Volume 255

1972

STRUCTURE AND PATTERNS OF SCIENCE

A. B. ZELMANOV

(Presented by the scientific seminar of the Department of Political Economy)

The growing role of science in society gives rise to the need to study it by scientific methods.

In the works of Soviet researchers of science there is an economic, sociological, science-of-science, logical-gnoseological, informational, and prognostic approach to science¹. However, an integral, comprehensive, multidimensional approach to the study of science as a specific social institution with its inherent structure, functions, and laws of development is only with difficulty making its way. It seems necessary, in the analysis of science, to apply a modern scientific approach, one manifestation of which may be considered systems-structural sociological analysis. In the present article an attempt is made at a systemic analysis of the constituent elements of science as a specific social institution and of the laws governing the development of modern science, connected with the change in its place and role in society.

1. The Concept of Science

In studies of the 1960s, science is regarded predominantly as a specific form of social consciousness. Thus, E. M. Chekharin gives the following definition: “Science is one of the forms of social consciousness, whose purpose is

systematic cognition of the objective laws of nature and society and the discovery of ways of using them in practice”²). A similar definition of science can be found in the works of M. M. Karpov: “Science is a complex and many-sided social phenomenon. It reflects the objective world in the form of scientific concepts, laws, and theories and is a form of social consciousness. It is a historically formed and continuously developing, on the basis of social practice, system of knowledge about nature, society, and thought”³).

Most authors of textbooks on philosophy uncritically repeat such definitions, reducing the conception of science to a system of knowledge about nature and society⁴). Such a conception of science, although on the whole correct, is nevertheless one-sided. The point is that the transformation of science into a direct productive force, into a most important factor of social progress, convincingly shows that science cannot be reduced only to a system of knowledge; science is a multifaceted phenomenon, including both material and ideal aspects.

The main shortcoming of defining science only as a form of social consciousness is its illegitimate reduction to the final result of scientific production (knowledge). To G. N. Volkov’s credit, one should acknowledge his attempt to study science as a social phenomenon. In his book The Sociology of Science, G. N. Volkov goes beyond a purely gnoseological understanding of science and formulates a sociological definition of science as a special type of production, as the activity of society in the production of knowledge⁵).

If science is not only knowledge in itself, but also scientific production, then, naturally, the possibility opens up for an integral analysis of the structure and function of science, which includes within its “body” the material and technical base, scientific personnel, organization, methods of cognition, and the final product—scientific information, reliable knowledge.

An extended definition of science can be given only from sociological positions. It includes the definition of the subject matter of science, the fixing of its goals and role in society, its structural components, functions, and laws of development.

Truth is a process. This proposition of Marx’s philosophy is fully applicable to the manner of deriving a definition of science. In order to give a systemic, that is, integral structural-functional definition of the essence of science, it is necessary to make an ascent from abstract, partial, and one-sided definitions to a concrete concept of science as a specific social institution that has a specific object of investigation—the cognition of the laws of nature, society, and thought; a complex structure, including such elements as a technical base, personnel, organization, methods, and a result in the form of a system of knowledge; and also one that performs diverse functions in society.

It should be emphasized that understanding science as a social institution for the production of knowledge by no means signifies acceptance

²) E. M. Chekharin. The Role of Science in Creating the Material and Technical Base of Communism. Moscow, 1965, p. 18.
³) M. M. Karpov. Science and the Development of Society. Moscow, 1961, p. 5.
⁴) See: D. I. Chesnokov. Historical Materialism. “Mysl,” Moscow, 1964, p. 359. Marxist-Leninist Philosophy. Historical Materialism, “Mysl,” Moscow, 1969, p. 277.
⁵) G. N. Volkov. The Sociology of Science. Moscow, 1968, p. 121.

...the conception of science current in contemporary non-Marxist sociology of science. American sociologists, for example, characterize science as a social institution which, together with such institutions as the state and education, enters into the structure of the social system, but they invest the concept of science chiefly with a behaviorist, i.e., idealist, content. Thus Norman Storer defines science as “a social institution, a complex of patterns of behavior and interaction having sufficient internal coherence to make it possible to distinguish it from other areas of social behavior.” It is further asserted that “the sociology of science studies the patterns of behavior into which the scientist enters, the factors influencing this behavior, and the consequences of the behavior of scientists for large groups and for the society to which they belong”². The reduction of science to patterns of scientists’ behavior and the consequences of their behavior for society is an extremely one-sided understanding of science, tinged with socio-psychological and behavioral tones, ignoring the material elements of the structure of science as a system, and therefore unacceptable.

