PROCEEDINGS
OF THE TOMSK POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE
OF THE ORDER OF THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE ORDER
OF THE RED BANNER OF LABOR
named after S. M. KIROV

Volume 291 1974

WORLDVIEW AS A FACTOR IN SOCIAL ACTIVITY

A. N. KNIGIN

It is known that the social activity of the masses is a most important condition for solving major social tasks. Taking this into account, “the CPSU, in the process of communist construction, does everything necessary so that working people may actively influence the formation and implementation of state policy, and may have a real opportunity to display their initiative, their undertaking”¹. The scientific worldview of all members of society is of essential importance in the unfolding of the social activity of the masses; this is indicated in the Program of the CPSU and in the Report of the Central Committee of the CPSU to the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union². However, in theoretical terms the interrelation between worldview and social activity has been insufficiently studied. Even at the extraordinarily representative conference on the problems of the growth of the activity of social consciousness in the period of the construction of communism³, this problem was not posed with sufficient clarity. Its consideration appears very important. The present article attempts to analyze the problem of the influence of worldview on social activity in a survey-like manner. Here various aspects of the problem are touched upon without any claim to a final solution.

We shall consider social activity as the activity of an individual person and of social groups, on various scales, directed toward social objects. We borrow the definition of social activity as a category from I. M. Popova, considering it the most adequate to the essence of the matter: “Activity as a sociological category is a characteristic of human activity as specifically goal-directed, guided by a value-normative mechanism”⁴. It follows from the definition that we shall understand activity not as a state, but as action. Activity

manifests itself in activity and only in activity. It is clear that the motivator of activity, that is, the source of activity, is material and spiritual needs. But not every need immediately leads to activity aimed at satisfying it. In many cases needs are suppressed. This is connected with the conscious impossibility of attaining what is desired and with limitations of a value-normative character. Therefore needs arouse activity only by being refracted through the entire content of the consciousness of the individual and of social groups. In this process the decisive role is played by worldview.

The significance of worldview as a factor of social activity is determined by the essence of this spiritual phenomenon, its structure and functions. The specificity of worldview consists in the fact that it is a constant regulator of activity. In worldview, as many researchers point out, an important role is played by principles concerning the meaning of life, the essence of the human being, and his place in the world. On this basis principles and moral norms are developed that determine human behavior⁵. Worldview contains within itself criteria of evaluation and, consequently, of choice. Worldview determines for the individual as a whole his life credo and life position. It is not external, not introduced artificially, but is conviction; therefore all the activity of the individual is in one way or another conditioned by worldview. Of course, we are speaking of an actual worldview that has taken shape in a person, and not of views that may be expressed but are not convictions. Worldview as a reality manifests itself precisely in activity, and not in declarations. Hence the inseparability of worldview from activity. Since activity likewise manifests itself in activity, it is clear that worldview and activity are organically connected. To reveal the regularity of this connection is important from many points of view. This would make it possible to understand more deeply the interconnection of material and spiritual life, to regulate activity by means of influencing worldview and, conversely, to form worldview through the regulation of social activity, and so on.

Let us consider a number of aspects of the interaction between worldview and social activity, without claiming completeness of coverage.

One of the first questions that arises is: what is the relation of social activity to the truth or falsity of worldview? At first the trivial thought comes to mind that a true worldview is a source of social activity, whereas a false worldview leads to passivity. Certain facts speak in favor of this—for example, the passivity (for the most part) of religious people in our society. However, reality is nevertheless more complex. As F. A. Selivanov points out, “activity is not always caused by positive motives and by truth”⁶. The history of society shows that a false worldview can support social activity. For example, a religious worldview that has reached the level of religious fanaticism is capable of impelling both individual persons and large masses of people to active actions. True, some researchers consider such activity a “surrogate of human activity”⁷, but such a label is unlikely to add anything to the understanding of social actions based on activity of this kind. An increase in activity consists in the fact that the volume, mass, and degree of activity grow within certain time intervals and for the attainment—

⁵ Ibid., p. 268.
⁶ “Proceedings of the Inter-University Scientific Conference...,” Kursk, 1968, p. 341.
⁷ Ibid., p. 345.

of known goals. And this is a fact in many cases when a false worldview is present. At the same time, the presence of a basically correct worldview does not in itself guarantee constant social activity.

