DEVELOPMENT OF COGNITIVE INTERESTS IN LEARNING

G. I. Petrova

(Presented by the scientific seminar of the Department of Scientific Communism)

In the philosophical, sociological, and psychological literature it is recognized quite unconditionally that the basis for the development of the productivity and effectiveness of any kind of activity is an interest in it and the emergence, on this basis, of a creative attitude. The formation of deep cognitive motivation constitutes one of the ways of increasing the learner’s activity in cognition and is one of the directions in the contemporary movement for the reform of education.

In our literature, of all the existing definitions of the concept of interest, what impresses us most is bringing it under the class of relations that exist objectively. “The common interest exists not only in representation... but, above all, it exists in reality”¹. It must be said that interest is determined not by just any relation in general, but by a relation of a creative character. That is, it is connected with the real activity of the personality.

These general propositions make it possible to draw a conclusion about the nature of cognitive interest. The latter, like interest in general, is caused not only by the content of a particular object (toward which the interest is directed), but also by the cognitive process itself as a relation. “Cognitive interest is a selective orientation of the personality, directed toward the field of cognition, toward its subject aspect and toward the very process of mastering knowledge”².

Since cognitive interest is qualified as a type of creative relation, its development in learning must proceed from resolving the question of how to promote the development of the creative character of cognition in learning—that is, how to make learning a genuinely creative process. In our time this question is especially important and urgent for pedagogy, didactics, sociology, and psychology, for it is linked with the question of the increasing complexity of the learning process under the conditions of the scientific and technological revolution, in connection with the exponential growth of science, the rapid increase of knowledge, changes in the style of thinking, and so forth. That is, at the present stage the problem of developing cognitive interests in learning comes up against a more

the general problem of the dependence of the character of instruction on the state of scientific knowledge. For it is precisely the state of scientific knowledge that determines both the organization of instructional material and the organization of the activity of instruction itself.

What is characteristic of the organization of instructional material under present conditions? Since an academic subject is science methodologically reworked, all the characteristic phenomena of contemporary science must be reflected in it. Such phenomena are, above all, the processes of theorization of scientific knowledge, the cognition and generalization of entities of a “higher order,” which cannot be grasped by sensory representation, the change, on this basis, in the role of experience in cognition, the increased importance of abstractness and logical thinking, and so on. As a result, what is now required is a distinctive reorientation of the subject of cognition from the final results of his activity to the beginning of the cognitive process, connected with the choice and substantiation of goals. The object of cognition requires “...reflection on the actions undertaken, their usefulness and the conditions of their implementation, their connection with the preceding processes that prompt these actions and determine their character, and with the processes that are the consequence of these actions”³. The theorization of the sciences, connected with the discovery of their deep foundations, reveals the unity of the latter, which entails processes of integration of scientific knowledge and the creation of a unified scientific picture of the world. In the methodology of cognition this takes shape in general systems theory, in the discovery of the structuredness of knowledge, and in the advancement of the systems approach to the foremost place in scientific analysis.

In order that the named phenomena and processes of contemporary science may serve as guideposts in the organization of an academic subject, they must also determine the corresponding organization of the activity of instruction. The latter, in turn, includes within itself those processes of cognition that are dictated by present-day science and therefore must necessarily be present in instruction. Such processes are assimilation, investigation, and substantiation. The concrete character of these processes of cognition in instruction, and the singling out of one (or several) of them as leading, changes historically depending on the philosophical-worldview foundations of instruction and on the state of scientific knowledge. Assimilation as the sole cognitive process necessary in instruction was possible only in the period of mechanistic-metaphysical orientations in philosophy, when epistemology was wholly determined by the principle of rigid determinism. Such a worldview fully corresponded also to a definite state of science: the collection and classification of facts, their empirical systematization, the undeveloped state of the foundations of the sciences, the absence of integrative processes, and the principle of rigid determination in the style of thinking. The science of that time, in N. Wiener’s apt expression, was an enormous mechanism (the seventeenth–eighteenth centuries) or an energy machine (the nineteenth century). All this conditioned the orientation of instruction chiefly toward the process of assimilation, toward methods of coercion, rote learning, and scholasticism.

The critique of such instruction acquires particular significance in positivist and pragmatist methodology. But the worldview foundations of the latter determine a metaphysical solution to the question of the relationship among the basic processes of cognition in instruction. Positivist theory of knowledge and pragmatism, among other things, are based on indeterministic assertions, on the proclamation of extreme activism

in cognition. The indeterminism of the pragmatist, so-called “active” or “free” school determined the orientation of instruction primarily only toward the process of inquiry. In pragmatism, instruction is not connected with the assimilation and substantiation of knowledge. “The free school rebelled against the rigid, book-oriented, and authoritarian customs of the traditional school... It follows various instincts, activity, will, and spontaneity,” writes Edward Jomans in a discussion of the problem of instruction that took place in the pages of the journal Saturday Review^4). Such a position leads to the practicalism of the “free school,” to inattention to knowledge of a theoretical and worldview character. The pragmatist philosophy of education orients instruction toward the practical, current needs of production and does not correlate the educational system with the requirements of science.