The essence of science is manifested in its structure, functions, and social role. In order to define science, it is necessary to carry out not only a logico-gnoseological but also a broader sociological analysis, including an investigation of the structure of science.

2. The Structure of Science

Most researchers describe the structure of science in the logico-gnoseological aspect. P. V. Kopnin distinguishes two basic elements of science—the system of knowledge and the method of cognition:

“If science is considered from the logico-gnoseological side, then in it one may distinguish the following two interrelated moments: the system of knowledge and the method of cognition”³. From the standpoint of logico-gnoseological analysis such an approach is legitimate. But in the sociological aspect the structure of science includes a number of fundamentally new components.

Academician B. M. Kedrov investigates the structure of science on a different, logical basis. Studying the subject matter and interconnection of the natural sciences, he proceeds from the fact that the structure of science is determined by the structure of its object and subject, on the one hand, and by the structure of the process of reflection of this object, on the other⁴. In accordance with this criterion, B. M. Kedrov analyzes a twofold structural cross-section of science—horizontal and vertical. Corresponding to the increasing complexity of the developing object of research, that is, the basic forms of motion of matter, there is a differentiation of the structural units of natural science—subatomic and atomic physics, chemistry, molecular physics, geology, and biology. This is the horizontal cross-section of the structure of science. Let us note that by science the author in the cited book understands primarily the natural sciences, the sciences of nature. It must be acknowledged that in the literature there have been no attempts to analyze the horizontal cross-section of the humanities, although the need for such a classification is ripe.

The vertical section of the structure gives, according to B. M. Kedrov, a picture of the development of the cognition of nature. He includes here such structural elements of scientific cognition as the gathering of empirical material (facts) by way of observation and experiment, the primary systematization and description of this material, the theoretical generalization of facts, their explanation through the discovery of the laws of nature, the creation of natural-scientific theories, and the elaboration of a general scientific picture of the world⁵. It is not difficult to see that here science is analyzed in the unity of the ontological and gnoseological approaches. The synthesis of the horizontal and vertical sections of the structure of the natural sciences is the content of natural science as the result of cognition of nature. In this aspect, “natural science includes within itself, in inseparable unity, experiment and theory, facts and their generalization, experimental data and their systematization”⁶.

The investigation of the structural elements of science even in the gnoseological aspect alone is far from a trivial task. The very establishment of the constituent elements of science as a logical system presents well-known difficulties. Thus, M. M. Karpov distinguishes within science facts, the results of the generalization of factual material—laws, axioms and theories, the philosophical interpretation of a theory, that is, methodology, and conjectural knowledge in the form of hypotheses⁷. I. S. Narsky, answering the question “What is the structure of science?”, records such of its components as precisely established facts, inductive generalizations of various degrees of generality, axiomatically constructed fragments of theory, recommendations for practical applications, as well as hypotheses and the raw empirical material adjoining science⁸.

However, even in the gnoseological aspect there are significantly more structural elements of science. The comparatively young field of knowledge—the logic of scientific research—counts among the basic elements of science, alongside facts and scientific theory, scientific abstractions, the idea, the problem, interpretations of a scientific theory, the scientific ideal, and the higher levels of the systematization of knowledge (worldview and the scientific picture of the world)⁹.

Despite all the instructiveness and depth of the theoretical analysis of the structure of science in the ontological, logical, and gnoseological planes carried out by B. M. Kedrov, P. V. Kopnin, and other authors, the need has matured to study the structure of science in the sociological aspect, taking into account the place of science in the integral social system, its interconnection with the other structural components of society, and its role in the contemporary world.

The first structural element of science in the sociological aspect is the technical base of science. If in the past, for the social sciences, the microscope and other instruments of investigation were replaced by the power of abstraction, now even the humanities require large material resources. Thus, comparatively large expenditures are required for conducting sociological research. The results of research are processed with the aid of computers. Consequently, even the humanities do not

limit their cognitive resources by the power of abstraction. As for the natural and applied sciences, their development requires costly technical devices (for example, synchrophasotrons, aerodynamic tunnels, radio telescopes, computer technology, precision measuring instruments, etc.). If, for the process of producing material goods, according to Marx, the osteomuscular and vascular systems are necessary (production premises, containers for storing raw materials, warehouses), then scientific production also requires material means.

