EXCHANGE OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL EXPERIENCE BETWEEN SOCIALIST ENTERPRISES DURING THE RECONSTRUCTION OF THE NATIONAL ECONOMY

V. F. Shershnev

In the first years of Soviet power, when our country was in a difficult economic situation and lagged behind the developed capitalist countries in many indicators, V. I. Lenin raised with full urgency the task of creating the material and technical base of socialist society, a task that found expression in Lenin’s plan for building socialism in the USSR. In his report to the Fourth Congress of the Comintern (November 1922), V. I. Lenin said: “Without saving heavy industry, without restoring it, we shall not be able to build any industry; and without it we shall perish altogether as an independent country... Salvation for Russia lies not only in a good harvest in peasant farming—this is still not enough—and not only in the good condition of light industry, which supplies the peasantry with consumer goods—this too is still not enough—we also need heavy industry.”¹ Only the development of heavy industry could lead to a high degree of concentration of production in industry, agriculture, transport, and other branches of the national economy, and thereby ensure the complete victory of socialism. “Only when,” wrote V. I. Lenin, “the country has been electrified, when industry, agriculture, and transport have been placed on the technical basis of modern large-scale industry, only then shall we be victorious finally.”² This is why mastering technology and mass technical propaganda became the central problem of the period of the socialist reconstruction of the national economy. Technology therefore became the decisive link, mastery of which could ensure the complete victory of socialism, while raising the technical level of the masses was regarded as a component part of the entire process of the technical reconstruction of the national economy. In the resolution of the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU on this matter it was noted that it was necessary to take vigorous measures to expand technical propaganda, to involve, through special public organizations, the broad masses of workers in the work of introducing the latest technology, and to use the creative initiative of the masses for the purposes of the technical reconstruction of industry.³ The urgent task arose of mastering technology in the near future and learning how to man-

¹ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 33, pp. 388–389.
² V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 42, p. 159.
³ CPSU in resolutions and decisions of congresses, conferences, and plenums of the Central Committee, part III, 7th ed., 1954, p. 159.

to manage production. But the low level of technical qualification significantly limited this possibility, since the gap between the level of production technology and the level of technical qualification of the masses at that time was substantial. Therefore mass technical propaganda, mastery of technology, and the exchange of technical experience became central tasks in the building of socialism. To this end, industrial laboratories were transformed into a kind of scientific institute, where technological processes and the scientific organization of labor and management were studied; various units, machine tools, and assembly lines were also created there, tested, and transferred to production. Thus, at the CIT (Central Institute of Labor) there operated several problem laboratories, which subsequently began to prepare assembly lines for individual enterprises of heavy industry. Science gradually became a constituent element of the productive forces of socialist society. For the fastest possible mastery at the country’s enterprises of equipment arriving from abroad and of domestic equipment, special technicum-minimum schools were created, in which questions of a political-economic nature were studied, as well as the tasks assigned to enterprises, the properties of metals, questions of the organization of labor and of the workplace, knowledge of machine tools and instruments, and the struggle against defects. A monthly journal, Study Technology, came to the aid of workers; it reported not only on the novelties of modern technology and gave recommendations for their accelerated study, but also popularized the best shock workers of technical study. The press, cinema, and radio were placed at the service of technical propaganda. After completing a certain course of study, the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions organized socialist technical examinations, introduced by a special resolution of the Council of Labor and Defense of the USSR. Those who passed the socialist technical minimum were transferred to better rates, received work according to their new qualifications with corresponding pay, and attended special advanced-type circles for the further study and mastery not only of domestic but also of foreign technology.

The exchange of experience among leading workers and innovators of production became widespread in this period. This made it possible to uncover additional reserves, contributed to the continuous growth of labor productivity, raised the cultural and technical level, improved workers’ qualifications, and ensured the maximum use of technology. “Before us stands the task not only of the socialist reconstruction of technology,” it was noted in the pages of the journal Problems of Economics, “but also of making full use of what the capitalist system gives us, the task of discovering in this technology the possibilities that are concealed by the capitalist application of machines and technical processes.”⁴ Only with the organization of a broad exchange of production and technical experience was it possible to solve this task fully. It is no accident that V. I. Lenin attached enormous importance to questions of the propaganda and introduction of everything new and advanced. His instructions are relevant even today. In the very first years of Soviet power he noted that for the successful rise of the national economy it was necessary to introduce constantly and in good time into production the newest achievements in the field of science and technology, not only in our country but also abroad; to develop in every way the creative initiative of the masses; and to generalize and use in the practice of socialist construction advanced production experience. “It is precisely now,” V. I. Lenin noted, “that we must take care that the mass of extraordinarily valuable material which exists in the form of experience in the new organization of production in individual cities, in

⁴ Yu. Milonov, “Questions of Technology in the Period of Socialist Reconstruction,” Problems of Economics, 1931, No. 7–8, p. 54.

at individual enterprises, in individual village communes,—so that this experience would become the property of the masses¹.

