Proceedings of the Tomsk Polytechnic Institute
of the Order of the October Revolution
and the Order of the Red Banner of Labor
named after S. M. Kirov

Vol. 292　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　1974

On the Content and Scope of Economic Accountability in Scientific Institutions

L. L. Beloborodova

The content of economic accountability in scientific research, as in other spheres of the national economy (in industry, agriculture, construction, etc.), is, in our view, a combination of planned and value-based relations.

To this day, however, among economists studying this complex problem, scholarly debates continue over the question of the essence, the reasons for the existence of economic accountability, and its place in the system of socialist relations of production.

Since there are considerable differences of opinion on these questions among economists engaged with them, the presentation and analysis of various views logically leads to an attempt to substantiate, at least to some extent, one’s own point of view on this problem.

Economic accountability is a complex problem; therefore, naturally, the economic literature contains many works on particular aspects of economic accountability, such as collective and individual material incentives, price, profit distribution, charges for funds, and others. This is understandable. After all, all these aspects are constituent parts of a single system—namely, economic accountability.

Such a line of research, by analyzing in detail particular problems of economic accountability, contributes to the theoretical and practical solution of the problem of economic accountability as a whole. In all the above-mentioned directions of research on the problem of economic accountability there is substantial scholarly material that promotes the development of the theory of economic accountability.

But, in our view, one of the greatest shortcomings in the scientific development of the problem of economic accountability is the unsatisfactory theoretical solution of the problem of economic accountability as a whole. And the lagging state of the theory of economic accountability as a whole hinders the successful solution of the particular problems indicated above.

It is true that in the last decade major scholarly works have appeared in which the problem of economic accountability as a whole is investigated. But even from a purely quantitative standpoint, the literature in which economic accountability as a whole is studied in its theoretical aspect is far too limited in comparison with that in which particular problems and forms of economic accountability are studied.

For a long time economists have argued over whether economic accountability is an objective economic category, or whether it represents one of the elements of economic policy.

After the economic discussion of 1951, the overwhelming majority of economists recognized khozraschet as a category of the political economy of socialism. And at the present time khozraschet is regarded mainly as a method of planned economic management and as an objective economic category of socialism.

It is important for us to clarify what constitutes the essence of khozraschet as an economic category.

There are various points of view on this matter in the economic literature. I. Malyshev and V. Sobol interpret khozraschet as an accounting category. Understanding khozraschet in this way, they cannot conceive of communism without it. “Even under communism,” they write, “economic accounting will be preserved, as the necessity of taking account, at every sector of production, of the expenditures of social labor and its results.”^1 According to this conception, khozraschet is a form devoid of real economic content and performing only technical functions in the accounting of labor expenditures. Therefore the accounting interpretation of khozraschet is incorrect.

S. Tatur and L. Leont’ev see the essence of khozraschet in the coverage of an enterprise’s expenditures by its revenues and in the receipt of profit,^2 i.e., they see it in a method of economic management (in legal form). But the form in which khozraschet appears, and still more its legal form, cannot constitute the essence of khozraschet. On the contrary, the essence of khozraschet determines the forms in which khozraschet appears.

V. Pereslegin sees the essence of khozraschet in its functions.^3 Such a functional interpretation of the essence of khozraschet is also completely unacceptable, for in it the disclosure of the essence of khozraschet is replaced by the forms in which it appears. The positive aspect of this interpretation, in comparison with the accounting one, is that it correctly points to the functions of khozraschet. At the same time, it understands the functions of khozraschet not as accounting-technical, but as economic.

There is also another variant of the functional interpretation of khozraschet—its definition as a way of combining social, collective, and personal economic interests. Such a definition of the essence of khozraschet became widespread under the conditions of the economic reform and is given by B. Rakitskii, A. T. Kulikov, and others.^4

Such a definition of the essence of khozraschet is, in our view, incorrect. We interpret khozraschet as a definite, independent category, while economic interests do not constitute an independent, separate economic category as an object of reproduction. Economic interest is a form of expression of economic relations in motion. Interest acts as the driving force in relations of production. Interest, as it were, “penetrates” and represents a (driving) element in one or another relation of production. Therefore, obviously, it is incorrect to explain the essence of the category of khozraschet by interests.^5

In the economic literature, a commodity interpretation of khozraschet is widely prevalent, i.e., the identification of khozraschet with commodity-money relations. Such an interpretation of khozraschet is given by E. Andreson and L. Galkin.^6 If khozraschet is identified with commodity relations,

^1 I. S. Malyshev, Social Accounting of Labor and Price under Socialism. Sotsekgiz, 1960, p. 69.