Modern science is characterized both by high economic efficiency, by the high profitability of its technical use, and by the need for enormous appropriations for the development of science itself. In connection with the exponential development of science and the need for expenditures on the technical base of science, an intensive growth of expenditures on science is observed.

In the United States of America, over the period 1776–1969, expenditures on science amounted to 286 billion dollars, of which 251 billion dollars (88%) were in the period 1953–1969. National expenditures on research and development in 1968 amounted, in the USA, to 25 billion dollars; in England—to 2.112 billion dollars; in the FRG—to 3.498 billion dollars; in Japan—to 1.951 billion dollars¹⁰. In the USSR, expenditures on science from 1940 to 1971 increased from 0.3 billion rubles to 13 billion rubles. In 1968 they constituted 1.6% of expenditures’ share in the gross social product. During the eighth five-year plan, expenditures on science increased in our country by a factor of 1.6¹¹.

A large share of these expenditures goes to the development of the technical base of science. And if fundamental scientific discoveries lead to qualitative changes in the development of technology, then science itself cannot now progress without advanced technology for observation, experimentation, measurement, and information processing.

The second necessary element of the structure of science is the people of science, scientific personnel. A substantive analysis of the dynamics of scientific personnel is given in G. M. Dobrov’s book The Science of Science. Throughout the world there is a rapid growth in the number of scientific workers. Already at the initial stage of the modern scientific and technological revolution, in the developed countries there are 2–3 scientific workers for every 100 persons employed in industry. The doubling of the number of scientists in the USSR has in recent years taken place over 7–8 years, in the USA over 10 years, and in Europe over 15 years¹². In 1914 there were 11.5 thousand scientists in Russia; in 1940, 98.3 thousand; in 1967, more than 770 thousand scientists¹³. In the sociological aspect, what is of interest is not only the quantitative growth of the number of scientific workers, which expresses the tendency for science, technology, and education to become the leading sphere of human activity¹⁴, but also the qualitative composition of scientific personnel, both by demographic characteristics and in terms of scientific qualifications, as well as the productivity of scientists’ labor. Statistical observations show that scientists obtain the best results in the interval of 15 years—from 26 to 40 years of age. An enormous reserve for the development of science is the involvement

women into the sphere of scientific activity. In the Soviet Union, for example, women make up more than 30% of scientific workers. The qualifications of scientific workers are certified by the awarding of academic degrees. In 1965 in the USSR, out of 664.6 thousand scientific workers, 149.2 thousand persons held the degrees of doctor and candidate of science. At present, out of 940 thousand scientific workers, more than 200 thousand persons have academic degrees. Nevertheless, throughout the world there is an acute shortage of qualified scientific workers. The principal supplier of personnel for science is higher education. The United States of America is also following the path of importing scholars, thereby calling into being the problem of the “brain drain.”

It should be noted that there is a great disproportion between the number of natural scientists and scholars in the humanities. For example, in the USA in 1963 there were 60 thousand physicists, 80 thousand chemists, and only 6 thousand sociologists¹⁵. In the future it is to be expected that the sciences of man will undergo extraordinary development, and this disproportion will be smoothed out.

The third element of science is its organization¹⁶. The primary structural component in this respect is the scientific collective. Scientific collectives are extraordinarily diverse in size and in their modes of functioning. In contemporary science, “invisible collectives” of scholars from various regions of a country, and even from different countries, united by personal contacts on the basis of common scientific interests, are developing. State direction of science and its planning have led to the creation of scientific organizations of various scales. The solution of the most important scientific and technical tasks, such as mastering nuclear fuel and space flights, has united thousands of scientists from various fields of knowledge into an enormous scientific collective.

In the USSR, science develops in organizations subordinate to the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, to ministries, and to departments. Higher educational institutions, above all universities, constitute a large reserve for the development of science. On the whole, a well-ordered state system for directing scientific activity has been created in the Soviet Union. In the developed capitalist states, science develops within the system of higher education, including through financial support from the state and private firms, and also in scientific laboratories and institutions attached to the largest corporations.

