitfulness of the work of many scientific institutions, which have begun to take better account of the needs of the national economy. However, in analyzing the experience of planning science, one must record not only the positive aspects but also the shortcomings. For example, one cannot fail to see a certain slowing in the rate of scienti-
to scientific progress in the “all-union” period of development of our economy. Without a critical approach one cannot give a correct assessment of our achievements; without it our forward movement will be less successful.
The main shortcoming of the existing procedure in this area remains the separation of the planning of science from the entire complex of national-economic planning. The development of science is planned largely on its own, chiefly from the standpoint of the interests of scientific schools, while the planning of production is weakly connected with the plans for the development of science. As a result, the necessary linkage among science, technology, and production is not achieved. Discrepancies arise between scientific and technical plans and the real production and financial conditions for carrying them out. The comprehensive character of the planning of scientific-research work is violated. Scientific forces and material resources are insufficiently concentrated on the most important directions of science; there is no necessary coordination in the conduct of scientific research, design, and experimental work.
The economic reform being carried out in the USSR and in other socialist countries aims to eliminate this disunity and sharply increase the interest of all scientific institutions and enterprises in raising the scientific and technical level of production. The principles of economic reform are introduced into the scientific and scientific-production sphere by the Resolution of the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR of September 24, 1968, “On measures to increase the efficiency of the work of scientific organizations and to accelerate the use in the national economy of the achievements of science and technology”*). The planning of scientific-research and experimental-design work must be built on the same basic principles that underlie the entire system of planning and management of the national economy. It is necessary to take into account only the specific features of this sphere of human activity. Scientific and technical progress is always prospective and presupposes complex interbranch links both during the conduct of research and in the course of the practical realization of its results. It is envisaged that scientific and technical forecasts for long periods will be drawn up for all the most important national-economic problems. Forecasting science does not contradict the planned principle of the socialist economy. On the contrary, forecasts serve as a basis for current planning.
The principal form of planning is the state five-year plan for the development of scientific-research work. Along with
*) Pravda, October 23, 1968.
the plan for solving major scientific and technical problems are now coordination plans that provide for the execution of the entire complex of work—from the formulation of ideas to industrial implementation. Plans for the implementation of the most important scientific and technical achievements will be a component part of the state annual plan for the development of the national economy.
The resolution mentioned helps to discard everything that is obsolete and holds back the development of science. But it has not resolved, and could not resolve, absolutely all questions concerning the improvement of the planning of science, especially at the level of the scientific institution.
A serious shortcoming in the planning of science continues to be the gap between thematic plans and the plans for financing and material-and-technical supply of scientific institutions. These three plans must be organically linked with one another, but they are considered and approved in different organizations. In no single instance is the plan of a scientific institution approved as a unified document. The importance of a planned topic is often determined not by its scientific value, but by the source of financing (the state budget, centralized funds of ministries, the centralized fund for mastering new technology, capital investments). Some works are considered more obligatory, while others depend on the financial capacity of the customer organizations. The mismatch in the distribution of material resources among individual scientific directions is caused not only by different sources, but also by shortcomings in the established procedure for financing scientific-research work.
Major shortcomings exist in the financing of work performed in higher educational institutions under cost-accounting contracts with enterprises. The latter allocate relatively few funds for establishing scientific ties with scientific institutions. In addition, ministries that have their own branch scientific-research institutes have obligated them to conclude cost-accounting contracts first of all with these institutes, and have sharply restricted funds for cost-accounting contracts with higher educational institutions. And this is in conditions where far from all branch research institutes are fully staffed with highly qualified personnel. Higher educational institutions often solve many problems at a higher scientific level. The heavy workload of branch research institutes leads to their beginning to open branches that are weak in scientific terms, while the scientific potential of higher educational institutions is far from being used to the full1.
Not the isolation of branch science within the framework of a department, but the development and strengthening of its ties with higher education—this is the path that—
…will lead to an increase in the effectiveness of science and production. Before creating a new branch scientific institution, a ministry or department must consider whether it would not be more advantageous to organize a new scientific subdivision on the basis of an already established higher-education collective.
The Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR made it incumbent upon ministries and departments, and upon the State Committee for Science and Technology, when planning scientific-research work, to provide for the participation of higher educational institutions in carrying out research under economic contracts with enterprises, and for the allocation for these purposes of the necessary material-technical and monetary resources2.
The causes of shortcomings in the planning of science should be sought not in the fundamental principles, but in defective methods and in the absence, on the part of ministries, departments, and academies of sciences, of the necessary determination to improve them radically. Higher authorities, in essence, merely reduce the subject matter of scientific institutions to tables.
