The Specific Nature of Scientific Labor and Some Issues in the Organization of Wages in Research Institutions

V. G. Zavyalov

(Presented by the scientific seminar of the Department of Political Economy)

The functioning of scientific research as a labor process is always carried out within the framework of definite economic relations. These relations arise in the sphere of science in connection with the use in scientific research of definite objects and means of labor, as well as of the results of research. The material conditions for conducting the given research, as well as its results, act as an object of ownership. Under socialism they are the property of society; therefore society disposes of the results of the scientist’s labor.

On the other hand, all scientific workers without exception, in all fields of science, participate in the distribution and consumption of the social product. By virtue of this alone, economic relations penetrate the sphere of scientific research and leave their imprint on relations among people. However, as has been correctly noted in the economic literature¹, economic relations in the sphere of science and, in particular, relations of distribution are distinguished by a whole series of features in comparison with the sphere of material production. The factor that determines the presence of these features is the specific nature of the very processes of creating new technology. For economic relations in the field of scientific research, what is of primary importance is, above all, the creative character of the labor of scientific workers, which determines its relative non-reproducibility, uniqueness, the probabilistic character of its results, and their sharp differentiation as a consequence

a great difference in the individual creative capacities of workers, and the absence of a clear confinement of the labor process within the limits of working time.

The specific manner in which labor processes unfold in the sphere of scientific research reflects the special role of the factors of time and uncertainty in evaluating this type of activity. It is expressed in the impossibility of:

a) precisely establishing the basic proportions between expenditures and the expected effect, owing to the noncoincidence in time between them;

b) reliably determining, in a number of cases before the labor process begins, its final outcome and the paths by which this result will be realized in social production.

The distinctive features of economic relations in the sphere of science are determined by the specificity of the products of scientific labor themselves, whose immaterial, non-material form makes their valuation in terms of cost difficult².

Consequently, the character and features of scientific labor make it possible to clarify the specificity of economic relations in the field of scientific research and, on this basis, to establish the forms and methods of participation by scientific workers in the distribution of the aggregate social product. The improvement of systems of material incentives in science is currently proceeding in two directions:

1. Improvement of the relations between the worker and society concerning the distribution of material benefits in the process of creating new technology through the wage system and through special state bonus systems.

2. Improvement of distributive relations between workers and society through the relations of the collective with the state, by improving the formation and use of the incentive funds of a scientific organization.

In the first case, direct relations are established between the worker and society concerning the distribution of material benefits; in the second, these relations are mediated by scientific organizations. Corresponding to the two directions in the development of material incentives, practice also knows two methods of such incentives:

a) centralized—at the expense of nationwide resources,

b) cost-accounting—at the expense of the incentive funds of the scientific organization.

In turn, each of the named methods is manifested in a whole series of forms of incentives for scientific workers, depending on the expenditures of their labor and on its results.

The starting point for analyzing the totality of distributive relations in the sphere of science is the consideration of those aspects of them that take shape between the scientific worker and society with regard to the distribution of the fund of individual consumption and appear in the form of wages. These relations differ substantially from similar distributive relations between the worker and society that exist in the sphere of material production³.

There, production makes it possible to establish a direct dependence between the work performed by a definite, concrete worker and the results obtained. Thanks to this, distribution is also able to reflect this connection directly and immediately, by granting the given worker a definite share in the fund of individual consumption corresponding to his labor contribution, the expression of which is the result obtained.

In the sphere of science the matter stands differently. Owing to the so-called asynchrony of the incurring of costs and the obtaining of results, the direct connection between the labor contribution of an individual worker and the results of labor is broken, and this cannot fail to be reflected in relations of distribution. “In the sphere of science, under conditions of a significant time gap between the incurring of labor costs and the social recognition of their product, exceptional importance attaches to the task of finding the optimal limits of the ‘lagging’ evaluation of the labor of an individual worker”⁴. In order to avoid excessive “lagging,” to ensure a stable material interest on the part of workers in the development of scientific and technical progress, and not to violate the unified principles of distribution in all branches of the economy, society is compelled to enter into relations with each individual scientific worker without knowing in advance the final results of his labor, but only assuming the possibility of obtaining them in the future. In other words, the direct connection between labor expenditures and the results obtained, reflected in the system of distribution of the remuneration fund according to labor, is broken in the sphere of science, while scientific labor itself is evaluated above all according to the fact that expenditures have been made, provided that they are recognized as scientific.