The mechanism of interaction between worldview and activity is connected with the truth of the worldview not directly, not unambiguously, but mediately and in many ways. But, of course, merely stating this fact would contradict Marxist methodology, which requires that in a system of relations one find the leading, principal connection. It would be wrong to think that the truth of a worldview is altogether indifferent to its influence on activity. Such an understanding would provide no rational orientation, and it does not correspond to reality. In singling out the leading connection, we must undoubtedly note the fundamental dependence, possessing a stable character, between activity and a true worldview; the connection between activity and an erroneous worldview is of a weaker character. Both history and logic testify to this.

A worldview not only impels one to activity, but also determines certain basic directions of activity. It is not like a catalyst that triggers a reaction but does not participate in determining its essence. Alongside other factors, a worldview determines the content, direction, and plan of activity. But if the worldview is wrong, sooner or later the activity based on it will come into conflict with objective laws and will fail. This will cause disappointment and a decline in activity, which is conditioned by the very essence of social activity. The dynamics of any value-normative system is determined by comparing results, goals, and means. I. M. Popova expresses this well: “Various variants of realization perform the function of ‘reinforcement’ and determine the degree of stability of the personality’s normative system”⁸. Applied to worldview, this proposition cannot be understood literally in the sense that lack of reinforcement by a result leads to a change in the worldview of an individual, group, or, still more, class. A worldview is stable; the process of changing it is not simple, and is painful. Therefore what occurs is rather precisely a decline in activity, not a change in worldview. Thus a false worldview contains within itself fundamental limitations on its activating influence. This, in particular, is one of the explanations of the character of bourgeois “revolutionism,” of rebelliousness that passes from bright outbursts to decline, to pessimism.

The role of a true worldview in this sense is more consistent. By evoking activity and action, a true worldview indicates paths leading to practical success, which in turn strengthens this worldview and increases its activating effect. The foremost example of this can be Marxism-Leninism—a consistently scientific worldview. The practical successes of socialism continually expand the sphere of Marxism’s authority, turning it into an ever more powerful factor in the activity of the masses in our epoch.

Here an interesting parallel or analogy presents itself. The interaction of a false worldview with activity is, as it were, a mechanism with negative feedback. The results of activity dampen and stop the activity itself. The interaction of a true worldview with activity is a mechanism with positive feedback: the results of activity intensify this activity. Activity

⁸ Materials of an Interuniversity Scientific Conference..., Kursk, 1968, p. 71.

worldview manifest themselves at different levels. The levels of worldview depend on the breadth of action and functioning of a worldview system or set of worldview principles. It is natural to distinguish the following principal levels: the worldview of an individual, of a group, of a social class, of a formation, and of an epoch. The worldview systems of these levels relate successively to one another as the particular to the general. The worldview of a personality is determined by the worldview of the group to which the personality most closely belongs (for example, a professional group), but it may include purely specific, individual notions. The worldview of a group appears as the general; the worldview of a personality—as the singular, the particular. Further on, at all stages, this relation is repeated. It is important to note the relation between the worldview of a class and that of a formation. Within a formation there exist various classes, of which two are basic.

Each class has its own class consciousness, which manifests itself in various aspects of its spiritual life and activity. This includes the worldview of the class as an element of its consciousness; it is class-based, that is, specific in comparison with the worldview of another class. Can one, in that case, speak of a worldview characteristic of a formation? It seems that one can and must. In every formation, the ideology of the ruling class is dominant, and not only in a quantitative respect but also in a qualitative one: the ideological principles of the ruling class enter into the consciousness of the oppressed classes, become their conviction, and thereby form a powerful base of support for the rule of the exploiters within the exploited class itself. Thus, the peasantry of the epoch of feudalism shared the notion of the justice of feudal relations, provided only that they did not manifest themselves in extreme forms of violence and lawlessness. At the same time, it cannot be said that the worldview of the ruling class is also the worldview of all other classes and of the formation as a whole. This would distort the actual picture. The complexity of real worldview phenomena within a formation leads to the complexity of the social activity of classes and masses. The activity of different classes may have a different or identical social orientation, depending on which elements of worldview condition and regulate it. The activity of the social life of an epoch, manifested in the activity of the broad masses, is conditioned by the character of the worldview principles of the formation at the given stage of its development (they may change and do change within a formation).