Under the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution, rapid growth is observed in the number of scientific institutions. In the USSR in 1928 there were 1,263 scientific institutions; in 1940, 1,821; in 1950, 2,848; in 1960, 3,548; in 1967, 4,650¹⁷. In the USA in 1920 private corporations had only 307 laboratories, while in 1960 they already had 5,400¹⁸. The growth in the number of scientific institutions poses complex tasks of coordinating scientific research, of long-term planning for the development of science, and of guiding it on the part of the state.

An analysis of the diverse methods of cognition lies beyond the tasks of this article. We shall merely note that to the traditional logical means of cognition, such as induction, deduction, analysis, synthesis, analogy, and the posing of hypotheses, in contemporary science there have been added—

are and acquire ever greater weight: relatively new nontraditional methods. Among them may be included extrapolation, idealization, and the thought experiment. With the emergence of cybernetics, various kinds of modeling are becoming widespread.

It should be acknowledged that in the specialized logical and philosophical literature there is still no clear classification of the methods and means of scientific cognition. Progressive development does not remove, but only repeatedly increases, the role of the universal method of cognition, which is the philosophical method.

The final product of scientific production is knowledge. The logical structure of knowledge, as has been noted, contains reliable facts, ideas, concepts, and laws (scientific theory), as well as philosophical interpretation and explanation. In sociological terms it is important to represent the role of knowledge in modern society. The point is that the production of knowledge now constitutes a significant share of the so-called “tertiary sphere” of human activity. If in the past the social division of labor presupposed the employment of an enormous mass of the population in the primary sphere of economic activity (agriculture) and in the secondary sphere (manufacturing industry), then in the course of the scientific-technological revolution, according to forecasts, by the end of our century in the economically most developed countries less than 5% of all workers will remain in agriculture, and about 10% will be employed in industry. The rest of the economically active population will be concentrated in the tertiary sphere: in science, education, administration and transport, trade and social services^23). Thus, knowledge is becoming the chief wealth of society. On the banner of communism, liberated humanity will write, together with the words Labor and Peace, the word Science.

The growing significance of science is manifested in the increasing complexity and expansion of the functions of science, i.e., of the tasks it performs. Contemporary science performs the following functions: utilitarian, worldview, gnoseological, and prognostic^24). A number of works also note the logical^25), informational^26), and cultural-educational functions of science^27). The question of the social functions of science was first examined in detail by John D. Bernal in the book The Social Function of Science (1939). Sometimes, in sociology, functions are understood as the consequences of a given phenomenon or object for the entire system into which the object is included as one of its structural elements (a subsystem). In this understanding of the term function, the question of the social functions of science is closely intertwined with the problem of the regularities of modern science.

^23) The Scientific-Technological Revolution and Social Progress. Moscow, 1969, p. 8.

^24) A. B. Zelmanov. Social functions of science. In: Proceedings of the Third Scientific Conference of the Department of Social Sciences of the Tomsk Polytechnic Institute. Tomsk, 1970, pp. 136–141.

^25) The Logic of Scientific Research. P. 289.

^26) V. I. Rotnitskii. Science as a Direct Productive Force. Proceedings of the Tomsk Polytechnic Institute. Vol. 220, Tomsk, 1970, pp. 94–98.

^27) P. A. Rachkov. The Role of Science in the Construction of Communism. Pp. 273–277.

3. Patterns of the Development of Science

Every material object represents a unity of stability and mutability. Science, being a relatively independent system, is likewise a unity of stability and mutability. In the structure of science the moment of its stability is fixed. Mutability, the process of the development of science, is fixed by the functions and patterns of science. Of course, the structure of science itself “can be disclosed and correctly understood only from the standpoint of the idea of development”¹⁹.

Science as an object is subject to the laws of development. The patterns of the development of science may provisionally be divided into two groups. The first group comprises laws to which not only science, but all forms of social consciousness are subject²⁰. The second group comprises the laws of the contemporary development of science. The laws of the first group are general sociological laws; the laws of the second are specific regularities.

Among the general sociological laws of science are the secondary character of science and its dependence on social being, the relative independence of science and its active reverse influence on social being, continuity in development, interaction with all forms of social consciousness, and also the class character of science.

