THE WORLDVIEW ASPECT OF THE PROBLEM OF THE COMPLETENESS OF LITERARY THEORY

A. A. KORNIENKO

In Soviet philosophical literature of recent years, considerable interest has emerged in the problem of the possibility of obtaining complete knowledge, i.e., of constructing a complete theory of the object of investigation.

Turning to this problem as applied to literary studies is connected with the fact that here the principal philosophical problematics require their own concretization and further creative application. We are speaking of such purely philosophical questions as the relation of the objective and the subjective in literary research, the problem of truth in literary analysis, and, finally, the possibility of the exactness of the science of literature in those relatively closed, completed systems that literary studies of a given epoch represent. The posing and attempted solution of important philosophical questions of literary analysis could play a positive role by freeing the science of literature from bare empiricism. In the work “On the Significance of Militant Materialism,” pointing to the methodological significance of philosophy, V. I. Lenin wrote: “Without a solid philosophical foundation no natural sciences, no materialism, can withstand the struggle against the onslaught of bourgeois ideas and the restoration of the bourgeois worldview”¹. The genuine scientific character of the analysis of any field of human knowledge is directly connected with the degree to which the philosophical spirit has penetrated the science. This also applies to literary studies. The investigation of the possibility of constructing a complete literary theory is a serious worldview problem, whose importance is determined by its close connection with the practical tasks of art and criticism. The question of the possibility of obtaining complete knowledge in literary studies, and the directly related question of the objective criterion of literary criticism, ultimately appears as an attempt to resolve wherein lies the value of art for humanity, what determines the influence of criticism on the mass reader, so varied in social status, and, finally, what constitute the new principles of scientific methodology that could fully correspond to the needs of the scientific analysis of literature.

What has been set forth above explains the topicality of posing the question of a philosophical consideration of the phenomena of literary analysis, and,

¹ V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, vol. 45, pp. 29–30.

first of all, the question of the possibility of constructing a complete theory of literary studies.

However, it should be noted that the problem of obtaining complete knowledge about the object of study has been examined in sufficient detail and breadth only as applied to physical theories. As for literary studies, then, so far as we know, this question has not found reflection in the philosophical literature. Undoubtedly, the problem named, while being generally philosophical, has for each particular science its own specific manner of solution. Nevertheless, the methodological basis of its solution, deriving from a general philosophical, worldview approach and based on the structure of science in general, must be unified. This justifies the possibility of applying to literary studies the methods used to resolve this question with respect to physical knowledge.

As applied to physical science, the question is resolved in the following way:

1. A physical theory is complete if every element of physical reality, being the object of this theory, finds its reflection in it, while supplementing the theory with new ideas independent of it makes it contradictory.

2. The object of study of a physical theory possesses the property of inexhaustibility, understood, on the one hand, as the infinity of the diversity of phenomena and properties inherent in the material world as a whole and in any finite part of it; on the other hand, inexhaustibility is understood as the inexhaustibility of the forms of matter and the laws of its existence.

3. From recognition of the principle of the inexhaustibility of the material world there does not follow the conclusion that it is impossible to construct a complete physical theory. The apparent contradiction between the inexhaustibility of the object and the possibility of constructing a complete theory is dialectical in its basis and is resolved by the fact that a complete theory has the status of relative truth. The basis for the completeness of a physical theory is the relative independence of the circle of phenomena under investigation, a distinctive “closedness” of properties. This closedness of the system of phenomena under investigation allows a complete theory to explain this system from within itself¹.

If the object of study of a physical theory were finite, the question of the completeness of knowledge would be resolved trivially. Only by virtue of the inexhaustibility of the physical object does every physical theory possess the property of relative completeness. Consequently, in order to resolve the question of the possibility of constructing a complete theory in literary studies, it is necessary to establish whether the principle of inexhaustibility is applicable here to the object of study. In other words, is the object of literary studies finite?

As is known, literary studies deals with questions of the history of literature, its theory, and literary criticism. Let us consider what constitutes the object of study of each of the listed elements in the structure of the science of literature. Literary theory studies the general properties of imaginative literature, the character of the literary process, and the features of individual works. Literary criticism has as its task the comprehensive analysis of particular literary phenomena from the standpoint of their ideological and artistic significance for the present. As for the history of literature, in investigating the process of literary development, it determines the place and significance in this process both of con-

concrete literary works and individual writers, as well as various methods, types, and genres.