In the first years of Soviet power, questions of international scientific and technical exchange and the borrowing of advanced production experience acquired exceptionally important significance. In order to study and introduce it, a special decree of the Sovnarkom of the RSFSR in 1921 proposed the creation of Bureaus of Foreign Science and Technology in the most developed capitalist countries.

Initially it was created in Germany, and their organization was also planned in the USA, England, Sweden, France, etc. The tasks of the Bureau included the collection, study, and dissemination—already directly in Soviet Russia—of the most valuable foreign scientific and technical information. V. I. Lenin pointed out that information bodies should “carefully follow all the relevant literature in all languages, translating or at least abstracting everything of any value in this field”². At the same time, by a special decree of the Sovnarkom, the Central Interdepartmental Commission was created, whose functions included the collection and dissemination of incoming information. “The main task which Kominolit (the Central Interdepartmental Commission.—V. Sh.) should set itself,” wrote V. I. Lenin, “is to ensure that in Moscow, Petrograd, and the large cities of the Republic there should be concentrated in special libraries one copy each of all the latest foreign technical and scientific (chemistry, physics, electrical engineering, medicine, statistics, economics, etc.) journals and books from 1914–1921, and that the regular receipt of all periodicals should be organized”³. Naturally, the use of the knowledge accumulated by humanity and of the constantly arriving results of research work, both in our country and abroad, was impossible without well-organized scientific and technical information. The absence of a clear system of information services often led to unjustified expenditures on the development of various types of machines and technological processes, and to duplication in scientific research. It was necessary to build a ramified network of information services while creating a single coordinating and directing center. To this end, every enterprise was obliged to provide information on production achievements, and to report introduced inventions and rationalization proposals to a department under the All-Union Council of the National Economy (VSNKh). The materials received were processed, reproduced, and sent to interested branches and enterprises. At the same time, the VSNKh began preparing the first information publication of the series “Socialist Exchange of Production Experience” (“SO”), which served as the initial stage of a broad exchange of advanced production and technical experience. During the first years, on the basis of the materials of “SO,” about 50 innovations were introduced with an economic effect of 500 thousand rubles, and over the four years of its existence 9.5 million rubles were saved in socialist industry⁴. The mass dissemination and free exchange of advanced production and technical experience becomes a law-governed feature of the development of socialist production and is conditioned by social ownership of the means of production. K. Marx wrote that “productive forces are the result of the practical energy of people, but this energy itself is determined by the conditions in which people find themselves”⁵. Therefore all technical

novelty, improvement, and the degree of mass participation in technical creativity depend on and are determined by the socio-economic system that exists in a given society.

Under conditions of capitalist ownership, the main purpose of introducing technical achievements and inventions is the striving to increase the degree of exploitation and to obtain the maximum share of profit. For these reasons the sphere of application of technical innovations narrows and the pace of technical progress slows. At the present time there are special legal rules according to which no one has the right not only to publish in the press information about an invention he has created, but also cannot submit an application to the Patent Office without the consent of the firm. Only “with the transfer of the means of production into the hands of the workers’ and peasants’ government,” wrote F. E. Dzerzhinsky in a circular on workers’ invention, “did entirely new possibilities open up before the worker at the machine for using the inventive abilities that lie hidden in him... The worker now knows that he is working not to strengthen the domination of his class enemy, the capitalist, but, on the contrary, gives his own state, his own class, the opportunity to raise labor productivity, improve the sum total of productive wealth, lighten arduous labor, and improve the condition of the working people. This consciousness creates a powerful stimulus to the creative work of workers and technicians engaged in production.”^10 It was precisely this commonality of interests that gave rise to the mutual interest of the employees of socialist enterprises in improving industrial production, reducing the cost of output, and increasing labor productivity by raising the level of modern technology.

The means of production that came into the country from abroad could not withstand the adopted pace of socialist construction. It was necessary to reconstruct machines with consideration for the new conditions of their use, and also to create new ones at the level of the best world models. This was promoted by the technical creativity of workers and engineering-technical personnel, manifested in mass invention and rationalization, which embraced a large part of the country and required the creation of a single guiding center. Soon, under the All-Union Society “For the Mastery of Technology” (VSOZOT), a committee was created whose functions included organizing assistance in popularizing scientific and technical achievements and exchanging advanced production experience among state enterprises. The committee’s connection with rationalizers and inventors was carried out through the system of ZOT societies, established in all branches of the national economy. In order to disseminate rationalization and invention proposals, beginning in 1930 the journal Workers’ Exchange began to be published; on its pages detailed information was provided about scientific and technical achievements not only in our country but also abroad. It became a conduit for the knowledge that had been accumulated by that period in the field of science and technology. Some enterprises also had special bureaus for the “exchange of experience,” which carried out systematic work on the use of production achievements in other branches, organized technical exhibitions and reviews, “campaigns for experience,” and other forms of interconnection. The exchange of advanced production and technical experience among socialist enterprises became an important factor that made it possible, in a shorter time, to carry out the technical reconstruction of the national economy. If during the first five-year plan more than 150 were installed and put into operation in industry—