Science is a unity of the material and the ideal. From the standpoint of its role in society, of its influence on all social relations, science appears as a social institution for the production of knowledge. In this respect science contains material elements (technical base, personnel) and ideal elements (methods of cognition, a system of knowledge). From the standpoint of the specificity of science’s reflection of objective reality, it is one of the forms of social consciousness, and in this respect it represents an ideal phenomenon.

Being precisely a form of social consciousness, science reflects social being and depends on it; consequently, science is secondary in relation to social being. Naturally, science has its specificity in comparison with such forms of social consciousness as political consciousness and legal consciousness. These forms of social consciousness directly reflect the basis and depend on it. In political consciousness and legal consciousness the fundamental interests of the main classes of society find ideological reflection. Science is also a reflection of the needs and interests of various classes (especially the social sciences). But in it the contradictory unity of the cognitive and ideological moments is formed in such a way that the cognitive moment predominates (especially in the natural sciences). The secondary character of science in relation to social being is manifested also in the fact that, being a system of reliable knowledge about nature, society, and cognition, it arises and develops under the influence of the needs of material production, and depends on the level of development of production.

In modern society the feedback connection between science and production is manifested especially noticeably. Science actively affects all

aspects of social being and, first of all, the process of producing material goods. The active influence of science on production in the modern world leads to the transformation of science into a direct productive force, and this is already a specific regularity of science as a social institution.

In its development, science, like all forms of social consciousness, possesses continuity. Even fundamentally new, revolutionary scientific theories arise on the basis of the preceding development of science and can be understood only with due regard for the prehistory of their emergence. Thus, Einstein’s development of the theory of relativity was preceded by the works of Minkowski and Lobachevsky, Poincaré, Lorentz, and Mach. Even I. Newton, noting the merits of his predecessors, asserted that he had stood on the shoulders of giants. Marxism, having carried out a revolution in socio-political views, in society’s worldview, absorbed the rational ideas of A. Smith, D. Ricardo, G. W. F. Hegel, L. Feuerbach, A. Saint-Simon, Ch. Fourier, and R. Owen.

Science interacts in a complex way with all forms of social consciousness—political ideology, legal consciousness, moral consciousness, aesthetic consciousness, religious consciousness, and philosophy. In the modern epoch, to a lesser extent than in the past, the interaction of science with religion is manifested, owing to the displacement of religion from the spiritual sphere of society; but the active interaction of science with moral consciousness and art is becoming ever more manifest.

Finally, science is a class form of social consciousness. The class character of such human sciences as political economy, historical materialism, and scientific communism is indisputable. The class character of the sciences of nature is less obvious. The social sciences directly express the interests of the principal social classes. The natural sciences do not directly touch upon the interests of the classes struggling in bourgeois society, but their results are used in the epoch of imperialism in the interests of the monopolies, and under socialism in the interests of the victorious proletariat and of society as a whole. Further, worldview conclusions from the natural sciences are used in the ideological struggle, which is a reflection and manifestation of class struggle. The class nature of science is far from obvious even to outstanding representatives of contemporary natural science. Speaking of the role of science in the modern world, Norbert Wiener quoted the words of the physiologist Bove: “Science is used like coal or oil.” But Wiener goes on to assert that “the inner life of science must not be too directly dependent on the politics of the moment or on the official mode of thought... This means that, as a condition of the scientist’s effective activity, there must remain something—not too much—of the position of the ‘ivory tower,’ which it is now fashionable to denounce.”^30) If this statement by one of the pioneers of cybernetics is understood in the sense of the relative independence of science, one can agree with it. But if one speaks of the class nature of science in the contemporary world, Wiener’s arguments provoke serious objections. The point is that modern science, by virtue of its class character, is ever more closely intertwined with politics. In the Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU “On the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin” it is emphasized: “Science and technology in the modern world have become the most important arena of competition between two opposing socio-econo-

^30) N. Wiener. Science and Society. Voprosy filosofii, 1961, No. 7, p. 120.

...world system. Here a long and persistent struggle lies ahead”^31).

Let us turn to an analysis of the specific regularities in the development of modern science. With the development of science, their number is becoming increasingly recognized.