One may also speak of the worldview of an epoch. Within an epoch, different formations and different worldviews coexist. Thus, in the modern epoch, begun by the Great October Socialist Revolution, two socio-political systems—socialism and capitalism—coexist and struggle, and two worldviews struggle: the communist and the bourgeois. They are irreconcilable in their class principles. But worldview is not a purely ideological phenomenon. It is influenced by non-class principles, for example, knowledge about nature. Therefore, worldview ideas common (characteristic) for a given time may arise in the consciousness of an epoch. For example, a common feature of the Middle Ages was the dominance of religious views. At the present time, a characteristic feature is the growing influence and authority of scientific knowledge, the high prestige of technology, and so forth. The principles of peace, internationalism, etc., are spreading ever more widely. What accounts for this? It is known that an epoch is determined by which class stands at its center. Thus, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the bourgeoisie largely determined the character of ideas and relations in society.

It, as Marx and Engels pointed out, destroyed all patriarchal, idyllic relations, drowned the sacred awe of religious ecstasy, chivalrous enthusiasm, and philistine sentimentality in the icy water of egotistical calculation, transformed a person’s personal dignity into exchange value, and stripped of their halo all kinds of activity that had formerly been regarded with reverence, trepidation, and so on.^9) All these traits—individualism, cynicism, shamelessness, and the callousness of private-property psychology—remain characteristic of the bourgeois worldview even today. But the bourgeoisie is no longer the central class of the epoch. At the center of our epoch stands the working class. And although it is not the ruling class in the political sense in humanity as a whole, its ideological, worldview principles are increasingly becoming the principles of the epoch. This is organically connected with the fact that, as L. I. Brezhnev pointed out, our Marxist ideology is on the offensive. The social activity of many peoples—both in socialist and in non-socialist countries—is to a considerable extent (though, of course, not entirely) conditioned by this circumstance.

Taking into account the dialectic of levels of worldview is necessary for analyzing worldview as a factor of activity. Here distinctive relationships arise.

In considering the activity of an individual, it is necessary to take into account the group and individual features of his worldview. The worldview positions of the group determine the behavior of the given individual as a member of that group. The distinctive features of behavior are determined by the distinctive features of worldview. A very great deal depends on the character of these particular traits. If they are a hypertrophied expression of group ideas, then the individual may become the ideological leader of the group, and, given a number of additional conditions, a leader in general, a director, a chief. If certain features of the group worldview are weakened, the individual tends toward negative activity, or toward passivity, from the point of view of the group’s activity.

Analogous processes—and, moreover, practically very important ones in our epoch—take place with regard to group and class worldviews. Thus, this question becomes topical in connection with the changing structure of the proletariat. The proletarianization of the living conditions of such strata of the population as lower and middle employees, engineering and technical workers, and others leads to the formation in them of features of proletarian consciousness and worldview. But the specific features of the worldview proper to these groups, conditioned by the traditions and characteristics of their sphere of labor and everyday life, are preserved. How does this affect the social activity of such groups? It is obvious that, to the extent that features of a bourgeois worldview appear in their views, this restrains their proletarian activity. But acts of activity may also occur that are not grounded in the principles of Marxist scientific analysis, appearing as a manifestation of petty-bourgeois impatience.

This is manifested with particular vividness in the activity of the student youth of the West. It constitutes a specific group above all because its social-class composition is becoming increasingly complex. Moreover, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, “the students are the most responsive part of the intelligentsia.”^10) In the article “The Tasks of the Revolutionary Youth,” V. I. Lenin showed that the specificity of stu—

^9) K. Marx and F. Engels. Works, vol. 4, p. 427.
^10) V. I. Lenin. Collected Works, vol. 7, p. 343.