Thus, every expenditure of scientific labor is recognized as socially useful and significant and serves as the basis for the participation of people of science in the distribution of the fund of individual consumption. In this connection there arises the question of the quantitative aspect of the participation of the scientific worker in the distribution of the fund of individual consumption. Its expression in a direct economic form in the sphere of science is evidently not possible. If in all other types of activity the periodic recurrence of the conditions for the reproduction of the worker’s capacity for labor to a considerable degree determines the quantitative characteristic of the measure of consumption, since it establishes its lower boundary, then the relative nonreproducibility of scientific labor endows it with elements of economic monopoly and requires the removal of the quantitative dependence of the measure of consumption on the conditions for reproducing the worker’s capacity for scientific labor.

What has been said does not mean that there is in general no possibility of determining the measure of consumption by a scientific worker, nor does it prevent the finding of criteria that would establish its boundaries indirectly, by empirical means. Apparently, the quantitative characteristic of the measure of consumption is already embedded in the very method of evaluating the social usefulness of scientific labor according to a formal criterion.

Indeed, if society admits a scientific worker to distribution without knowing in advance the concrete results of his labor—

yes, but, without assuming their appearance, this means that it evaluates this type of labor no lower than any other. Consequently, the measure of consumption of scientific workers cannot be less than the volume of consumption of workers in any other type of activity that is freely reproducible. At the same time, it must be sufficient for the scientific worker to engage precisely in this type of activity; that is, quantitatively, the volume of consumption of scientific workers must be established at the level of the measure of consumption of the most highly qualified types of freely reproducible labor. It would seem that real confirmation of this can also be found in the concrete practice of labor remuneration.

Indeed, the wages of workers in science are higher than those of industrial-production personnel. However, first, the wage of scientific workers, set at or above the wage of workers in a freely reproducible type of activity, is only the lower limit of their measure of consumption. Second, the gap in labor remuneration between the sphere of science and the sphere of industry is currently very small. Moreover, it is steadily decreasing. Thus, over 19 years (1950–1969) it declined from 24.5% to 3.8%. The wage of industrial workers in 1969 amounted to 96.3% of the wage of workers in science and scientific services. At the same time, the rates of growth of the average monthly wage of industrial-production personnel considerably exceed the rates of growth of wages of workers in the sphere of science. In 1950–1969 they amounted, for the former, to 4.2%, whereas for the latter they were only 2.2%.

If these rates of growth are maintained, in the near future the wage of industrial workers will not only reach the wage level in the sphere of science and scientific services, but will exceed it. Unfortunately, the absence in the statistical data and materials of the Central Statistical Administration of information on the average wage of individual categories of workers in the sphere of science makes it impossible to compare them with the various categories of industrial-production personnel. Therefore, the analysis has to be limited to data on the personnel of the spheres of science and industry as a whole.

But even these data make it possible to assert that, when establishing the quantitative characteristic of the measure of consumption of scientific workers, society in fact equates it with the volume of consumption of workers in the sphere of material production. Using this measure of consumption as the objective basis of calculation, it subsequently shifts the remuneration of workers in science in one direction or another depending on the time, place, and type of scientific activity.

Consequently, in the sphere of science, the basis for a worker’s participation in the distribution of the fund of individual consumption is society’s recognition of his labor as scientific. But in that case the question arises: by what criteria should labor be regarded as scientific and a worker be admitted to participation in distribution? N. G. Smirnov and B. A. Rybin consider such criteria to be the worker’s possession of higher education and his activity within the framework of a scientific organization⁵.

With this approach, equating the volume of consumption of scientific workers with the measure of consumption of industrial-production personnel raises no objections. In fact—

such an equation contradicts the character and content of scientific labor. If scientific labor is regarded as creative labor, possessing a special complexity and requiring increased expenditures on the part of the worker, then it must be acknowledged that the measure of his participation in distribution should substantially exceed the volume of consumption of most types of freely reproducible activity.

In practice, this is the case only for that part of scientific workers which holds an academic degree. Consequently, it is precisely the academic degree that should serve as the basis for society’s recognition of labor as scientific and for establishing for the worker a measure of consumption corresponding to the character and content of the activity he performs.

This characteristic still remains formal, since the award of an academic degree to a worker does not yet guarantee society that it will subsequently receive scientific output from him. But it reduces the risk of unjustified expenditures on wages on the part of society, since it admits to distribution workers capable of engaging specifically in scientific labor and of obtaining genuinely scientific results.