Science’s self-knowledge of its own specific laws of development leads to the formulation of an ever larger number of empirically derived regularities of science. B. M. Kedrov investigated the regularities in the development of the natural sciences. Among them he includes the very laws of nature studied by natural science. The classification of the laws of nature, according to B. M. Kedrov, appears as follows: broader and narrower laws (according to the sphere of their action), more general and more particular laws (according to the character of their commonality in relation to one another), deeper and more descriptive laws; laws expressing succession in time; laws expressing preservation, the connection of aspects and objects differing in their structure; qualitative and quantitative laws; laws expressing functional dependence^32). Kedrov does not consider laws of science proper, that is, the laws according to which science functions and develops as a system, although he does use the term “laws of science.”

M. M. Karpov includes among the internal regularities of the development of science: a) the relative autonomy of science, b) the struggle of opinions in science, c) the mutual influence of sciences, d) continuity, e) the international character of the development of science, and f) international cooperation^33).

Such a classification of the laws of science is neither rigorous nor exhaustive. There is no rigor in M. M. Karpov’s scheme of the laws of science already because general sociological laws (items a) and c)) are mixed with particular, specific laws. In addition, the regularities named are characteristic not only of science but also of many elements of spiritual culture.

The main shortcoming of the proposed classification of the laws of science is that contemporary tendencies in the development of science are not reflected here.

The chief feature of modern science, marking its fundamentally new position in contemporary society, is the transformation of science into a direct productive force. This is the first specific regularity of modern science. Modern production is based on the technological application of science, as predicted by F. Engels^34). The influence of science on production is effected through the mediating influence of technology. For the progress of productive activity, the anticipatory development of technology is necessary; for the progress of technology, the anticipatory development of science is necessary.

The second regularity in the development of science is its exponential development. The law of the exponential development of science was discovered by F. Engels and received mathematical expression. The development of science cannot proceed for a long time exponentially. At the present time, its action in quantitative expression in particular—

^31) “On the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin.” Theses of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Politizdat, Moscow, 1970, p. 56.

^32) B. M. Kedrov. The Subject and Interrelation of the Natural Sciences. pp. 102–120.

^33) M. M. Karpov. Science and the Development of Society. pp. 22–48.

^34) Engels wrote that all types of production are gradually turning into a “technological application of science.” (K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, vol. 23, p. 638).

...of structural subdivisions of science (for example, departments) is expressed by a logistic curve. From the moment when scientific methods saturate all kinds of human activity, the law of the exponential development of science will lose its force.

Modern science is characterized by mutually opposite and mutually complementary processes of differentiation and integration. The differentiation and integration of knowledge is the third specific law of modern science. At present the differentiation of science predominates. For example, in medicine there already exist more than 270 independent disciplines, and in all there are reckoned to be more than 2000 sciences.

The emergence of cybernetics and of general systems theory is a striking example of the integration of knowledge achieved on the basis of identifying common problems for many fields of science. The tendency toward the mutual penetration of the methods of different sciences also testifies to the progressiveness of the tendency toward integration. The differentiation of the sciences is manifested not only in the appearance of new areas of knowledge and boundary disciplines arising at the junction of sciences, sometimes studying different forms of the motion of matter (for example, biochemistry, geophysics, physical chemistry, space medicine). Even within a relatively independent field of knowledge there is a fairly clear division of labor between theorists and “applied specialists.” On the whole, the process of differentiation and integration in modern science cannot be evaluated unambiguously—either as progress or only as regress. This process is contradictory, and at present it is still impossible to draw categorical conclusions as to by what means science itself will in the future neutralize the negative consequences of the differentiation of the sciences and the narrow specialization of scholars.

The fourth specific regularity of modern science is the mathematization of knowledge. The process of the mathematization of science is a progressive tendency leading to the improvement of scientific theory and to the expansion of the field of activity of the applied applications of science.

Modern science is concerned not so much with the description of complex systemic objects as with the explanation of the internal regularities governing the motion of complex objects. In this connection the researcher deals with the analysis of numerous variables and their complex interaction; the methodological significance of such categories as probability increases. Complex connections among numerous variables and probabilistic processes can be investigated only by mathematical methods. It is no accident that quantitative methods have penetrated not only biology, but also the social disciplines. As a result, such disciplines as operations research, mathematical linguistics, econometrics, mathematical sociology, and so forth have appeared.