...of the student body does not allow one, in a vulgar-sociological manner, to assign its various parts to different classes and to stop there. V. I. Lenin classified the student body of Russia of that period (1903) into six groups and remarked in this connection: “We might be told, perhaps, that the above division into six groups is incorrect, for it does not correspond to the class division of Russian society. But such an objection would be untenable. The class division is, of course, the deepest basis of political grouping; in the last analysis it always determines this grouping, of course. But this deep basis is revealed only in the course of historical development and as the consciousness of the participants and makers of this development grows”⁵. This Leninist indication provides a very profound methodological principle for analyzing the contemporary student movement. It also explains for us the attraction to ideas of “revolutionism” of the Marcusean type and anarchism, and the subsequent demarcation in class battles, as, for example, in the May–June events of 1968 in France.

From the point of view that interests us, it is essential that the worldview of student youth should be considered above all as specifically group-based, with a varied and insufficiently differentiated class foundation. It is this that initially unites the student body and youth on positions which, in V. I. Lenin’s words, are those of “vulgar revolutionism.” From the point of view of Cohn-Bendit or Marcuse, this unification is quite sufficient. But such a view is neither new nor correct. It is a typical bourgeois-objectivist tendency: having registered a fact, to elevate it into a principle. Objectively, it has the significance of consolidating the initial class undifferentiatedness of the student body, thereby tearing student youth away from the consistently revolutionary class—the proletariat.

V. I. Lenin, analyzing in 1903 the student movement and its problems, wrote: “From the current point of view of vulgar revolutionism, the ideological unification of the student body does not require an integral worldview, but excludes one”⁶. This is explained by the heterogeneous composition of the student body and, correspondingly, by the heterogeneity of “revolutionary” ideas. V. I. Lenin points out that this is a gross error. Truly revolutionary unification is possible only on the basis of a scientific socialist worldview.

Under contemporary capitalist conditions, the student movement as a whole is subject to the regularities revealed by V. I. Lenin. The worldview of the student body is basically bourgeois, but not traditionally bourgeois, not liberal-bourgeois, not philistine-bourgeois, but bourgeois-rebellious. The specific features of such a worldview are a source and factor of activity, but of activity that is essentially destructive and negative. It manifests itself in “programless revolts,” in the “hippie” movement, and so forth. The social content of such rebelliousness is not progressive. It was precisely such activity that, under other conditions, fascism harnessed to its cart, and that the “great cultural revolution” harnessed to its cart. And now people are trying to use it above all to tear student youth away from the working class and from the communist movement. Therefore, as never before, the Leninist principle of developing a coherent scientific proletarian worldview as the basis of ideological and organizational unity for struggle is relevant in this question.

The difference among worldviews at the level of an epoch is also of great importance for understanding worldview as a factor of activity. If one makes assessments on a general-historical scale, the following may be said. The worldview of the medieval epoch was passively oriented. Marx and Engels said on this subject: “The crude manifestation of force in the Middle Ages... found its natural complement in indolence and immobility”¹³). Hence the low rates of social change, the slowness of historical development. The worldview of the epoch of the bourgeoisie’s triumph may be characterized as active-passive. The bourgeoisie, as the class standing at the center of the epoch, appeared in its time as a mighty accelerator of social progress. There is no need to repeat here the characterization of the bourgeoisie given in the Manifesto of the Communist Party¹⁴). But the activity of the bourgeoisie as a class is historically limited. At the present time, the effective possibilities of social transformation from the standpoint of the paths indicated by the bourgeois worldview have been exhausted. Therefore, at present the bourgeois worldview as a whole is oriented toward historical passivity, although its internally active character is now expressed in the justification—as before—of wars, anarchic acts, violence, and the like.