On the other hand, no less harm is done to science by a subjective approach, by the disdainful attitude that existed until recently toward scientific data. Individual recommendations that had not been sufficiently verified were elevated to the rank of immutable truths, to be introduced regardless of whether they would be useful or not3. “Unity” of opinions was achieved by a very simple method: the opinions of scientists who held other points of view were not taken into account. Science can develop successfully only in an atmosphere of genuinely scientific creative discussions, with broad competition among different trends. At the same time, it is necessary to raise the level of the culture of scientific discussions. A genuine discussion is based on exact facts, principledness, scientific conscientiousness, respect for the opinion of the other side, and the desire to find the truth rather than to confuse the issue. A crushing blow to subjectivism and administrative command methods in all spheres of economic and scientific activity was dealt by the October (1964) and subsequent Plenums of the Central Committee of the CPSU, which created favorable conditions for creative activity in all the country’s scientific institutions.
Subjectivism and administrative command methods also left their mark on the practice of calendar planning that existed until recently, under which research was subordinated to the time factor, and not the other way around. This gave rise to the harmful tendency to present—
by the end of the year even studies that are underdeveloped as regular ones. Practically no researcher was interested, either morally or materially, in completing the work early and well. And in general, since plans had to be submitted annually, the most lightweight and often unpromising topics were entered into them.
To eliminate administrative overmanagement, the entire planning system must encourage bold creative daring. But even the participation of scholars in drawing up plans for the development of science does not exclude subjectivism (although it does limit administrative overmanagement). Scholars, like other workers in creative professions, are almost always inclined somewhat to exaggerate the importance of their own work. Now, when, for example, genetics has been fully restored to its rights and this biological science is being given its due, another extreme is emerging—to give its conclusions an all-embracing character. This is the best way to discredit science.
To this is added an unwillingness to lose accumulated results, and the need to overcome difficulties connected with organizing new work. The existing practice of planning contributes to preserving old lines of work, which provide modest but guaranteed results. And the academic councils of institutes, which are supposed to assess the theoretical importance and practical significance of scientific research, are not always objective judges. The point is not that, in a number of scientific institutions, joint work gives rise to an atmosphere of mutual benevolence, and that the council is headed by a person personally responsible for the institution’s activity. The point is that the overwhelming majority of scientific institutions conduct complex research, drawing on specialists of the most varied profiles. Some lines are represented by two or three scientific workers, as a result of which most members of the council, in assessing work included in the plan, rely entirely on the opinion of their more competent colleagues.
One means of combating subjectivism may be the coordination of scientific research work. The main task of coordination consists precisely in this, and not in uprooting so-called “duplication” in subject matter. Duplication in the exact sense is a rare occurrence in science. Moreover, its elimination is the simplest form of activity for a coordinating institution. Harmful duplication is characteristic chiefly of those institutes that were created by sovnarkhozes and the economic agencies of some republics in the name of local, departmental interests. The struggle against duplication must not affect “competition”
ideas.” In science it is impossible to establish absolute criteria for the perfection of achieved results. One and the same problem can be solved in many ways. The results achieved can be evaluated only on the basis of comparing several solutions. If there is no competition of ideas, a scientific monopoly is formed, which can lead to stagnation of thought. Very often an increase in expenditures connected with parallel research is justified economically as well: it accelerates the pace of work, and the choice of the optimal variant may more than repay all costs. It is important to identify a topic that is so urgent that it deserves parallel development.
Every coordinating center must consist of the most prominent specialists. True, subjective approaches are not ruled out in the process of coordination itself. In particular, they are expressed in the division of sciences into “current” and “not current,” into “exact” and “descriptive.” For the former—a green light and resources; for the latter—whatever remains. Such an opinion reflects only the temporary state of various branches of knowledge. A positive role in the struggle against this kind of subjectivism can be played by the scientific community, the free contest of opinions, and so on.
It is necessary to seek objective indicators of scientific creativity, to introduce economic-mathematical methods of work planning, and to develop measures that materially stimulate the drawing up of economically justified plans for the development of science, combining the interests of the state as a whole with the interests of the scientific collective and of the individual scientist.
A resolute struggle must also be waged against those who, under the guise of combating subjectivism and administration, deny the role of planning discipline and regard state planning of science as red tape. Such attitudes cannot help the cause.