Thus, in the sphere of science, labor serves as the basis for the worker’s participation in distribution, but it is not the measure used in establishing his share in the fund of individual consumption. This measure is established empirically, by comparison with activity in material production. From this follows an important conclusion for the organization of wages for scientific workers in research institutes and design bureaus. First of all, the determination of the quantity and quality of scientific labor that underlie wages is carried out by means of a special method, through comparison with the sphere of material production.

The quantity of labor is expressed through the working time spent on carrying out a given scientific topic, preparing working drawings, executing a model, etc. The difficulty in establishing the quantity of labor of scientific workers consists in the fact that, in most cases, there are no scientifically grounded labor-intensity norms for carrying out research work. One of the main reasons for this situation is the fundamental differences in the very character of research work as compared with work connected with the direct manufacture of one product or another; this also prevents the application of norm-setting in the sphere of research. Research work rarely consists of completely repeated operations, since it is connected with developing the theory of a question, conducting laboratory and experimental investigations, contains elements of risk and uncertainty, etc.; that is, it is characterized by creative content.

It is precisely for this reason that methods of labor norm-setting must differ substantially from the generally accepted ones. Unfortunately, the existing departmental instructions on planning and accounting for work in research institutes and design bureaus contain no guidance at all on the means and methods of estimating labor intensity. This leads to diversity in determining methods for measuring labor expenditures by different research institutes and design bureaus. At present the overwhelming majority of them determine labor intensity by the expert method.

The theoretical basis of this method is that the labor intensity of a study is a function of the duration of its execution and the number of participants in the work. Hence the tendency is understandable, when

by expert assessment of labor intensity, to determine above all the number of participants, given the pre-established deadlines for carrying out the work. In most cases the number of participants is established on the basis of experience in conducting similar work. As a rule, the required number of participants is taken to be equal to the actual number of employees in the departments and laboratories of the research institute. The distribution of the total labor intensity by stages and types of work is carried out by the head of the work in agreement with the heads of the research-institute subdivisions participating in the given developments. Such a practice of labor standardization in research institutes does little to help establish the proper ratio between pay and expenditures of labor, and does not create conditions for the application of rational forms of remuneration in research institutes.

The matter is still more complicated when it comes to determining the quality of scientific labor. It includes two aspects—the qualitative differences in the labor of workers of different professions, and the qualitative differences in labor within the limits of a single profession. The first of these requires a substantial differentiation of wage rates for scientific workers of different professions. However, carrying out this measure contradicts the formal recognition of scientific labor as the basis for a scientific worker’s participation in the fund distributed according to labor. Indeed, if society allows a scientific worker to participate in distribution only on a formal basis, then there are no grounds for any substantial differentiation in their basic wage rates. The absence of accounting for the concrete results of activity deprives society of the possibility of evaluating one or another type of scientific labor as more significant by a strictly defined amount, and compels it to fix its remuneration on the basis of a firmly established objective foundation. As such an objective basis in determining the minimum wage rate for scientific workers, qualification (level of education) and length of service are used. Neither the one nor the other makes it possible to differentiate pay by profession. Such differentiation is carried out only depending on the national-economic significance of the field of science in which the given worker is employed. In turn, the significance of particular scientific professions is established chiefly on subjective grounds, which cannot have a positive effect on the differentiation of wages in the various fields of science.

The second aspect—the qualitative differentiation of scientific labor within each given type of it, each given profession—is taken into account through wage supplements for length of service in the given profession or in the given branch of labor. A distinctive qualification supplement to the official salary is the supplement for an academic degree, which makes it possible to differentiate the remuneration of scientists into two groups—candidates and doctors of science—and to create a long-term incentive for raising the level of training of scientific personnel. However, through supplements for length of service and for an academic degree it is impossible to differentiate, with sufficient accuracy, the wage rates of scientific workers according to the quality of their labor. It is generally known that workers who have the same level of education and equal length of service in their specialty may differ significantly in their actual qualifications and have far from identical results in labor.

Consequently, neither the qualitative differences of scientific labor within the framework of different scientific professions, nor the qualitative differences—

...or within each given profession at the present time to the extent to which they are taken into account, do not make it possible to carry out the necessary differentiation in the remuneration of scientists. Their significance in the sphere of science, however, is exceptionally great. It has been established that the officially regulated factors that cause wage growth (length of service, academic degree) have a relatively small specific weight. Thus, increases for length of service of scientific workers account for 5–10% of the total amount of additional payments, and for an academic degree, 10–25%. But 70% of the total increase in wages falls on the employee’s advancement in position⁶. This means that the principal means of material stimulation of scientific workers is their promotion in position. In practice, in a number of cases this leads to undesirable phenomena. For example, lacking the possibility of additionally stimulating a highly qualified scientific worker who is successfully conducting scientific research at a given salary rate, he is transferred to a more highly paid category of managerial personnel. In doing so, a valuable researcher is often lost, since he must now perform new organizational functions, and the purposeful nature of material interest is violated, because the object of material stimulation is being substituted.