In the modern conditions of science, the continuation of traditions that absolutize the processes of assimilation or inquiry can lead only to a reduction in the cognitive activity of the learner. To a certain extent, it is precisely this that determines the contradiction noted by sociologists between the growth of the subject’s activity in the general process of cognition and its reduction in instruction (the spread of the so-called “psychology of the C grade”^5)). Contemporary instructional practice requires, alongside inquiry and assimilation, the inclusion also of methods of substantiation. Only in this direction is it possible to activate the learner’s activity; optimistic prospects for the assimilation of knowledge under conditions of an information explosion may emerge; and only on this path can cognition in instruction reflect all the other (named) new phenomena of contemporary science. For it is precisely substantiation that concentrates in itself the phenomena of theorization and integration of scientific knowledge as the leading tendencies of present-day science, creates the possibility of presenting instructional material by means of logical structural schemas, and makes real the assimilation of the unified logical structures of knowledge and of the systematicity of the subject.

It seems to us that precisely such an organization of the activity of instruction is necessary under modern conditions and is the only one capable of solving the problem of developing cognitive interests. The point is that each of the named processes of cognition can be directed toward the formation of a definite cognitive interest in instruction. A fairly clear classification can be traced: inquiry gives rise to heuristic interests, substantiation to interests of a methodological character, and assimilation to encyclopedic interests. The correlation of all the named interests, their formation in unity, constitutes one of the tasks of organizing the process of instruction. This necessity is determined by the fact that cognitive interests constitute the strongest motivational basis for mastering the basic forms of knowledge as nodal points of science^6): the concept (categories, constructs, etc.), theory (principles, hypotheses, laws, etc.), and worldview

^4) S. Muver. Letter to the editor of the education section (in English). Saturday Review, August 15, 1970, p. 44.

^5) I. V. Sukhanov. The Psychology of the “C Grade.” Sociological Studies of Educational and Upbringing Work in Higher School. Gorky, 1969.

^6) Form and content in the philosophical literature are defined by some authors as structure and elements (A. Spirkin. Course of Marxist Philosophy. Moscow, 1964, p. 196; Marxist-Leninist Philosophy. Textbook. Moscow, 1964, p. 189), by others as “substitute” and “that which is substituted” (A. M. Minasyan. Categories of Content and Form. Rostov, 1962, p. 250; G. P. Shchedrovitsky. Problems of the Methodology of System Research. Moscow, 1964). There is also a third point of view: content-knowledge is “a set of information about an object domain,” form is the means of fixing content. (See: A. K. Sukhotin. A Gnoseological Analysis of the Capacity of Knowledge. Tomsk, 1968, p. 168).

(worldview, picture of the world, etc.). Knowledge in the form of concepts and theories is the result of a process of inquiry and is directed toward satisfaction, and at the same time can develop the heuristic interests of the individual. Theoretical and worldview knowledge, however, functions in the process of substantiation, and the stimulus for its development is provided by interests of a methodological character.

The question of precisely such an organization of instruction acquires urgent significance under contemporary conditions, since the nodal points of science, being a form of knowledge, fix its entire substantive part. In connection with the qualitative and quantitative change in the content of knowledge under present conditions, the question of its correlation with form has arisen in a new way. It is at this point that the questions of organizing learning activity and organizing instructional material mutually condition one another. To the extent that contemporary science dictates the indicated dialectic of the basic processes of cognition, it determines the need to organize instructional material on the basis of the laws of the capacity of knowledge and of the simplicity of the form of its presentation.

Without excluding other aspects in the organization of an academic subject, let us note that the compression of knowledge is also brought about by processes characteristic of contemporary science. It is important to see the combined effect of all these processes. In this sense it is important to emphasize that the question is by no means raised only by the fact that the learner is now unable to assimilate the entire substantive part of knowledge. It is conditioned first and foremost by the general evolution of scientific knowledge toward an ever-increasing simplicity of its logical foundations, toward the identification of unified initial principles of science.

Substantiation is the process that determines the possibility of an optimal solution to the problem of the relationship between the content and the form of knowledge: it makes the form capacious. Of course, the substantive aspect, as reflected reality, is decisive for characterizing the capacity of knowledge. But at the same time, capacity is possible only through knowledge of its form.

The organization of learning activity and instructional material considered here conditions the development of cognitive interests because it is connected with the activation of the activity of cognition, with the activation of learners’ intellectual capacities. In cognition as a whole, and in instruction as well, this manifests itself in the increasing importance of deductive methods, which make substantive formalization possible. Deduction in instruction is considered from the point of view of its possibilities for presenting knowledge in a condensed form.