^10 F. Dzerzhinsky, Selected Works, vol. 2, Moscow, 1957, p. 70.

thousand machines and units, i.e., almost about 100 new machines every day, then in 1933–1934—70,000, or 120 machines a day⁶. Naturally, rationalizers and inventors played a significant role in this. “Socialist rationalization,” it was noted in the resolution of the Sixteenth Congress of the CPSU, “being the best means of mobilizing hidden powerful reserves and reducing costs, must become an inseparable part of the practical work of all administrative and technical personnel in industry and must be at the center of the technical-production work of the enterprise... at the same time, the exchange of experience in rationalization achievements among state enterprises must be widely organized. To this end, throughout the entire industrial system, from top to bottom, bodies for rationalization must be strengthened”⁷. Only with such an approach was it possible to identify production possibilities most fully, uncover reserves for production growth, improve quality, and reduce the cost of the products being manufactured. A comprehensive study of the entire production process enabled the Krasnyi Putilovets plant, in 1930 alone, to receive 5,132 rationalization proposals, i.e., approximately 5.5 times more than in 1928–1929; moreover, the 1,500 proposals that were implemented yielded 1,754,000 rubles in savings⁸.

The successful development of technical creativity was determined in large measure by a comprehensive approach to the problem under study, in which workers and engineering-and-technical personnel were first widely informed of the need to examine a particular section of production. The next stage consisted of discussing the results of the examination and analyzing the scientific and technical information obtained concerning that section. And the final stage was the study of it by all means available at the given enterprise. The results of the comprehensive study carried out were systematized and transmitted to related enterprises. It should be noted that such an analysis of production activity came into wide use only somewhat later, while in the initial period of the reconstruction of the national economy this function was performed by special laboratories established under the Central Institute of Labor.

Siberian workers made a significant contribution to the development of socialist industry and the creation of the material and technical base of communism. The task of rapidly industrializing the country required the development, in the Siberian region, of mass technical propaganda and of a movement for mastering and improving technology. In November 1928 the Siberian Central Bureau of Inventions (Sib. TsBRIZ) was established; it directed the movement of rationalizers and inventors in Siberia and sought the necessary forms for the exchange of production and technical experience among enterprises. The bureau received the most valuable inventions, those of important national-economic significance, and sent them to the All-Union Society “For Mastering Technology” for their further dissemination and introduction in various branches of industry. Each enterprise had its own primary commission under the administration, which considered incoming proposals, determined their degree of importance, carried on broad propaganda among workers concerning the significance of rationalization in one or another section of the given enterprise, determined the effectiveness of technical creativity, and established bonuses.

How broadly the work on rationalization and invention in Siberia was organized can be seen from the following example. In 1931 alone, the bodies promoting invention in the Siberian Territory registered 1,683 inventions; of these, 1,235 were submitted to local bodies and 448 to the Siberian Bureau for the Implementation of Inventions. The effectiveness of rationalization proposals in Siberian industry amounted to 3 million rubles of net profit, which was invested in the fund for creating the technical base of socialism. It should be noted that some proposals had no definite value for industry and were rejected, while others were sent into production for introduction. Thus, for example, an invented machine for dry seed treatment was of such exceptional importance for agriculture that in the very first year 3,000 machines were manufactured and an order for 15,000 was placed from the “center.” Another invention, for obtaining leaf glue, which gradually displaced the imported product, found wide application at the “Siberia” match factory. This method spread not only in Siberia but also in the Urals, where 150 apparatuses were manufactured.^14

The pace at which technical creativity developed and improved can be seen from the following example. Whereas in 1928–1929 the Siberian Bureau for the Implementation of Inventions registered 918 applications, in 1929–1930 the number of workers’ proposals, compared with the previous year, amounted to 243%, i.e., 2,960 applications. The economic effect exceeded the result of the previous year fourfold and was expressed in the sum of 800 thousand rubles. The social structure of the participants in technical creativity also gradually underwent changes. Thus, in 1928, among inventors, workers accounted for 34%, and employees for 40%; but already by the end of 1929 the picture had changed substantially. Among those who submitted applications for patenting, workers made up 41%, employees 36%, peasants 9%, handicraftsmen 6%, and others 8%.^15

Thus, the technical creativity of workers and, in particular, the exchange of advanced production experience among socialist enterprises significantly accelerated the process of creating the technical base of socialism.

^14 See: For the Industrialization of Siberia, 1930, no. 6, p. 57.
^15 See: For the Industrialization of Siberia, 1930, nos. 11–12, p. 86.

1. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 36, p. 149. ↩

2. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 45, p. 25. ↩

3. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 53, p. 228. ↩

4. See Technological Libraries of the USSR, 1962, No. 5. ↩

5. K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, vol. 27, p. 402. ↩

6. See: For Technical Culture, Study Technology, 1934, No. 11, p. 1. ↩

7. The CPSU in Resolutions and Decisions of Congresses, Conferences, and Plenums of the Central Committee, Part III, 7th ed., 1954, p. 47. ↩

8. See: Workers’ Ingenuity, 1931, p. 31. ↩