The insignificant ranges (gaps) in salaries for individual categories of employees in research organizations do not make it possible to differentiate substantially the rates of their basic wages, especially for persons without an academic degree, and thereby to create real, prospective material incentives within the very system of official salaries. At present, a three-stage system of official salaries operates in research organizations. For each separate category the gap coefficient (the ratio of the highest salary to the lowest) is 1.25. The overall gap coefficient (the ratio of the highest salary of the highest category to the lowest salary of the lowest category) for the main categories of employees (without the supplement for an academic degree) ranges from 1.8 to 2.1. In the economic literature it has long been proposed to raise the gap coefficient and increase the number of salaries within individual categories, which will lead to an increase in the overall gap coefficient. But such an increase must be scientifically substantiated. Apparently, the basis for increasing the range of the official salary and their number should be a closer connection between the wage of a scientific worker and the results of his labor. That direct connection which exists between the labor expenditures of a scientific worker and his results must receive fuller and more precise reflection in his official salary. To this end, by decision of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the USSR on Labor and Wages of August 13, 1968, the L. Ya. Karpov Moscow Research Physicochemical Institute (VNIFKhI) was transferred, as an experiment, from the fourth quarter of 1968 to a new system of remuneration for scientific staff.

The director of the institute was granted the right:

1) to establish, for a period of 2 years, upon the recommendation of the qualification commission, guaranteed minimum salaries for scientific and engineering-technical employees in the amount of 70–80% of the existing official salaries;

2) establish increments to the guaranteed minimum position salaries of employees, depending on the effectiveness of their labor, so that these salaries, together with the increments, do not exceed the amounts provided for in the regulations;

3) establish, for a period of 1–2 years, increments to the wages of highly qualified workers within the limits of 30% of earnings, and also, for individual clerical employees and employees of the scientific auxiliary staff, up to 30% of the position salary.

For the duration of the experiment, the wage fund allocated to the institute was divided into two parts: the guaranteed wage fund and the material-incentive fund.

The guaranteed wage fund consists of the guaranteed salaries of employees occupying scientific and engineering-technical positions, and the salaries of the remaining employees.

The material-incentive fund is determined as the difference between the wage fund and the guaranteed wage fund, and also includes the amounts allocated to the institute under the existing regulations on bonuses for employees.

It should be noted that the institute’s annual allocations from the state budget for scientific-research work (including the wage fund) are maintained at the level approved in 1968 and, if they are not used during the reporting year, are not withdrawn into the revenue of the state budget but remain at the institute’s disposal, provided that the plan is fulfilled.

Three years have passed since the L. Ya. Karpov Physico-Chemical Scientific Research Institute transferred to the new system of remuneration for scientific workers, and it is now possible to sum up certain results and draw definite conclusions*). First of all, under the new procedure of remuneration, the employee’s academic degree and length of service are still taken into account. These criteria determine his guaranteed minimum salary. But now they are not the only indicators for determining the size of the salary. The amount of the increment is established depending on the effectiveness of the employee’s labor. For example, in an institute of the first category, the salary of a senior research associate with the academic degree of Candidate of Sciences, with up to 5 years’ experience in scientific-pedagogical work, is 250 rubles; from 5 to 10 years—280 rubles; over 10 years—300 rubles. At the same time, the effectiveness of his labor could vary, while remuneration remained unchanged. Now, at the L. Ya. Karpov Physico-Chemical Scientific Research Institute, a senior research associate with the academic degree of Candidate of Sciences has been assigned a guaranteed salary of 225 rubles. Provided that his work is maximally effective, it may be raised to 375 rubles.

And so it is for employees of every category. The increment for effectiveness is of especially great importance for employees who do not possess an academic degree. Thus, under the existing scheme of position salaries, a junior research associate without a degree may receive no more than 127.5 rubles per month. At the Physico-Chemical Scientific Research Institute, with very good work, he can now receive a salary of up to 200 rubles per month, i.e., the same salary that was formerly received by a junior research associate with the degree of Candidate of Sciences and with no less than 10 years’ work experience.