The object of literary analysis in all cases is an individual work, or the creative output of a writer, or a series of works by various writers; that is, all elements in the structure of literary studies have as the subject of their study artistic material, or theoretical material constructed on the basis of the study of works of art. Thus, the source of information for analysis is always concrete material. There is no fundamental difference between whether an individual work is being studied or whether the creative output of a number of writers united by a literary type, genre, method, or movement is subjected to analysis. In all cases the object of literary research is finite. First, it is finite in terms of the volume of literary material possessed by the researcher. Second, this definite volume of literary material is finite in its content. We shall consider separately the question of the finitude of the content of the object of research, since the content of a work of art in literature includes two moments: 1) information about the events described; 2) the totality of artistic devices used in the work.

The finitude of the factual information and of the set of artistic devices and methods used in a work does not raise any doubt. It should be noted, however, that the specificity of artistic literature as a type of art is achieved by a particular form of organizing information about events through the use of a system of artistic means; therefore, in the overall structure of a work, not one of the components of its content can be metaphysically isolated from its connection with the others. The singling out of moments (1) and (2) in the content of a work of art pursues only one aim—to show more clearly the finitude of the content of the literary object.

Thus, the aesthetic content of a work of art, which is the result of the synthesis of factual information and the system of representational means used by the author, is always finite both by virtue of the reasons indicated above and by virtue of the fact that the volume of aesthetic content is always limited by the author’s conception, the aesthetic ideal from whose standpoint reality is reflected, and, finally, by the framework of the epoch that created the work.

Thus, the history of literature, the theory of literature, and literary criticism study a finite object. Having recognized this, we at the same time discover a contradiction, which consists in the fact that, despite the obvious finitude of the object of research, no less obvious is the relativity of the literary theories constructed with respect to this object. Indeed, how is one to explain the circumstance that seemingly coherent theories are powerless in the attempt to understand a work that opens a new epoch in the development of literature?

The early dramaturgy and stories of M. Gorky, which marked the birth of socialist realism in art, are inexplicable from the theoretical positions of critical realism. It is equally impossible to analyze Nekrasov’s poetry, Shchedrin’s stories, and Lermontov’s dramas within the channel of the sentimentalism that preceded critical realism, and still less that of classicism.

An answer to this question is impossible without considering the general requirements for the completeness of any theory. As was indicated earlier, a theory is complete if it satisfies the requirements of descriptive and deductive completeness. Let us use the definition of descriptive completeness,

given by A. Einstein: “Of every complete theory, it seems to us, the following must be required: every element of physical reality must have a reflection in the physical theory”³).

What, then, is an element of reality in literature? Undoubtedly, it is the work of art. But must all works of art, as elements of literary reality, be described in literary scholarship? What is meant are cases in which a work directly related to the literary style, method, or trend under consideration falls outside the researcher’s field of vision. Does this exclude the possibility of constructing a complete theory in literary scholarship in the descriptive sense? Yes, it does, if the material used by the researcher does not contain objects that in one way or another characterize the essential aspects of a literary trend, genre, or literary epoch as a whole. At the same time, however, there are grounds to suppose that the exclusion of a number of works from analysis does not violate the completeness of the description in a case where the research material includes works that most distinctly reveal their connections with the epoch, the internal movement of literature, and are notable for their influence—that is, works that are the most characteristic and, in a certain sense, viable. L. Tolstoy, as is well known, wrote of Goethe: “He has 32 volumes, I think, and from them one can choose 2, perhaps 3, while the rest is not good at all: his novels, dramatic works. Humanity moves forward and has gone beyond this…”⁴).