A fundamentally important achievement of science, connected with progress in the construction of computing devices, is the use of electronic computers to solve a class of problems whose solution was in principle impossible in the past. Among such problems, which have enormous national-economic significance, are problems of compiling optimal variants for the placement of productive forces on the scale of large economic regions and of the country as a whole, methods of weather forecasting, calculations of satellite orbits, etc. On the whole, Marx’s profound thought is justified...

that “science attains perfection only when it succeeds in making use of mathematics”^35).

And yet it must be acknowledged that the penetration of mathematical methods into the social sciences still has only limited application. It would be naïve to think that the reason for this is the mathematical dilettantism of humanists, although, of course, the mathematical training of scholars in the social sciences is far from perfect. It should be recognized that new mathematical tools are required to describe complex social systems. Although in recent decades such branches of mathematical science have appeared as operations research, game theory, graph theory, queuing theory, which are successfully applied in social research, a mathematical apparatus has still not been created for solving many problems. Many problems still do not even have an approximate quantitative solution, and in the solution of some problems trivial results are obtained, and sometimes simply absurdities^36).

The fifth specific regularity of the development of modern science is the planning of its development. Modern science develops and is carried out by large collectives. Society is interested in the high effectiveness of the activity of large scientific collectives. Through the state, society as it were issues a social order for the solution of the most urgent national-economic tasks. The concentration of efforts and resources produces the proper effect in solving fundamentally important scientific problems. The example of the creation of nuclear weapons in the USA and the USSR is the first model of the planned development of science.

Of course, it is difficult to plan a scientific discovery in a rigid way, with accuracy down to years and months. However, the example of the predictions of futurologists and of the intensive development of forecasting shows that, in principle, it is possible to plan and predict fundamental discoveries for which the need has ripened and the prerequisites for whose realization have in principle been created. One should distinguish between the planning of fundamental discoveries and of applied investigations. “By its natural character, scientific and technical creativity is a probabilistic process; its results cannot be predicted in advance in all their detail and concreteness—otherwise it would cease to be creativity, that is, the discovery of something new, unknown,” writes Academician A. M. Rumyantsev^37). But further on he rightly notes that this does not mean the exclusion of fundamental discoveries from the sphere of planning. “The planning of fundamental and of applied research based on their presumed results must provide for the general target direction of efforts, the allocation of resources in accordance with social needs and possibilities”^38).

The sixth regularity of modern science is the interpenetration of methods. This regularity can be explained by the action of the above-considered regularities of science—its mathematization and integration. The interaction of the methods of the various sciences reflects both the unity of the world and the unity of the basic laws of cognition. The interpenetration and interaction of methods

^35) Reminiscences of K. Marx and F. Engels. Gospolitizdat, Moscow, 1956, p. 66.

^36) See, for example: Problems of General and Social Forecasting. Issue 2. Information Bulletin of the Soviet Sociological Association, No. 29, 1969, Moscow, pp. 11, 67.

^37) A. M. Rumyantsev. Problems of Contemporary Science about Society. “Nauka,” Moscow, 1969, p. 260.

^38) Ibid., p. 261.

is proceeding intensively in the natural sciences. Thus, physical methods of research have penetrated into chemistry and biology; cybernetic methods are used in all the fundamental sciences. In the social sciences this process is less noticeable, but it also takes place. For example, in modern economic science the sociological approach to the object of research is becoming increasingly characteristic. In sociological studies, methods of social psychology are applied.

The foregoing considerations make it possible to arrive at the conclusion that there is a fairly large number of new regularities of science. In this connection the question arises of classifying these regularities. An attempt to classify the general regularities of science was undertaken by V. A. Dmitrienko²¹. On the basis of a critical analysis of the works of D. M. Troshin, M. M. Karpov, P. A. Rachkov, and others, he distinguishes the following groups of laws of the development of science: 1) internal laws operating within the limits of its autonomy; 2) laws that record the interrelation of science with various aspects of social life; 3) empirical and theoretical laws; 4) general and particular laws; 5) structural-functional laws²².