But to establish such a salary, it is necessary to carry out very complex and painstaking work to determine the effectiveness

*) See: “New Developments in the Remuneration of Scholars,” Pravda, March 25, 1969, No. 84; Ya. Kolotyrkin, “The Material Interest and Responsibility of the Scholar,” Sotsialisticheskii trud, 1969, No. 11.

the labor of a scientific worker. It would not cause particular difficulties if there existed a measure of labor or the possibility of a quantitative assessment of the results of scientific activity. However, as was noted above, such methods of evaluating labor in the sphere of science are either altogether impossible or extremely difficult. In this connection, the evaluation of the labor effectiveness of VNIFKhI employees was carried out by expert means and was assigned to the central and three sectional qualification commissions created at the institute. Their membership included the most authoritative scientists representing all the principal areas of the institute’s scientific activity, as well as representatives of public organizations. In addition, a list of information that had to be considered in evaluating an employee’s labor was developed in advance for each category of employees, taking into account its specificity and the level of requirements imposed.

In order to avoid chance factors, the evaluation of labor effectiveness was given for five years and was three-stage. At the first stage, the laboratory head evaluated the results of the work of his employees and gave a recommendation concerning changes in their wages. At the second, the sectional commission determined the employee’s labor effectiveness on a ten-point scale. At the third, the central commission checked the correctness of the decisions adopted and adjusted the coefficients in accordance with the institute-wide level. All decisions were made without the presence of the employees being certified, but they retained the right to appeal them to the director of the institute and to demand a repeated consideration of the question in their presence.

The new system of official salaries with supplements has been established for two years, after which recertification of scientific workers will again be carried out.

The chief merit of the new system is that it links labor remuneration with its results much better than before and thereby serves as a powerful stimulus for increasing the effectiveness of scientific labor. This is attested by the facts. Thus, in the first six months of 1969, the scientific workers and engineers of VNIFKhI made one and a half times more inventions than in any year of the preceding years, when the old system of labor remuneration was in effect. The number of articles submitted by institute employees for publication increased by 25%.^8

The new system of labor remuneration made it possible to differentiate more deeply the salaries of scientific and engineering-technical workers, which ensures the prospective interests of individual workers in the development of scientific and technical progress, since the wages of all categories without exception act as a long-term incentive, as a stable form of ensuring material interest. A deeper differentiation of pay is the result of an economically justified increase in the coefficients of the gap between the salaries of different categories of workers, since the basis for such an increase is the productivity of workers’ labor.

Such an increase is especially important for employees holding the positions of junior research associate and engineer, since these are the most widespread categories of employees in research institutes. Moreover, the majority of employees in these categories, as a rule,

^8 Ya. Kolotyrkin, “Material Interest and the Responsibility of the Scientist,” Sotsialisticheskii trud, 1969, No. 11, p. 22.

do not hold an academic degree, and consequently differentiation in the remuneration of their labor is effected only by means of the range of the official salary. The relatively small “gap coefficient” in the salaries of senior research associates (under the current scheme of official salaries, 1.5; at VNIFKhI, 1.8) is explained by the fact that the majority of employees occupying these positions have the academic degrees of Candidate or Doctor of Sciences; therefore, a deeper differentiation of pay concerned, chiefly, persons with degrees. (For senior research associates who are Candidates of Sciences the gap coefficient is 1.9, and for Doctors of Sciences, 2.) What is new in the experiment being conducted at VNIFKhI is the establishment of a range of official salaries for the institute’s managerial personnel: heads of departments, heads of laboratories, and group leaders. Such a measure should be recognized as expedient, since, first, the named categories of persons can take a direct part in scientific research and exert the same influence on its results as all other research associates; and, second, the organizational and technical measures they carry out largely determine the success of the research and its results. These circumstances make it necessary not only to differentiate the remuneration of managerial personnel, but also to differentiate it considerably more deeply than that of ordinary research associates, since their influence on the process of scientific labor and on its results is greater. On the whole, the increase in the gap coefficient in salaries for each separate category contributed to a substantial increase in the overall gap coefficient as well, which at the L. Ya. Karpov VNIFKhI ranges not from 1.6 to 2.1, as in most research institutes applying the old scheme of official salaries, but from 2.25 to 3.6.