The worldview characteristic of our epoch is active-creative. It manifests itself in all the variety of mass revolutionary movements—socialist, democratic, antiwar, national-liberation, and others. The core of the worldview of our epoch is Marxism-Leninism—the worldview of the party of scientific communism. The distinction of this worldview lies in the fact that it is consistently scientific and consistently activates social life. Therefore our epoch, like the entire future life of humanity, is and will be active-creative, consisting in the ever greater transformation of nature and social life in the interests of people.

Worldview as a factor of social activity plays an essential role in various types of activity—in politics, art, and science. Let us consider the latter.

The activating role of worldview in science is called into question by positivists or by scholars under their influence. Very characteristic in this respect are the reflections of the outstanding physicist Werner Heisenberg. He addressed the problem of worldview in the creativity of the scientist more than once. First of all, he opposes science and worldview as two completely opposite modes of spiritual relation to the world. Science is experiential and critical knowledge. Worldview is faith. In this connection, worldview always contradicts scientific activity. Having the character of faith, worldview is “much firmer and stronger” than concrete knowledge. Faith remains unshaken even when it collides with experience; therefore new knowledge cannot destroy it. Meanwhile, the scientist must be prepared for the possibility that, thanks to new experimental data, the very foundations of his knowledge may be changed. The results of scientific reflection may contradict old, generally accepted ideas (worldview). W. Heisenberg compares developing knowledge and worldview (philosophical principles) with new wine and old wineskins and says that it is sometimes difficult “to pour new wine into old wineskins. Such attempts are always unpleasant, because they force one again and again to deal with patching—

¹³) K. Marx and F. Engels. Works, vol. 4, p. 427.
¹⁴) K. Marx and F. Engels. Manifesto of the Communist Party, ch. 1. Works, vol. 4.

old bellows instead of enjoying the “new wine”^15). Thus, Heisenberg does not see any activating significance of worldview in the activity of the scientist. Worldview is regarded by him only as an inevitable evil in science.

On the whole, it is not difficult to see the reason and basis for this incorrect view. W. Heisenberg does not see the difference between a scientific and a nonscientific worldview, between dogmas and conscious conviction; he unduly identifies worldview with faith. The history of science shows that the role of worldview principles in science is extremely great and clearly different when what is at issue is a nonscientific worldview and a correct worldview. General ideas, if they are correct, possess enormous heuristic power, helping to formulate hypotheses. Worldview acts as a support for theoretical concrete-scientific thought. Thus, in constructing the electromagnetic theory of the field, J. C. Maxwell relied on the general conception (having the character of a worldview) that space is filled with a certain medium. He wrote: “The vast interstellar and interplanetary spaces can no longer be regarded as empty places in the Universe. We find them already filled with this medium—filled in such a way that nothing can remove it from the smallest portion of space or produce the slightest break in its infinite continuity”^16). On the other hand, for example, Mach’s conception prevented him from accepting the atomic doctrine. These two historical facts alone are enough to confirm the thought of the activating role of correct worldview views and the restraining role, with respect to scientific activity, of a false worldview. It is clear that for scientists a worldview is formed as a set of more or less consciously selected philosophical principles.

At the same time, of course, one cannot ignore certain circumstances correctly noted by W. Heisenberg. A worldview, although it is not faith in the religious sense of the word, is nevertheless akin to faith in the character of its functioning in the sense that a worldview is always a deep conviction. Knowledge is worldview-related only when it has assumed the character of conviction. Therefore worldview principles are indeed “more solid and firm,” less mobile, less flexible (in the psychological plane) than concrete scientific knowledge. Because of this, a contradiction between rapidly changing knowledge and a firm worldview is possible (the classic example, having a historical character, is the crisis of physics at the turn of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, but contradictions may also occur in the individual practice of a scientist). But this testifies only to the necessity of a scientific worldview—scientific not only in content, but also in the character of its functioning: the worldview must be creative, as science itself is. Marxist philosophy meets this requirement.