The chief feature of planning scientific and technological progress under the conditions of economic reform should consist in shifting the center of gravity from the centralized development of research topics to the level of scientific institutions and enterprises. The desire to take account of and plan every detail from above fetters initiative locally. Until recently, the heads of research institutes and higher educational institutions were bound by numerous instructions that deprived them of the possibility, at their own discretion, to dispose of funds, staffing, and so forth. Now, in order to increase the initiative of scientific institutions, they have begun to be entrusted with approving for themselves the subject matter and plans of initiative work and exploratory research in fundamentally new scientific and technical directions.
The denial of the petty evaluation in planning presupposes the concentration of the efforts of scientists on the choice of the most important directions and on the proper allocation of resources among them. For the time being, one of the main shortcomings in the work of scientific organizations is the weak concentration of scientific and material resources on the principal directions, and the multiplicity of themes in the work. Now the Central Committee of the CPSU and the Council of Ministers of the USSR have created such conditions under which institutes themselves are interested in reducing the multiplicity of themes, since many of them, in their own field, must now be responsible for the state of the scientific and technical level in the country.
A scientific plan, while demanding from scientists effectiveness of research and practical return, must not lead to extremes—for example, to a fascination with work of a purely empirical character. The abandonment of the posing of major theoretical problems is also harmful, as is the striving for abstract searches. It must not be forgotten that science must ensure the more distant prospects of technical progress. We must maintain a high level of scientific research in such leading fields of modern natural science as the physics of the atomic nucleus and elementary particles, the disclosure of the foundations of vital processes, and the disclosure of the logic of processes of control in nature and in society4. All these are exploratory works that are not amenable to planning in the generally accepted sense of the word. It is impossible to include in a plan the concrete results of scientific search. One can determine only the principal concrete principles and goals, and also establish in detail the proposed working conditions. The organization of fundamental research can and must be directed in another form—not through a plan, but through long-term scientific forecasts.
There cannot be the same procedure for compiling scientific forecasts for fundamental sciences and plans for the development of applied sciences. The compilation of thematic plans for fundamental science is the task of the scientific councils of academic institutes and higher educational institutions. It is precisely these bodies that must be the sole authority considering and approving thematic plans. The administrative principle in this matter is not capable of raising collectives to the solution of major problems, since it cannot be a generator of ideas. Only scientists who have their own scientific ideas can ensure qualitative forecasting of fundamental sciences; they should be given great freedom of action both in the organization of new laboratories and in planning.
But it would be wrong, in forecasting scientific and technical progress, to confine oneself to the selection of main lines in fundamental research. The results of theoretical research must necessarily be supplemented by the development of applied questions. Corresponding Member of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR M. I. Agoshkov says: “At present the most acute problem is the creation of a continuous system for planning scientific research, from exploratory investigations to the use of scientists’ conclusions in the national economy”5.
The planning of already explored scientific directions must be conducted differently. Here scientific institutions are obliged to “deliver output.” The planning of applied research should be carried out not only “from below,” as is done now, but also “from above,” proceeding from the main practical tasks. Since such research is usually of a complex character, planning must be more detailed here than in exploratory or theoretical research. The breakdown or delay of even one link threatens to stop or delay the entire chain of research. If such work is interdepartmental in character, then the planning function must be concentrated in one set of hands. For the most important work of national significance, this should be in the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR for Science and Technology; for more particular work, in the scientific and technical councils of ministries or in the academic councils of leading branch institutes.
The planning of science should be thematic. It is determined by the principal directions and problems in the development of science and technology. It is impossible to plan the number and nature of scientific discoveries. As Academician S. I. Vavilov said, the planning of science does not mean that the state can foresee the creative work of Mendeleevs and Pavlovs in advance. Quantitative indicators in the planning of scientific creativity, if they do not concern financing and material-technical supply, are in most cases artificial and have no scientific basis. Hardly anyone can imagine the completion of a topic, for example, by 110 percent. In rubles and percentages one can show only the financial provision of the plan and the plan for spending the funds allocated for scientific research. Nor can one set an exact date for a scientific discovery. But it is possible to determine the sequence of the most important stages in the development of a topic. The duration of applied research and development, however, can be determined with fairly high accuracy.
The essence of thematic planning consists in setting the tasks most important for the national economy. It is necessary that planned research should always contain elements of justified expectation and foresight, and should be provided with favorable conditions for scientific inquiry. “In order to find, one must not only look and look attentively, but must also know a great deal in order to know where to look,” wrote D. I. Mendeleev6. Academician A. A. Nesmeyanov said the following about this: “It is, of course, impossible to plan scientific discoveries, but it is possible and necessary to plan the rational concentration of forces on the more promising sectors of science”7.