For contemporary literary scholarship there is no need to give an evaluation of every one of Derzhavin’s satires or Chenier’s poems. Yet it is known that in the epoch of classicism not one of even the minor works of these major poets was left without attention. It is also known that only those works have preserved their viability which differed from others by the depth of their penetration into social phenomena and human characters. As for works that have ceased to be objects of detailed analysis, they disappeared from research precisely because they contained nothing new in comparison with those that remained; and in this indirect way they remained included in the literary arsenal of the epoch, without thereby violating the requirement of descriptive completeness. Consequently, one may conclude that the requirement of descriptive completeness in literary scholarship can be satisfied. In this case there is no need to include, as objects of study, the entire existing multitude of works. It is enough to consider, as has been said, the most characteristic of them.

As for deductive completeness, then, in accordance with the well-known proposition, from descriptive completeness there necessarily follows deductive completeness. The latter means that the introduction into a theory of new independent ideas, or else the introduction as an object of study of elements of literary reality that have no analogue in the sense of qualitative similarity in the material on the basis of which the literary-theoretical theory has been constructed, must come into contradiction with this theory. Precisely for this reason not one of the works arising in the process of literary creativity can be explained on the basis of theoretical material that characterizes the artistic trends and methods preceding that within whose channel the given work was created.

However, the possibility of constructing a complete theory of literary scholarship—in the descriptive and deductive sense—in the science of literature

³) A. Einstein. “Can the quantum-mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?” Collected Scientific Works, vol. 3, 1966, p. 605.
⁴) N. B. Goldenweiser. Near Tolstoy. Moscow, Goslitizdat, 1959, p. 86.

coexists with the fact that the literary resonance of the works even of great authors is far from identical in different epochs. This makes it possible to believe that a complete theory at the same time possesses the property of relatively complete knowledge. For example, Shakespeare, famous and esteemed today, in the age of classicism was recognized in England itself only as a master of comedy—and, moreover, a master whose mediocrity was beyond doubt. Shakespeare’s tragedies, which later brought the author the glory of a national genius, were not taken into account: they shocked the refined taste of the English aristocracy. A little later, in the 1730s, in France, Voltaire rediscovered Shakespeare for the French. Yet even in his generally high assessment of Shakespeare, he synthesized within himself at times the most contradictory qualities. Shakespeare is “the father of English tragedy,” and he is also “the father of barbarism” that appeared and was legalized in dramaturgy only beginning with Shakespeare. “It seems,” Voltaire wrote, “that Nature was pleased to unite in Shakespeare’s head everything one can imagine of the strongest and the greatest, with everything base and repulsive that can belong to crudity devoid of reason...”⁵. The enthusiastic assessment of Shakespeare by the English Romantics stands in direct contradiction to this⁶.

Let us try to clarify the causes that determine the relativity of literary-critical judgments. The principal one is that literature, as an object of study, is in constant development. Newly emerging literary works give rise to new artistic devices, techniques, methods, and trends, which creates the need to supplement existing theoretical views on literature and to introduce new methods of research. From what has been said it becomes obvious that literary-critical judgment with respect to one and the same work cannot remain unchanged, since the emergence of new trends, methods, and means of analysis makes it possible to determine more precisely the place and role of the work under study in the overall system of literature. However, the development of literature itself is most closely connected with the development of society, with its problems and needs, with the spiritual evolution of society as a whole. This explains the fact that the greatest interest in certain literary works, as well as the fading of interest in them, is a function of the problems posed by society at a historically concrete moment of its development and resolved in one way or another by literature. Changes in public interest in works of art, determined by social needs, are the basis that ensures the difference in critical evaluations of literature and, thereby, the relativity of literary-critical knowledge as a whole. Evaluations arising from social needs “are determined by the distinctive features of the epoch... are objectively determined, and differ for different epochs and classes on objective grounds”⁷. In this respect it should be noted that the difference in literary-critical judgments is not, at the same time, a denial of certain stable principles in literature: the artistic imagery of a work is based on concrete material, the generalization of which is made in accordance with the principles of the author’s aesthetic ideal. What has been said makes unacceptable the position taken by the schools of “new criticism” and “modern interpretation” in bourgeois literary studies. Despite certain differences in theoretical views, both the “interpreters” and the adherents of “new criticism” regard the artistic work—

⁵ K. N. Derzhavin. Voltaire. Moscow, Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR, p. 328.
⁶ M. B. Khrapchenko. Time and the Life of Literary Works. In: The Artistic Perception. Moscow, 1971.
⁷ V. Tugarinov. The Theory of Values in Marxism. Leningrad State University, 1968, p. 53.