At the same time, the application of the new system of labor remuneration also revealed certain shortcomings inherent in it. Above all, all changes in labor remuneration were not to exceed the wage fund established for the institute. If it became necessary to raise the wages of the majority of the institute’s employees, there might simply not be enough resources for these purposes. “The institute’s administration was taking a risk, since the assessments proposed by the commission might have been such that, with the number of employees unchanged, there would not have been enough resources from the wage fund to raise salaries at all (in that case, the director of the institute would have had to introduce amendments in accordance with the right granted to him).”⁷

The emergence of such a situation would have reduced to a minimum the stimulating effect of the new system of remuneration for research associates, and then its introduction would have lost all meaning. Consequently, at present the transition to the new system of labor remuneration means only a redistribution of research associates’ wages without any change in the total size of their wage fund. But such redistribution must be economically justified. If the efficiency of the labor of research workers is used as the criterion for changing official salaries, then the assessment of this efficiency must have carefully developed objective parameters. Yet it is precisely on this issue that the greatest difficulties are encountered. The absence of a clear expres—

given quantitative characteristics for measuring the effectiveness of scientific labor forces one to use the method of expert assessments. The desire to avoid subjectivism under such a method compelled the management of VNIFKhI to carry out the assessment in three stages and to spend a month and a half on this work. Obviously, in the future such practice needs considerable simplification.

It seems advisable to develop standard methodologies for groups of research organizations, both academic and sectoral, depending on the specific character of their activity, which would indicate by which indicators the activity of different categories of employees should be taken into account. On the basis of standard methodologies it will be possible organizationally to simplify the entire system of assessments within an institute.

However, simplifying the mechanism for assessing the effectiveness of scientific labor makes it possible to redistribute the wage fund of scientific workers more effectively, but it does not solve, and cannot solve, the question of the sources for increasing the wage fund when the need arises to increase it for the majority of employees. And such a need will inevitably arise sooner or later, if one takes into account that wages are becoming an effective means of ensuring long-term material interest. At the L. Ya. Karpov VNIFKhI they are trying to solve this problem by including in the wage fund the material-incentive fund, i.e., the sums allocated to the institute for bonuses to employees. Thanks to this, it became possible to increase the wage fund at the expense of part of the bonus funds made available to the institute. At the same time, it became necessary to amend the existing regulations on bonuses. Under the new regulation, bonuses for scientific workers are granted mainly once a year, in January, on the basis of the results of work for the preceding year.

It is true that the regulation states that bonuses may also be granted during the year for individual achievements in labor. For these purposes, at the beginning of the year an amount equal to 40% of the total annual bonus fund is placed at the disposal of the heads of subdivisions (in proportion to the wage fund of each subdivision). It is already clear from this that this sum is not so significant as to ensure effective current bonuses. The remaining 60% of funds are to be distributed on the basis of the results of work for the year. In essence, such bonuses perform the functions of wages. The allocation of part of wages to a special bonus fund based on the results of work for the year merely contributes to the better organization of the basic wages of scientific workers. It is not for nothing that this bonus is called the “thirteenth salary.” Therefore there is every reason to redistribute funds between basic wages and the bonus fund based on the results of work for the year. If necessary, the former may be increased by using funds allocated for bonuses based on the results of work for the year.

But in that case there occurs a substitution of different forms of material incentive by only one form—wages—which reflects only one side of the distributive relations between the worker and society. The other side of these relations, manifested through the material-incentive funds of a scientific organization, finds very weak expression in the practice of material incentives currently operating at VNIFKhI. Meanwhile,

The material interest of scientific workers cannot be limited solely by improving wages. It is known that of great importance is the stimulation of a worker’s efforts to carry out certain tasks that require increased labor expenditures not compensated through wages. Such stimulation is provided by means of bonuses. Consequently, strengthening the material interest of scientific workers presupposes the simultaneous improvement of both wages and bonus systems.

1. Scientific and Technological Progress and Economic Reform, “Nauka,” Moscow, 1969, p. 239. ↩

2. Scientific and Technological Progress and Economic Reform, “Nauka,” Moscow, 1969, p. 239. ↩

3. See N. G. Smirnov, B. A. Rybin, “The Specific Nature of Creative Scientific Labor and Its Reflection in the System of Distribution,” Proceedings of the Tomsk Polytechnic Institute named after S. M. Kirov, vol. 219, Tomsk, 1969. ↩

4. Scientific and Technical Progress and Economic Reform, “Nauka,” Moscow, 1969, p. 242. ↩

5. See the cited article, p. 45. ↩

6. Economics and Organization of Research Work. Leningrad: LDNTP, 1966, p. 50. ↩

7. Ya. Kolotyrkin, “Material Interest and Responsibility of the Scientist,” Sotsialisticheskii trud, 1969, No. 11, p. 20. ↩