Why should the planning of science be mainly thematic? Every scientific study begins with the formulation of a theme, with the determination of the aim of the work. It is precisely here that a mistake may be made which will later nullify all the work that has been done. A correctly chosen and formulated theme, on the contrary, can ensure a sharp increase in the efficiency of scientific labor. It is important to determine not only the aim of the work, but also to indicate the path of research. Here too lies a reserve for growth in the productivity of scientific labor.
In our country significant successes have been achieved in concentrating scientific forces on the investigation of the most important complex, interbranch, and branch problems, as well as on the most important theoretical and exploratory studies. The share of expenditures on such work in 1965 increased in the total volume of expenditures on scientific research to 72 percent, as against 56 in 19638. In the current five-year period scientific forces, material resources, and financial resources are concentrated above all on the main directions of science (elementary-particle physics, atomic-nucleus physics, solid-state physics, the study of the Universe, cybernetics and computer technology, knowledge of the laws governing the origin and development of life) and on the solution of scientific and technical problems of important significance for the national economy. These are, first of all, those directions whose intensive development may lead to progress in the most important branches of technology and of the national economy, including electric power engineering, machine building and metalworking, radio electronics, chemistry, economics, and others.
An important principle in the planning of research work must be the requirement that it be economically substantiated. Pla
planning of science presupposes that economic science must develop forward-looking models of the coordinated, interconnected development of different branches of science as the largest sphere of labor activity. Economic substantiation is especially important for applied work planned and introduced in the coming years. Work on drawing up the plan, said A. N. Kosygin in his concluding speech at the Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU, requires a creative approach, economic substantiation of planned targets, and the selection of the most effective paths of development. A thorough economic analysis of the decisions being adopted is a necessary condition for a sound scientific and technical policy. It makes it possible to select, from among various possible solutions to a scientific or technical problem, the most advantageous one, so that, by concentrating forces and capital investments, it may be brought into production more rapidly. It is necessary to overcome the opinion, still current among some scientists, that research plans can be built on the intuitive expectation of good results. A significant possibility for increasing the efficiency of the work of scientific institutions lies in creating an anticipatory development of preliminary economic studies. In the Siberian Branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences, a group of economists is carrying out work to create a model for selecting the most promising topics of scientific research. Their methodology is based on a model of scientific and technical progress.
For the time being, however, thematic plans for science and new technology are for the most part still drawn up without a deep preliminary economic analysis, although the situation is gradually changing for the better. Whereas in the state plan of scientific-research work for 1964–1965 there were no calculations of the economic efficiency of the use of scientific developments in the national economy for the majority of topic assignments, now all planned topics have an economic substantiation (though not all have been forecast). However, in many cases the calculations are formal in character, and when it comes to implementation they very often are not confirmed. Many scientific works are still evaluated not by the economic effect of their implementation, but by estimated cost. Because of insufficient preliminary economic elaboration, some works are discontinued in an unfinished state. The reason lies partly in the absence of simple and reliable methods for determining the economic efficiency of scientific research. It is especially difficult to calculate the saving when a scientific institution improves some part of a known technological process or develops a single machine that is to be incorporated,
to the actual data. If some saving is discovered in production at the end of the year, it is difficult to prove that it was caused precisely by the given scientific development.
Planned scientific work will have a sufficient economic justification only when the proposed technical solution has the highest technical and operational indicators (strength, reliability, etc.), the necessary design and artistic properties, and also when the work is guaranteed to be patent-clean.
A patent-clean solution is one that is original, progressive, and competitive on the world market. It contains no components, parts, or principles of operation protected by foreign patents. The requirement of patent cleanliness is very important in determining the paths of scientific search. Until now, plans for introducing “new” technology have sometimes provided for the introduction of long-known machines, mechanisms, and processes. The direct instruction of the USSR Gosplan to make obligatory reference, when drawing up such plans, to the number of the inventor’s certificate and the authors’ surnames was often ignored. As a result, instead of movement forward there was marking time. The matter must be arranged so that every scientific investigation necessarily ends in a discovery or an invention. This will bar the way to solutions carried out at a low technical level, eliminate one of the causes of technology’s lag behind science, and save large material and human resources. For example, it cannot but be alarming that in some branches of Leningrad industry up to one third of all products manufactured are in some respect inferior to the best foreign models9. These products are made according to designs developed by scientific organizations.