^2 S. Tatur, Khozraschet in the Industry of the USSR. Moscow, 1970, p. 43.

^3 V. Pereslegin, “The Essence and Functions of Khozraschet,” Voprosy ekonomiki, 1969, No. 10, p. 42.

^4 Voprosy ekonomiki, 1966, No. 8, p. 146.

^5 V. V. Radaev, Economic Interests under Socialism. Moscow University Press, 1970, pp. 119–120.

^6 E. Andreson, L. Galkin, The Economic Relations of State Enterprises in the Period of the Construction of Communism. Leningrad, 1968, p. 61.

then it should be acknowledged that either commodity relations exist between the state and enterprises, as well as within an enterprise, or economic accountability encompasses only relations between enterprises.

Many authors of textbooks on the political economy of socialism believe that economic accountability expresses a certain aspect of the system of relations between enterprises and the state, between various enterprises, and between enterprises and the collectives of workers employed in them. The main shortcoming of these definitions is that they contain no definition of economic accountability itself. After all, all categories of the political economy of socialism express some particular aspect of production relations. But precisely which aspect of production relations is expressed by economic accountability remains a secret of the authors themselves. Therefore such definitions of economic accountability do not reveal the essence of economic accountability as a specific economic category.

In our view, the following definition of the essence (content) of economic accountability may be given. Economic accountability is a system of interconnected and interdependent socialist planned-compensatory and commodity-equivalent relations between the state and the enterprise, between individual enterprises, and within the enterprise. Such a definition of economic accountability shows not only the commonality of economic accountability with other economic phenomena, but also its distinction, i.e., it shows economic accountability as a specific phenomenon of the socialist economy. The distinctive feature of economic accountability as a specific economic phenomenon, delimiting it from other economic phenomena, consists in the fact that economic accountability expresses not socialist relations in general, but specifically compensatory socialist relations (planned-compensatory and commodity-equivalent).

The essence of economic accountability in scientific research remains the same. But because of the specificity of scientific activity, the forms in which the essence of economic accountability is manifested in scientific research differ from the forms in which economic accountability is manifested in other spheres of the national economy.

Scientific research is divided into three types: theoretical and applied research, and development work. Depending on the type of scientific research, the question of the need to introduce economic accountability is resolved differently. Scientific research of a theoretical nature cannot be encompassed by economic-accountability relations, for labor in it fully appears as directly social. Scientific research of an applied nature may be encompassed by economic-accountability relations, but depending on the character of the applied research there may be full economic accountability here, or incomplete economic accountability (a combination of economic accountability and state-budget financing). Scientific research institutes engaged in the development of interbranch, nationwide, complex problems should be financed from the state budget. Scientific research institutes engaged in the development of branch problems and problems for individual industrial enterprises may operate on full economic accountability and be financed through direct economic contracts and centralized enterprise funds.

According to 1966 data, the actual ratio among sources of financing in branch scientific research institutes engaged mainly in applied research was: direct economic contracts—56%, centralized enterprise funds—2.5%, state budget—42%.¹

Scientific research institutes engaged in development work may be transferred to full economic accountability.

But in practice, research institutes engage not in separate types of scientific research, but sometimes simultaneously in all or two of them (theoretical and applied research, or applied research and development). Therefore, in such cases a research institute should have incomplete economic accountability.

The proposal to expand economic-accountability relations in research institutes to the scale characteristic of material production is inappropriate and theoretically incorrect. Such proposals stem from a misunderstanding of the content (essence) of economic accountability.

In research institutes, by comparison with industrial enterprises, planned-remunerative relations will predominate, since labor in scientific activity is socialized to a greater degree than in industry.

Owing to the specific character of scientific activity (the uncertainty of scientific research—when it is impossible to determine precisely the consumer of its results, and the multiple use of those results, which leads to the possibility of uncompensated consumption of the results of science), new forms of exchange arise in comparison with the exchange customary in material production; equivalent exchange in traditional forms proves impossible.