The compression of knowledge in instruction and the deductive construction of material are directly dependent on the elaboration of the logical questions of cognition. An academic subject proceeds from the logic of the concepts of the corresponding science. Therefore the methodological reworking of the latter consists first of all in its logical description. It is necessary to develop the logic of the science, and only then the logic of the instructional material. Methodological treatment must proceed from the deductive method of constructing the subject. One of the chief tasks of the methodology of instruction, therefore, is to find rational ways of structuring the knowledge to be assimilated. The deductive construction of knowledge must provide an understanding of general principles, must unite particular cases into a single cognitive scheme. Deductive methods of cognition prove necessary and natural when the structuredness of knowledge has been revealed, when the systems-structural approach to the object of inquiry becomes one of the chief methodological principles. It is precisely deduction, with its

with an orientation toward comprehending the parts through the whole and deeply substantive concept-generalizations, can play the role of a method for knowing the structural character of the subject, of knowing it in enlarged, integral units. That is, deduction makes possible the mastery of the basic forms of knowledge: concepts, theory, and worldview. In this sense, an important role is played by orienting instruction toward the basic concepts proposed in the academic subject. Such an orientation makes it possible to grasp the structure of the subject, its nodal, operational points, which are substantive generalizations. By virtue of their substantive character they can unite a class of similar phenomena and develop into a theory. Mastering the method of knowledge will allow the latter to be explained in worldview terms.

Thus, the organization of learning activity and the organization of instructional material considered here constitute a very powerful motivational basis for the development of the learner’s cognitive activity. What is crucial here is that mastery in learning is not limited only to an encyclopedic set of factual knowledge (toward which encyclopedic interests are directed), but also orients one toward the forms, methods, and means of cognitive activity. The latter is conditioned by interests of a heuristic and especially methodological character. The process of substantiation and deductive methods in teaching have heuristic value and determine the possibility of activity and creativity in learning. For it is through the techniques of substantiation that the method of knowledge is born; precisely this process is directed toward the formation of activity corresponding to subject knowledge.

The basic processes of cognition, developing in learners not only encyclopedic but also heuristic and methodological interests, are determinants of cognitive activity in learning because, through them, the problem of the unity of the tasks of communicating knowledge and forming the method of knowledge is solved. Method, on the one hand, ensures the completeness of substantive knowledge, along with its form, and on the other hand, the logical principles for the development of knowledge are revealed in it. Logic, in turn, is the art of discovery, since its object of knowledge is cognitive activity itself. Knowledge of method through the process of substantiation makes the knowledge acquired in learning truly active, containing within itself both a reflection of the objective world and the subject’s relation to it. Such knowledge negates dogmatism and forms a culture of thinking, the capacity for further independent cognition and study.

Here a new aspect opens up: the problem of cognitive activity turns into a worldview problem. For mastery of the method of knowledge and substantiation as a cognitive process are the paths along which the formation of a worldview is possible. The importance of posing the question in this way is due to the fact that a worldview possesses an active, creative function. Only in the case of the development of a worldview can the principal element in the structure of personal activity appear—an attitude which, in turn, gives rise to orientations, motives, goals, and the corresponding activity of the personality. A worldview, as the basis of cognitive activity, is capable of producing definite shifts and displacements in the structure of activity. In particular, cognitive activity is connected with shifts of motives and goals, since it arises when the goal of activity becomes its motive—that is, when cognition becomes a need, when the motive and goal of the personality coincide. Cognitive activity, therefore, arises if, on the part of the learner,

not merely cognitive actions are performed (motive and goal do not coincide), but a genuine activity of cognition, cognition as a need. Activity in cognition is a consequence of the fact that, at the level of worldview, when a definite personal attitude arises, knowledge turns into convictions that regulate cognitive activity. Convictions are those items of knowledge that have become a motive, an impelling force of activity.

The inclusion of attitude in cognition ensures high learning outcomes and leads to the acquisition of deep and durable knowledge. The level of motivation characteristic of activity (the coincidence of motive with goal) makes it the most effective condition for acquiring knowledge and skills, for self-education, and for the transformation of one’s own personality.

As applied to the problem of developing cognitive interests, all these questions also have the following bearing: mastery of the method of cognition and the possibility of a worldview-based explanation of knowledge give rise to the “logical beauty” of scientific theory. Here the aesthetic feeling that arises from the perceived rigor, orderliness, and beauty of science asserts its force. Science, having achieved the perfection of a logical scheme, gives rise to an aesthetic feeling, which proves to be a stimulus in cognition. Interest is usually connected with the emotional sphere and is perceived as an emotional experience. The strengthening of cognitive activity is therefore ensured both by the simplicity and convenience of condensed knowledge and by its purely aesthetic content.

And this is independent of the type of educational institution, the specialty being obtained, and so on. For the emotional exists and must be present not only in the teaching, assimilation, and cognition of the humanities and the arts, but also in the so-called exact disciplines. Of course, different types of social organization correspond to their own mental structures, different types of thinking; however, the effective side is a characteristic feature of the general process of cognition. Ignoring this aspect in the formation, for example, of engineering thinking may fail to yield the desired result in the cognition of typically engineering disciplines. Consciousness must not be identified only with abstract-logical thinking. Outside living, sensory-volitional, active activity, thinking does not exist at all.

1. K. Marx and F. Engels, Works, vol. 3, p. 31. ↩

2. G. P. Shchukina, The Problem of Cognitive Interest in Pedagogy. Moscow, 1971, p. 13. ↩

3. G. Kende, Development and Improvement of Management Services. Moscow, 1970, pp. 104–105. ↩