True, this cannot remove the problem as a whole, since the flexibility of a worldview can never be equal to the flexibility of concrete science; otherwise a person would lose the spiritual basis of his practical life. It is curious to note the interesting ideas about the activating role of worldview in everyday practical life and in history expressed by the same Heisenberg. He connects the role of worldview with the need to make decisions under conditions in which it is impossible to weigh all the “pros” and “cons.” A decision, even if it is based on reflection, always completes this reflection and exclu—

^15) W. Heisenberg. Physics and Philosophy. Moscow, 1963, p. 112.
^16) J. C. Maxwell. Articles and Speeches. Moscow, 1968, p. 61.

... guides him. To make a decision means to complete reflection concerning a task. But if not all the “pros” and “cons” have been weighed—what are the grounds for the decision? There must be something on which we can rely in such cases. This “something” is a worldview, the general principles by which a person is guided in life. “Without such a firm point of departure, our actions would lose all force,” Heisenberg asserts⁷. One can agree with this, and it is a very interesting thought that ought to be developed in greater detail. In solving any practical task, a person is faced with the possibility of an unlimited number of consequences that cannot be reviewed in analysis. Then the decision is made on the basis of general considerations, of worldview principles. The nature and content of these principles determine in a fundamental way what the consequences of the decision taken will be for the individual and for society.

The situation in science as a whole is also subject to this regularity. For in scientific research, too, it is impossible to review all possible variants of experiments, hypotheses, initial ideas, methods of investigation, and so on. In the final analysis, the choice is determined by “the scientist’s experience,” by “intuition,” by “general considerations”—and these are nothing other than a manifestation of worldview (not entirely, but to a significant degree). Thus, the role of worldview as a factor in the social activity of the scientist appears quite definite. Here we have abstracted from the role of worldview in the scientist’s socio-political positions, which, however, is also extremely important. Since a scientist’s worldview is, in the general case, more conscious than that of the majority of ordinary citizens, the connection between his political positions and his general views is, as a rule, sufficiently distinct. An exceptionally vivid example of this is provided by an episode from the lives of A. Einstein and S. Freud. In 1932 Einstein addressed a letter to Freud, who possessed great authority in the bourgeois scientific milieu, calling on him to take part in the struggle for the preservation of peace. Freud replied to this that war was, apparently, a wholly natural thing, since an aggressive and destructive instinct operates in every living being⁸.

The immediate motivating incentives to activity for individual people are always ideal, spiritual ones; they are expressed in plans, goals, desires, passions, and so forth. Therefore the question arises: how is one to single out specifically the worldview aspect in activity? Naturally, in psychological terms this is difficult and hardly necessary. The activity of the individual is conditioned by a synthesis of states of consciousness, including various moments and features. It is more difficult to determine the “specific weight” of each component, including the worldview component. However, a logical analysis of the role of worldview is possible.

Considering activity as a variable, one should understand the causes of changes. They may be innumerable. Thus, the solution of a task that had been the main content of activity for a certain period may lead to a decline in activity if no other task has yet been formulated. Conversely, the emergence of a life task arouses activity. But there may also be an outwardly opposite case: the solution of a task (which was difficult) leads to inspiration, to the formulation of new tasks that earlier had seemed unrealistic. And na—

on the contrary, the emergence of ever new difficulties can extinguish activity, evoking a feeling of hopelessness.

What is essential in these processes is that any activity, any changes in it in one direction or another, are connected with the arrival of information. If we abstract from internal psychological factors, then it is precisely information that proves to be the stimulus for an increase or decrease in activity. And it is at this point that the role of worldview appears with complete clarity.

Information in itself, by its own content alone, does not determine the character of its influence on activity, even if it contains directly motivating elements. This is connected with the subject’s possibility of choosing his own decisions. Even if an order arrives, an inducement to do “this and that,” this still does not mean that precisely what is prescribed by the order will be done. If, however, information does not possess directly motivating content—for example, “tomorrow there will be a solar eclipse” or “tomorrow there will be a concert by a well-known violinist”—then the direction of activity is all the less determined by it. Nevertheless, some people, having received such information, display heightened activity: they begin to smoke glass, to “get hold of” tickets, and, if necessary, to show wonders of ingenuity. It is clear that the cause of activity is not the information itself, but its interaction with a person’s inner world, with his interests, knowledge, temperament, and so on. In the most essential cases, when the anticipated actions have a certain life significance, activity and its direction are determined by the interaction of information with the worldview of the individual, with his socio-political and moral convictions, which constitute the social essence of worldview. Thus, millions of Soviet people, having learned of the beginning of the war, without waiting for instructions or orders, went to the military commissariats, to the induction points. But there were also those who began to seek ways to avoid mobilization. This information is unlikely to have left anyone indifferent, but the direction and content of the activity that arose were different and were determined, in the most essential respect, precisely by worldview.