In this classification, the distinction between the first and second groups of laws deserves special attention²³. Of the six regularities discussed in this article, the majority belong to the first group—to laws characterizing the internal life and development of science. These are the law of the exponential development of science, the law of differentiation and integration of science, mathematization, and the mutual penetration of methods. The law of the planning of the results of science and the collective character of its development, state regulation of scientific activity, and the transformation of science into a direct productive force characterize the interaction of science as a specific social institution with society as a whole. This is the second group of laws of science.

The named regularities in the development of modern science are precisely laws, since they express a stable, recurring, essential, and necessary connection of phenomena. These laws should be distinguished from certain features and tendencies in modern science that are characteristic not only of the functioning and development of science, but also of other forms of social consciousness. For example, freedom of criticism, the relative autonomy of science, and the inevitability of revolutions in its development, noted by M. M. Karpov in the book Basic Regularities in the Development of Natural Science, are features of many kinds of social consciousness, including art and philosophy.

In conclusion, let us note that the laws of the development of science and its structure must be considered in unity. Some laws of science characterize the development of its individual structural components. For example, the law of the exponential development of science applies primarily to the personnel of science and to its final result—knowledge. A detailed study of the structure and laws of the development of science is possible only along the paths of a systemic-structural sociological analysis of science.

1. See, for example: I. G. Kurakov. Science and Technology in the Period of the Full-Scale Construction of Communism. Sotsekgiz, Moscow, 1963; I. V. Lada, O. N. Pisarzhevsky. Contours of the Future. “Znanie,” Moscow, 1965; G. M. Dobrov. The Science of Science. “Naukova dumka,” Kiev, 1970; G. N. Volkov. Sociology of Science. “Mysl,” Moscow, 1968; P. V. Kopnin. Logical Foundations of Science. Kiev, 1968; P. A. Rachkov. The Role of Science in the Construction of Communism. Moscow, 1969; B. G. Kuznetsov. Science in the Year 2000. “Nauka,” Moscow, 1969. ↩

2. American Sociology. Perspectives, Problems, Methods. Ed. by T. Parsons. New York, 1968, p. 199 (in English). ↩

3. The Logic of Scientific Research. “Nauka,” Moscow, 1965, p. 290. ↩

4. B. M. Kedrov. The Subject Matter and Interconnection of the Natural Sciences. Moscow, 1967, p. 62. ↩

5. B. M. Kedrov. The Subject and Interconnection of the Natural Sciences, Moscow, “Nauka,” 1967, pp. 63–66. ↩

6. Ibid., p. 71. ↩

7. M. M. Karpov, Science and the Development of Society, p. 6. ↩

8. I. S. Narsky, Critique of Concepts of Science in Bourgeois Philosophy. “Znanie,” Moscow, 1969, p. 37. ↩

9. The Logic of Scientific Research. Moscow, 1965; P. V. Kopnin, Introduction to Marxist Gnoseology. Kiev, 1966. ↩

10. World Economy and International Relations, 1970, No. 8. (Supplement). ↩

11. Political Self-Education, 1971, No. 1, p. 13. ↩

12. G. M. Dobrov, The Science of Science, “Naukova dumka,” p. 13. ↩

13. Ibid., pp. 117–118. ↩

14. The Scientific and Technological Revolution and Social Progress. “Mysl,” Moscow, 1969, p. 8. ↩

15. Behavioral Sciences Today. New York, 1964, p. 250 (in English). ↩

16. For details on the organization of science, see the book by G. M. Dobrov, V. N. Klimenko, V. M. Odrina, and A. A. Savel’eva, Organization of Science, “Naukova dumka,” Kiev, 1970. ↩

17. P. A. Rachkov, The Role of Science in the Construction of Communism, Moscow, 1969, p. 120. ↩

18. V. M. Shamberg, “The Scientific and Technological Revolution and American Imperialism,” Modern and Contemporary History, No. 3, 1969, p. 9. ↩

19. B. M. Kedrov, The Subject and Interrelation of the Natural Sciences, p. 63. ↩

20. In different respects science appears now as a social institution for the production of knowledge, now as an information system, now as a form of social consciousness. ↩

21. V. A. Dmitrienko, “On the General Regularities of the Development of Science,” in Problems of the Methodology and Logic of Science, issue 5. Tomsk, 1969, pp. 3–9. ↩

22. Ibid., p. 7. ↩

23. Here we do not distinguish between the concepts of law and regularity. ↩