Some authors, for example, L. Blyakhman² and M. Ring, believe that the establishment of economic accountability in individual branch research institutes is impossible, and is possible only in scientific-production associations. They propose three types of associations: scientific-production, scientific-technical, and educational-scientific.

In individual production, in the opinion of these authors, scientific-production associations should be organized. They represent an association of a research institute and an industrial enterprise that is at the same time both the producing and the experimental enterprise. The leading role in such associations is played by the enterprise.

Scientific-technical associations (firms). This is an association of a research institute carrying out research at all stages and an experimental-industrial enterprise. The leading role here is played by the research institute.

Educational-scientific associations. This is an association of higher educational institutions with research institutes that conduct work under economic contracts. Not only faculty members of the higher educational institution, but also students, may take part in scientific research. These scientific-production and scientific-technical associations should not be confused with industrial associations, which unite a number of industrial enterprises and a scientific organization.

This point of view, in our opinion, is not entirely correct. One cannot deny economic accountability in individual research institutes engaged in applied research and development and at the same time recognize the possibility and necessity of organizing economic accountability in scientific-research associations.

Scientific-research associations represent a higher form of organization of scientific-research activity, one connected with the further development of the productive forces.

An analogous picture may be observed in industry. If one adheres to this conception, then it must be admitted that economic accountability did not exist at individual industrial enterprises, and that now it is carried out only in industrial associations. But practice and theory affirm the opposite: economic accountability at industrial enterprises has existed and does exist. At present in the USSR about 70% of all industrial output is produced by individual enterprises.

True, in the GDR already now ⅔ of all industrial output is produced by production associations. But in our country the process of creating production associations is only beginning, and in the future production associations, just as in the GDR, will produce the main part of industrial output.

Academicians M. A. Lavrent’ev and Mints propose the creation of associations that would constitute an organizational unity of research activity and the activity of industrial enterprises. Thus, for example, Academician M. A. Lavrent’ev advocates the creation of associations including all stages of scientific research, up to the introduction of scientific developments into production.

Academician Mints advocates concentrating theoretical and applied research in research institutes, while development work (one of the types of scientific research) should, in his opinion, be carried out at an industrial enterprise.

In our view, it is difficult to agree fully with such proposals. Research activity is a separate, relatively independent production sphere of activity. The final product of research activity is a mock-up, a drawing, an experimental prototype, and not output introduced on an industrial scale. Mass production is the result of material production, not of research activity. Therefore, if one adheres to this conception, then it must be recognized that research activity is not a separate, relatively independent sphere of human activity. And, moreover, with such an approach to the creation of associations, there will be no objective criterion for assessing the results of scientific research.

Having clarified the essence of economic accountability in scientific research, it is necessary to determine the economic forms in which the essence of economic accountability is manifested, for the forms in which an essence is manifested and the essence itself are not one and the same. In our view, the principal forms in which the essence of economic accountability in scientific research may be manifested are: fulfillment of the plan for themes of scientific work, the wage fund, credit, licenses, economic effect, and funds for material incentives.

But in our economic literature neither the forms in which the essence of economic accountability is manifested, nor, all the more, their quantitative measurement, have yet been defined.

Strelkovskii, for example, considers the expected and actual effect from the introduction of scientific research to be the principal indicator of the activity of a research institute, and the number of publications, authors’ certificates, and patents to be supplementary indicators³.

A. S. Konson proposes an entire system of (20) indicators for evaluating the economic activity of research institutes. L. Blyakhman also proposes an entire system of value and plan indicators. But he considers the presence of profit to be the principal, generalized indicator. In L. Blyakhman’s opinion, it is from profit that the material-incentive fund should be created, theoretical research performed on the initiative of the research institute should be financed, additional equipment should be acquired, and losses from the termination of unpromising themes and claims by customers should be covered.