The idea that it is not knowledge in itself, but knowledge in interaction with the subject’s inner world, that gives rise to activity has been emphasized by a number of researchers. Thus, Professor V. P. Tugarinov maintains that there is no proportional dependence between the quantity of information and its content, on the one hand, and the strength and character of activity, on the other. We find this same idea in R. V. Petropavlovsky, who believes that knowledge determines the limits of objectively possible actions, but does not predetermine which particular actions will be undertaken by the individual, since the choice of actions is subjective (within the limits of possibilities)¹⁹. The subjectivity of choice is determined precisely by the content of the worldview or the value-normative basis of all human actions.

It follows from what has been said that worldview plays the role of a certain “filter” for information: it, as it were, separates the significant from the insignificant in information, or, more precisely, creates the significance of information for the individual and determines the measure of this significance. Secondly, worldview plays the role of a kind of regulator, a triggering mechanism of activity: it channels information along a definite course of situational processing for the elaboration of concrete decisions.

¹⁹ See the articles by V. P. Tugarinov and R. V. Petropavlovsky in the collection: Materials of an Interuniversity Scientific Conference…, Kursk, 1968.

An analogous phenomenon also occurs in the case of the activity of social groups of any order, for example, classes or parties. The difference consists only in the fact that, in the case of the organized activity of a group, the processing of information takes place in certain governing centers, which work out the line of conduct of a class or party within the framework of the class’s worldview conceptions, as fixed in programmatic documents; moreover, in people’s consciousness this may be present as the reflection of some more immediate and narrow interest—political or economic. But the decision itself cannot avoid a worldview assessment, even if it is not consciously recognized, because political and economic interests, in one way or another, are anchored in a worldview, in which the most stable aspects of these interests are reflected—that is, the basic features of the given social system and of the position within it of the given class, which do not depend on changing current interests.

From all that has been said, the following general conclusions may be drawn. Worldview, as an aspect of social consciousness, is an essential factor in the social activity both of individual persons and of social groups of any order. The influence of worldview on activity is multivalent and is intertwined with the influence of other factors. However, lawful leading tendencies can be identified. They consist in the fact that a correct worldview is a more stable factor of activity. The scientific worldview of Marxism is a constantly operating factor in the social activity of the masses, the significance of which is continuously increasing. The role of worldview as a factor of activity consists in the fact that it determines the mechanisms for processing information on the basis of which social activity arises or changes.

1. L. I. Brezhnev, For the Strengthening of the Cohesion of Communists, for a New Upsurge of the Anti-Imperialist Struggle. In: “International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ Parties. Moscow, 1969.” Prague, “Peace and Socialism,” 1969, p. 211. ↩

2. See: “Materials of the Twenty-Second Congress of the CPSU.” Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1962, p. 409, and “Materials of the Twenty-Fourth Congress of the CPSU.” Moscow, Gospolitizdat, 1971, p. 83. ↩

3. See: Collection “Materials of the Interuniversity Scientific Conference...,” Kursk, 1968. ↩

4. “Materials of the Interuniversity Scientific Conference on the Growth of the Activity of Social Consciousness in the Period of the Construction of Communism,” Kursk, 1968, p. 69. ↩

5. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 7, p. 344. ↩

6. V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 7, p. 341. ↩

7. W. Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy. Moscow, 1963, p. 175. ↩

8. D. Reynolds. “Freudianism and Neo-Freudianism.” Problems of Peace and Socialism, 1971, No. 11. ↩