When higher authorities, in drawing up plans for science, demand an exact economic calculation, this is justified only in part (for applied research) and is not suitable as a general rule (for all science). The scientist has the right to take risks. Moreover, a negative result of a planned scientific search may also have positive significance for science. “Undoubtedly, the mistakes of a man of genius are as instructive as his achievements”10. The specificity of scientific creativity is such that the initial stages of theoretical research produce no effect by which one could judge the final result. It is enough to recall Faraday, Röntgen, and Tsiolkovsky. The practical significance of their discoveries was
—only immediately and far from always. Nor can one conduct an economic calculation of a study whose final result is only intuitively anticipated. It is hardly true that, in the forties, when he began solving the problem of controlling radar installations, Norbert Wiener could have supposed that from the solution of this particular problem there would, within a few years, emerge a new science—cybernetics—which would be destined to define the face of the century. The Canadian scholar Mardon, on the basis of the experience he has studied, asserts that in the first period, which takes up 50% of the time, no practical results are achieved. In the next period (25% of the time), approximately 30 percent of the results are achieved. In the remaining 25% of the time, the main (70 percent) possible results may be obtained1.
Theoretical studies, which account for up to 80 percent of the work of academic institutions, do not lend themselves to an accurate advance assessment of their cost. The gap between the planned and the actual cost of such studies reaches 70 percent or more. A useful output (apparently for industry) is given annually by 7 percent of fundamental works2. The closer a study comes to “pure theory,” the more uncertainty and risk there is. Moreover, scientific activity does not always consist only of the joys of success. It is full of failures and disappointments; often one has to acknowledge one’s mistake and begin everything from the start. “Errors are not yet pseudoscience. Pseudoscience is the non-recognition of errors. Only for this reason is it a brake on sound scientific development”3.
With properly understood planned guidance of science, such dramatic situations become increasingly rare, but one cannot do without conscious risk. Without elements of risk there is no real work, but only an “accurate plan of scientific works,” satisfactory to all authorities, in which everything is known in advance—both the final results and the economic effect. Meanwhile, to achieve an important scientific result what is needed is not superficial positive indicators, but a deep elaboration of the problem. This elaboration may yield not the expected result, but a negative one, which, on the other hand, will prove positive insofar as it defines the limits of applicability of a given phenomenon, machine, or material. Such works create the necessary basis for the development of the country’s scientific potential and determine the possibili—
possibilities and prospects for the development of various fields of applied science. In the last century D. I. Mendeleev wrote: “I am convinced of the possibility of obtaining nutritive substances from combinations of the elements of air, water, and earth, in addition to ordinary cultivation, that is, in special factories and plants…”. His pupils and followers have already learned to synthesize vitamins and fats. Academician A. N. Nesmeyanov is trying to realize the great chemist’s dream—to synthesize food protein as well. There are skeptics who regard these experiments as premature. But can this work be set aside when, on the planet Earth, insufficient food is now being produced? Approximately half of humanity is starving. To realize the idea expressed by D. I. Mendeleev, it is worth taking risks.
It is necessary to plan complex experiments, deep investigations, and not be afraid of expenditures. The philosophy of pragmatism, of immediate return and benefit, is good for all spheres of material production, but not for science—especially fundamental science. The psychological atmosphere of fear of risk took shape in a period when there was little of everything, while the tasks were grandiose. Now the tasks are even more majestic, but there are already reserves, and part of them can boldly be directed into science. This will repay itself a hundredfold.
No matter how perfect a plan of research work may be, it cannot reflect all the diversity of scientists’ creative labor. The specific nature of scientific creativity is such that, already in the course of fulfilling plans, in the very process of research, new, unforeseen problems may arise which, in the interests of the cause, must be solved immediately. Consequently, the planning of scientific research must be flexible and operational. It is itself a form of scientific creativity.
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Abstract Journal “Economics of Industry,” 1963, ref. 5397. ↩↩
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Collection, Ways of Increasing the Productivity of Scientific Labor, part II, Novosibirsk, 1966, p. 92. ↩↩
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P. T. Kapitsa, Theory, Experiment, Practice. Moscow, 1966, p. 21. ↩↩
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Cf.: M. V. Keldysh, speech at the Twenty-Third Congress of the CPSU, Pravda, April 3, 1966. ↩
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Quoted from the collection Ways of Increasing the Efficiency of Scientific Labor, part 1, Novosibirsk, 1966, p. 13. ↩
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See the preface to Pravda, August 14, 1966. ↩
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A. A. Nesmeyanov. Speech at the Twentieth Congress of the CPSU. Verbatim report. Gospolitizdat, 1956, p. 379. ↩
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Ekonomicheskaya gazeta, 1966, No. 2, p. 31. ↩
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Pravda, September 12, 1966. ↩
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P. L. Kapitsa, “My Recollections of Rutherford,” Novyi mir, 1966, no. 8, p. 208. ↩