In our view, profit cannot be the main criterion of the activity of a research institute, as L. Blyakhman asserts. Profit in a research institute is the difference between the actual and the estimated amount. The size of profit in such—

... in what case may speak both of the researchers’ talent and of an inability to estimate the forthcoming costs, and of a deliberate overstatement of the contractual (estimated) sums. And if profit is turned into the chief criterion of an R&D institute’s activity, then the institute will overstate the contractual sums. Profit as the chief criterion also has other shortcomings: if, for one and the same work, an R&D institute receives payment under a contract and a share of the effect from implementation, then an uncompensated flow of funds is created, very advantageous for the R&D institute and disadvantageous for the client enterprise. Therefore, in practice, profit cannot be regarded as the chief criterion of an R&D institute’s activity, for this indicator has a mass of shortcomings. It is theoretically incorrect to regard profit as the chief criterion, since the determining role in cost accounting must be played by planned indicators, not value indicators, which follows from the very nature of cost accounting.

The volume of expenditures, in our opinion, cannot be a criterion for evaluating the activity of sectoral R&D institutes, since the volume of expenditures is in fact not equal to the volume of work performed. In practice, the results of scientific research are equated with expenditures. And in that case economy of expenditures would be regarded as nonfulfillment of the plan, and overspending as overfulfillment of the plan.

In construction, where standard-setting is precise and covers all works, a correspondence is possible between the volume of work performed (results) and expenditures. In R&D institutes, however, there are no such ratios (expressed in the form of norms). Therefore the volume of expenditures cannot be an indicator for evaluating the activity of an R&D institute. Application of the cost criterion is justified in carrying out financial control, in distributing funds among topics, but in no way for evaluating the scientific works themselves and their results.

A. S. Konson, S. G. Strumilin, and others propose as a criterion for evaluating the activity of R&D institutes the number of publications, the degree of citation, and information. The number of publications as an indicator for evaluating the activity of an R&D institute was first proposed by S. G. Strumilin. He proposed calculating the number of publications according to the so-called four-point system⁴. This method did not find application in practice. This criterion can be applied for establishing general scientific regularities, but it cannot be applied at the level of individual R&D institutes. The degree of citation is also applicable, but only for clarifying general regularities. The main shortcoming of this criterion is the presence of a considerable lag between the appearance of publications and the emergence of references to them (usually 5–8 years). An evaluation with a delay of 5–8 years cannot be applied for operational decisions.

Information is the direct product of scientific labor, and not the outcome of productive application. It does not depend on the degree and scale of use, i.e., on factors that do not depend on the information itself. But in practice information, too, is not used for operational decisions.

Credit may be a criterion for evaluating the activity of an R&D institute, since payment for the work of an R&D institute must be made according to final results, and not according to stages of work, as it is at present. Therefore, for the activity of R&D institutes, and consequently also for evaluating the work of R&D institutes, the establishment of credit is necessary.

The next criterion for evaluating the activity of an R&D institute may be the economic effect. The economic effect, in the opinion of N. D. Tyam—

[[unclear: word fragment]] should be the sole criterion of scientific activity.

This is not entirely so, for economic accountability cannot be manifested in any single form, still less in a single value form. Moreover, the economic effect does not directly determine scientific output, but is the result of its use (the result will depend on the field and scale of application, prices, etc., i.e., on factors over which the researcher has no influence). In practice, the economic effect serves neither as a planning nor as a reporting indicator. The selection of subject matter precedes calculations in all cases. Thematic plans are formed on the basis of technical considerations, while the subsequent calculation of the economic effect merely provides an additional argument before higher-level organizations in favor of retaining the selected topics when the plan is approved.

For the time being, the results of calculations of the economic effect are used only as a basis for awarding bonuses to participants in the work and for enhancing the prestige of the institute.

1. B. P. Frolov. Questions of Economic Accountability in Branch Scientific Research Institutes and Design-and-Engineering Organizations. Author’s abstract. Moscow, 1968, p. 5. ↩

2. L. Blyakhman, “Problems of the Economic Accountability of Scientific Institutions,” in: Ways of Increasing the Efficiency and Productivity of Labor (Materials of a scientific-practical conference), Part 2, Novosibirsk, 1969, pp. 55–56. ↩

3. I. K. Strelkovskii, Economic Accountability in Sectoral Research (Design) Organizations and Its Special Features. Abstract of dissertation. L., 1967, p. 9. ↩

4. S. G. Strumilin, On the Methodology of Accounting for Scientific Labor. Academy of Sciences of the USSR, Leningrad, 1932. ↩