...meaning as a certain abstract principle, subject to infinitely diverse interpretation, finding a basis for this in the linguistic model of language.

True, perfect art, according to the interpreters, is devoid of a single meaning; the cognition of it is the cognition of symbols. As for the symbolism of the work as a whole, it is connected with the fact that “the basic brick of the poetic edifice—the word—has not one but several meanings. It gives within us an impulse, as it were, toward a second language, in which the work speaks with us... If the word had only one, dictionary meaning, if a second language did not appear so as to entangle... the exact meaning of words, there would be no literature either”^8).

It is quite obvious that such an approach to research is essentially unacceptable, and this is explained by the fact that the analysis of the concrete historical situation, denied by the “new criticism,” is the original foundation on which literary studies is built; and, as has been pointed out, differing interest does not at the same time exclude a strictly defined meaning of the work, but is only derivative of the problems that arise in society.

Thus, the difference in evaluations of fiction, being dependent on social needs, is the reason that determines the relative character of any theory of literary studies.

The relative character of literary-studies knowledge is also conditioned, to a considerable extent, by the fact that theory in the science of literature as a whole cannot be isolated from the evaluative moment. This circumstance is largely determined by the structure of literary studies itself as a science, by the fact that it unites elements that do not exist separately. Literary theory, literary history, and literary criticism are in direct connection and interaction with one another. Literary theory uses, in its scholarly constructions, the material of literary history, as well as the best critical studies and evaluations. Literary history, based on the material of criticism, brings in the general principles of analysis of the literary process that have been developed by literary theory. As for literary criticism, making use of theoretical-literary material, it relies on historical-literary data, which allows it to clarify the place and role of the work under analysis in the general system of literature. Thus, in a literary-studies judgment there is no impassable boundary between theory proper and evaluation.

Let us indicate the reasons for the relativity of theoretical and evaluative knowledge proper in the science of literature. Owing to the specificity of evaluative judgments, which consists in a certain influence of the subject on the character of the evaluation, one may single out a system of concepts from the standpoint of which the aesthetic significance of literature is determined. It seems possible to assign to this system worldview, aesthetic, moral, and legal norms, ideology—everything that is socially and historically conditioned. What has been listed determines the relative character of evaluation in literary studies, since the concepts named are historically concrete and just as historically changeable. And since theoretical knowledge in literary studies is determined to a significant degree by the character of evaluative knowledge, it is obvious that all the listed factors also influence the character of theoretical knowledge in literary studies, determining its relativity.

^8) E. P. Yurovskaya, “Problems of Artistic Criticism in Contemporary French Bourgeois Aesthetics,” Filosofskie nauki, 1967, No. 4, p. 83.

Taking into account that both the public interest and the subjective factor in the evaluation of belles-lettres ultimately depend on the development of society, one may conclude that the main reason for the relativity of knowledge in the science of literature is the involvement of literature and literary studies in the spiritual evolution of society.

Using what has been said, the following conclusions may be drawn:

1. Unlike the object of study of physical theory, the object of study in literary studies is finite in its content.

2. Within the system of concepts of a particular epoch, a literary theory can be constructed that possesses the properties of descriptive and deductive completeness. At the same time, there is no need to include in the study, as objects, the entire existing set of works. It is sufficient to consider the most characteristic among them. However, such a theory will be complete only in a relative sense.

3. The construction of a complete literary theory in the absolute sense proves impossible because literature, being involved in the spiritual evolution of humanity, reveals its aesthetic possibilities only in history.

4. However, because, like all theoretical knowledge, knowledge in literary studies contains within itself a moment of the absolute, the relation between a relatively complete literary theory and an absolutely complete theory is identical to the relation between absolute and relative truths, and confirms one of the most important worldview propositions of Marxist methodology concerning the relation between the absolute and the relative in scientific cognition.

1. V. S. Gott, E. M. Chudinov, “The Inexhaustibility of Matter and the Development of Physical Knowledge,” Voprosy filosofii, 1969, No. 5. ↩